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ANALYSIS OF THE TERMS OF BANK LENDING AND RISK MEASUREMENT: 
THREE ESSAYS ON SMALL BUSINESS LOANS 
 
 RAYMOND L. POSEY, JR. 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is a three-part dissertation, which provides a multi-faceted examination of loans and 
lending to small businesses in the US, which are a key source of economic and job 
growth.  From a broad perspective, this work shows the interplay among various terms of 
lending, marked differences in lender behavior based on size and type, and a significant 
role of multiple loans/lenders in explaining loan delinquencies. Essay 1 examines the role 
of loan guarantees in lines of credit grated to small businesses.  The presence of a loan 
guarantee is associated with lower interest rates and smaller lines of credit.  There is 
some evidence that loan guarantees and collateral are substitutes.  Firms with longer 
banking relationships and fewer banking relationships are less likely to have loan 
guarantees applied.  Since there is some evidence of simultaneity in the data, appropriate 
econometric procedures are used to obtain consistent parameter estimates.  Essay 2 
examines differences in terms of lending among two sizes of banks and farm lenders for 
small loans.  Large farm lenders do use more collateral than large bank lenders, but small 
banks use more collateral than small farm lenders.  There is evidence that small banks use 
more collateral than large banks.  All farm lenders appear to use similar levels of 
collateral, whereas small banks use more collateral than large banks.  The determinants of 
collateral differ based on lender characteristics.  For all sizes of farm lenders, the shorter 
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the term of the loan, the more likely the use of non-real estate collateral, and vice versa.   
Essay 3 examines the determinants of farm loan delinquencies, and in particular, the 
influence of multiple loans and multiple lenders on delinquency.  The number of lenders 
used by a borrower, the number of loans, and the product of the two are all positively 
related to loan delinquency.  These factors are at least as significant as standard financial 
ratios in explaining loan delinquency. The most consistent finding regarding farm 
borrower delinquency is that borrowers who have been denied credit in the past five years 
are more likely to have a delinquent loan.  It is also found that borrowers using more 
lenders appear to be able to bargain for lower interest rates.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
     Small business in the United States account for approximately 50% of the economic 
activity and also contributed approximately 50% of the job growth.  In order for these 
organizations to operate and grow, capital in the form of bank loans is essential.  Because 
of the economic importance of small business, agencies, such as the United States Small 
Business Administration (SBA) have been created to support this avenue of economic 
development.  For the same reason, research that develops an understanding of the 
lending process to small businesses can assist borrowers and lenders in working together 
to support business growth. 
     In this study, several aspects of lending to small business are examined.  Businesses 
are categorized as small if they have fewer than 500 employees.  In the first essay (Are 
Loan Guarantees Priced for Small Business Lines of Credit?), the role of loan guarantees 
in small business loans is examined.  Small businesses of all types of are included in the 
study.  While loan guarantees are available from the SBA, the loan guarantees examined 
here are generally not from an agency, but rather are provided by individuals or other 
14 
 
business entities.   
     A specific type of businesses, which is often a small business, is the farm.  In the third 
essay (Credit Scoring Models as Predictors of Farm Loan Delinquency), determinants of 
delinquency of loans to farms are examined.  Neither borrowers nor lenders benefit from 
delinquent roles so and understanding of the factors that contribute to loan delinquency 
should assist both in avoiding these circumstances. 
     The second essay (Non-Price Terms of Lending for Small Business and Farm Loans) 
examines the interplay among the terms of lending and also the external credit 
environment.  Four types of lenders are examined: large and small farm lenders and large 
and small banks.  Small commercial loans (<$100,000) are examined within each of the 
categories of lenders.  Contemporaneous relationships among terms of lending are 
examined as well as those with time lags.   This study is a bridge between the first and 
third essays as it provides an understanding of how difference types and sizes of lenders 
manage the same type of loans. 
 
1.2. Background on Commercial Lending 
     Compared to mortgage and consumer lending, commercial loans tend to be 
substantially larger and more complex contracts. This greater complexity arises due to the 
unique cash flows and credit requirements of the borrower. Firms of difference sizes 
operating in different industries have unique financing requirements. For example, some 
have greater need for short term working capital while others have greater intermediate 
and long term financing needs.  Revolving lines of credit are designed to be a flexible 
credit arrangement to be used when the borrower is not certain of the amount and timing 
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of their credit requirements. A prearranged line of credit (LOC) assures the borrower that 
at least a minimum of amount of credit will be available over a given period of time on 
predetermined terms as long as certain loan covenants are met. These predetermined 
terms include the level and nature of the borrowing rate (fixed or floating), compensating 
balance requirements, plus origination and commitment fees.  
     The bank normally has a target or required rate of return which is designed to: 
1) cover the marginal cost of funding the loan, 2) cover the costs associated with making, 
administering, and monitoring the loan, 3) generate an appropriate return on equity, and 
4) and include both maturity and credit risk premiums as appropriate. How the bank 
achieves it target rate is often open to negotiation with the borrower. For example, the 
bank may prefer to make a non-revolving term loan with a variable interest rate, and a 
substantial compensating balance requirement. On the other hand, the borrower may 
prefer a more flexible revolving line of credit with a fixed interest rate, low commitment 
fees, and little or no compensating balance requirements. All of the terms are 
theoretically open to negotiation between the bank and the borrower. In general, the bank 
is satisfied if it achieves its target rate of return.  For example, in Table 1-I, assume that a 
bank has an average return on its loan portfolio of approximately 7.30%. In Table 1-I, 
three alternative combinations of contract rate, commitment fees, and compensating 
balances can be used to generate the required return of 7.30%. To illustrate, assume a 
borrower is considering taking out a one-year $1,000,000 LOC. The following three sets 
of lending terms all achieve the same estimated yield (7.30%). In the case of lending 
terms #1 vs. lending terms #3, the borrower with loan # 1 wants a substantially lower 
explicit borrowing rate (4.25% vs. 5.75%) but is willing to pay a larger commitment fee 
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and maintain a larger compensating balance requirement to achieve this goal. 
 
TABLE 1-I. – Effective Interest Rate Comparisons 
Loan Terms                               Loan # 1                 Loan #2             Loan #3           
Amount:                                  $1,000,000              $1,000,000         $1,000,000 
Term:                                      1-Year LOC             1-Year LOC      1-Year LOC   
Contract rate:                               4.25%                       5.00%               5.75%                                             
Risk Premium                              1.00%                       1.00%               1.00% 
Adjusted rate:                               5.32%                       6.08%               $6.84        
Commitment fee on: 
     Total LOC:                                 .80%                          0.40%               0.00%      
     Unused portion of LOC             .60%                           0.40%              0.20%       
 
Compensating Balance on: 
     Total Commitment:                  5.0 %                          4.0%                3.0%    
     Borrowings (Draw-downs)       4.0%:                         3.00%.              2.% 
Estimated average usage:             75%                            75%                 75%                    
Reserve requirement                    10%                            10%                 10%  
Estimated Yield                             7.30%                          7.30%               7.30% 
 
     Securitization is the process of making a large number of loans, packaging these loans 
and issuing securities against this bundle or pool of loans. The cash flows from the pool 
of loans are allocated to different investor classes (tranches) which have unique expected 
cash flows. The securitization process involves a number of different players. The 
originator initially funds and possibly services the loans. The pool of loans is then sold to 
a trust. The trustee manages the process and arranges for credit enhancement as needed, 
an underwriter assists in the sale of mortgage back securities, and the rating agency 
supply a rating for the securities. Banks can either originate the loan themselves or buy it 
from another lender (i.e. a mortgage broker). Asset-backed securities created through this 
process are then sold to a broad range of investors with unique risk and return 
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requirements. The securitization process has revolutionize bank lending in that it allows 
banks to lend a much greater volume of the loans without incurring the substantial costs 
associated with holding the loans on the balance sheet for long periods of time. In 
addition, it provide the bank a flexible interest rate risk gap management tool where it can  
sell certain types of loans when it wants to adjust the duration of its assets to more closely 
match the duration of its liabilities. When loan are sold the originating bank often retains 
the servicing rights which augments the banks non-interest income.    
     In addition to removing risk from the balance sheet, another important goal is to 
reduce the cost of lending following a lend-and-hold vs. a lend-and-sell strategy. Many of 
the costs of the lend-and-hold strategy are hidden. For example, the costs of lending 
obviously includes the marginal cost of funding the loans, 4.5%, but also the required 
reserve ratio (10%), the bank’s capital to asset ratio (8.0%), the cost of deposit insurance, 
0.083%, the bank’s income tax rate (30%), the cost of originating and servicing the loan 
per dollar of assets funded (1.5%), and the expected loan loss rate (0.5%). In this 
example, the total cost of holding the loan on the balance sheet is substantially higher  
(8.4%) than the marginal coast of raising the funds (4.5%)1. Thus, the final cost of 
lending and loan ownership is almost 60% higher in relative terms than the explicit rate 
associated with funding the loan (8.4% vs. 4.5%). 
     While securitization provides many advantages there are some limitations or 
                                                 
1 At least this true before the current sub-prime mortgage meltdown where investors seem to care little 
about the credit risk of the underlying assets which backed the securities they purchased. 
 
2 At least this true before the current sub-prime mortgage meltdown where investors seem to care little 
about the credit risk of the underlying assets which backed the securities they purchased.                    
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drawbacks. For example, the lender is constrained to some degree in setting the terms and 
conditions for the loans it intends to sell.  The market likes and rewards loan pools which 
are relatively homogenous, since this homogeneity makes the cash flows from the pool  
more predictable and hence easier to value.  Furthermore, the market generally prefers to 
purchase pools of loans which have low default risk which also makes the cash flows 
more predictable and reduces the cost of purchasing a third default guarantee2. Thus, 
there may be a tendency to sell the higher quality loans and retain the lower quality loans 
in the bank’s portfolio.      
 
1.3. Summary of Findings 
1.3.1. Essay 1: Are Loan Guarantees Priced for Small Business Lines of Credit?  
     This study attempts to explain the role of loan guarantees when used in small business 
lines of credit.  More specifically, it examines the interplay among loan guarantees, 
collateral, interest rate, and relative size of the line of credit.  Consistent with the concept 
of the interplay among the terms of lending, other research, and this study, has found the 
terms of lending to be determined simultaneously.  Therefore, two stage estimation 
procedures are used.  For the empirical analysis, the 2003 Survey of Small Business 
Finances (available from the Federal Reserve Board) is used. 
     This study finds that loan guarantees are not explained by the presence of collateral, 
the interest rate, or the size of a line of credit.  However, the presence of a loan guarantee 
is associated with lower interest rates and smaller lines of credit.  There is some evidence 
that loan guarantees and collateral are substitutes.  Smaller firms and those with limited 
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liability legal forms are more likely to have loan guarantees applied to lines of credit.  
Firms with longer relationships with the lender and firms with a smaller number of 
banking relationships are less likely to have loan guarantees.  Other firm characteristics 
such as leverage, liquidity, and fixed asset intensity also explain the presence of loan 
guarantees.  These results may indicate that loan guarantees are more a characteristic of 
lending policy rather than a non-price term of lending based on specific borrowers or loan 
characteristics. 
     Two additional variables are included in this study, which that have not been used in 
the prior, cited research.  The strength of the banking relationship is often measured by 
the length of the relationship.  This study uses that measure also and adds the number of 
bank relationships that each firm has with.  Firms with more banking relationships may 
have weaker relationships, but may be able to negotiate better lending terms.  Firms with 
more banking relationships are more likely to have loan guarantees and pay higher 
interest rates, but findings consistent with the notion that weaker banking relationships 
may lead to the more frequent use of loan guarantees and higher interest rates.   
     Because of the expected interplay among loan guarantees, collateral, interest rate, and 
loan size during loan negotiations, a variable added is the ratio of the dollar value of 
credit granted scaled by the requested amount.  Higher values of this ratio are associated 
with a higher likelihood of a loan guarantee but a lower likelihood of a collateral 
requirement.  The ratio does not explain the interest rate or the relative size of the loan. 
 
1.3.2. Essay 2: Non-Price Terms of Lending for Small Business and Farm Loans 
     Collateral is a common feature of bank loans that can reduce both the probability-of-
20 
 
default (PD) and the loss- given-default (LGD) to the lender and attempt to control 
asymmetric information between lender and borrower.  The empirical evidence regarding 
the role of collateral is mixed.  Given the previous mixed empirical findings, the 
following questions will be addressed in this study:  (1) What are the differences in the 
terms of lending between small business commercial loans and similar (non-real estate) 
loans to farmers, and how do these differences vary over time?; (2) In particular, how are 
loan risk, collateral, and interest rates related for these two different types of farm and 
non-farm borrower?; and (3) How are these lending term relationships affected by the 
size of the lender?  Three data sources are used in this study, all of which are available 
from the US Federal Reserve Board.  They are (1) E.2 Survey of Terms of Business 
Lending; (2) E.15 Agricultural Finance Databook; (3) Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey on Bank Lending Practices.  The time frame is 1999Q4 until 2009Q1, which is 
the longest period for which all common variables of interest are available.   
     Large farm lenders do use more collateral than large commercial banks, but small 
commercial banks use collateral more frequently than small farm lenders.  Hence, the 
relationship varies by the type and size of the lender. 
     For non-real estate loans, farm lenders can require either real estate or other assets 
(non-real estate) to be pledged as collateral.  It is founds that the shorter the term of the 
loan the more likely the use of non-real estate collateral. It also appears that as maturities 
lengthen real estate is more often used as collateral among farm lenders.  Given the 
indefinite life of real estate, this finding is suggests that farm lenders match the length of 
loans with the longevity of the assets used for collateral. 
     A variable which captures the general credit conditions among lenders is used in this 
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research.  It can be argued that it may be exogenous because it reflects general 
macroeconomic conditions, or it may be endogenous and largely reflect the composition 
of a lender’s loan portfolio.  Most results here suggest those standards are exogenous.  
However, the cases where other variables explain standards (contemporaneously or with 
a time lag) are also of interest.  Loan risk is negative and significant in explaining 
collateral for large banks, but is not significant in any other of the OLS equations.  One 
and two lags of loan risk are positive and significant in the credit standards VAR (vector 
auto regression) equation for large farm lenders.  Risk Granger causes changes in lending 
standards for small commercial banks.  All of these results suggest that changes in 
lending standards are made in response to changes in the risk of the loan portfolio, as 
would be expected of lenders.  In these situations, credit standards appear to be 
endogenous.  The fact that credit standards is not significant in any of the OLS results, 
but is often significant in the VAR analysis and Granger causality tests, suggests that 
there are time lags in the lender’s response to changes in credit standards.  Outstanding 
loan commitments may also play an important role since these loan terms are negotiated 
before the loan is made.  One lag of credit standards is significant in the VAR model in 
the loan commitment equation for small commercial banks.  Maturity has 
contemporaneous explanatory power in the use of collateral in both sizes of farm lenders, 
and in either case, as maturity increases less non-real estate collateral is used.  On the 
other hand, for small banks longer maturities are associated with the use of more  
collateral.   
     In summary, while this research does not completely explain the use of collateral, is 
does support the notion that it is a complex relationship that varies with the type of lender 
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and the size of the lender and strongly supports the endogenous modeling approach 
employed in Essay 1.  
  
1.3.3. Essay 3: Credit Scoring Models as Predictors of Farm Loan Delinquency 
     Four questions are addressed in this research:  (1) Do the financial ratios used by 
Moody’s for small private firms and those recommendation by FFSC (Farm Financial 
Standards Council) explain loan delinquencies?; (2) Are borrowers who have had 
difficulty getting credit in the past more likely to be delinquent on their current loan(s)?;   
(3) Are delinquent borrowers more likely to have a larger number of outstanding loans 
and deal with a greater number of lenders than non-delinquent borrowers?; and (4) Can 
borrowers using multiple lenders negotiate more favorable lending terms such as lower 
effective interest rates and  longer maturity loans?  The data used is the 2006 and 2007 
ARMS (Agricultural Resource Management Survey) data provided by the United States 
Department of Agriculture through its Economic Research Section. 
     The financial ratios used fall mainly into the five categories of liquidity, solvency, 
repayment capacity, efficiency, and profitability.  Typically, at least one ratio in each of 
the first three categories is significant.  Measures of efficiency are generally not 
significant.  Where there are multiple ratios in each category in a single model, multi-
colinearity is present to a significant degree so parsimonious models were used that 
consist of only once ratio per category.  In general, it appears that a select set of FFSC 
ratios are more suited for farms than the Moody’s ratios for small business, at least for 
the purpose of explaining loan delinquency. 
     The number of loans and lenders does have explanatory power for loan delinquencies 
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and loan interest rates.  For 2007 only, the likelihood of delinquency increases as the 
number of lenders increases.  The number of loans is not significant.  However, using 
2006 data, the number of loans and the interaction of loans and lenders are both 
significant, while the number of lenders is not.  Pooled results using 2006 and 2007 data 
match the 2006 results.  Clearly, as the number of loans and lenders increases, the 
likelihood of delinquency increases, irrespective of the level of debt.  However, it is not 
entirely clear whether the number of loans or lenders is most influential.  The product of 
the two variables is consistently significant. 
     Credit denial in the past five years is the most consistent explanation of current loan 
delinquencies.  A priori, it was not clear whether this variable would have a positive or 
negative sign.  One explanation is that borrowers that have had difficulty getting credit in 
the past are more likely to continue to struggle financially, so the sign should be positive.  
However, it is also possible that borrowers that have had prior credit difficulties may 
reform their behavior in order to get credit in the future.  Based on this study, prior credit 
denial explains loan delinquencies and strongly suggests that prior credit denial is an 
important determinant of loan delinquency.  Based on these results, credit difficulties are 
persistent. 
     The number of lenders plays a role in determining the interest rate on loans.  Farms 
using more lenders have a significantly lower average interest rate.  This is true in the 
2006, 2007, and pooled analyses.  This finding supports the idea that borrowers are able 
to use competition among lenders to negotiate lower interest rates.  The number of loans 
and the loan/lender interaction variable are never significant when the weighted average 
interest rate is the dependent variable. 
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     Using the 2007 survey data, both the number of lenders and the number of loans are 
positively associated with the average term of the debt.  All three variables are significant 
at the 5%, but only the number of lenders is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Prior credit denial is not a factor in the weighted average term of the loan.  The size of the 
farm (in total assets) is also not significant.  Measures of efficiency affect the term of the 
loan and higher levels of efficiency are associated with shorter term debt.  Limited 
liability organizations have shorter term debt.  Farms with higher liabilities, relative to 
assets, have longer term debt, perhaps because of higher level of liabilities.  The liquidity 
position of the farm does not explain the term of its debt.   
     Overall, either set of financial ratios is helpful in explaining farm borrower 
delinquencies, but many of the factors are not always significant.  When multiple 
measures in each category are used, multi-colinearity can confound the results, so simple 
models are most effective.  The five categories of liquidity, solvency, repayment 
capacity, efficiency, and profitability seem appropriate.  There are 11 financial measures 
that are significant at least once.  At least one measure in each of the five major 
categories is significant at least once.  Difficulty with getting credit seems to be persistent 
as the most consistent explanation for loan delinquency is prior credit denial.   
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CHAPTER II 
ESSAY 1: ARE LOAN GUARANTEES PRICED FOR SMALL BUSINESS LINES OF 
CREDIT? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
     Numerous authors have investigated the importance of banking relationships in 
lending to small businesses.  A major issue is the relative difficulty in obtaining 
meaningful information and accurately assessing the credit worthiness of such borrowers.  
For this reason, many authors have examined the influence of this relationship on various 
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aspects of line of credits made.  For example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that small 
firm borrowing is concentrated, indicating a benefit to a banking relationship.  They 
conclude that there is value to the banking relationship, more for the availability of credit 
than for a lower cost of debt.  Brick, Kane, and Palia (BKP2003) study the 
interrelationship between interest rate, fees, and collateral in small business loans.  All 
three of these factors, in principle, can be negotiated simultaneously with the bank to 
address the risks inherent in the loan, and evidence of jointness is found. 
     Not included in the BKP2003 study is the influence of loan guarantees on the terms of 
the line of credits.  Loan guarantees can introduce a moral hazard at the bank because in 
the presence of a guarantee, the bank could relax lending standards knowing that it is not 
fully exposed to the risk of default because of the guarantee.  Loan guarantees can also be 
used as a policy tool to avoid credit rationing that may naturally occur, as discussed by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  In the United States, the US Small Business Administration 
(SBA) was created to assist small businesses and represents one source of loan 
guarantees for small businesses. 
     Small businesses in the US are responsible for approximately half the economic 
activity and more than 50% of the job growth.  The SBA has been making loan 
guarantees for small businesses since 1953, consistent with the importance of small 
businesses to the US economy.  It has operated since 1953 by providing direct loans and 
guaranteed loans to small businesses.  During the decade of the 1990’s, the SBA helped 
435,000 small businesses obtain $94.6 billion in loans.  Currently, more than $10 billion 
in loan guarantees are made annually by the SBA. 
    The focus of this research is on the effect loan guarantees have on the interest rates 
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charged and the size of lines of credit.  Two questions will be addressed.  First, what are 
the factors associated with the use of loan guarantees?  Secondly, to what extent does the 
presence of a loan guarantee affect the interest rate charged and the size of the line of 
credit?  Along with these variables, this study will also include the effects of collateral 
and compensating balances on the terms of line of credits. 
     It is possible that the existence of a line of credit guarantee would lower the bank’s 
evaluation of the risk of the line of credit, since its loss given default would be lower in 
the presence of a guarantee.  Similarly, this is the same argument for the use of collateral, 
so in this case, loan guarantees and collateral may operate as substitutes, as suggested by 
some authors.  Conversely, it is also possible that a lender may incur higher 
administrative expenses associated with lending when a guarantee is present, thereby 
raising the interest rate.   
     This study finds that loan guarantees are not explained by the presence of collateral, 
the interest rate, or the size of a line of credit.  However, the presence of a loan guarantee 
is associated with lower interest rates and smaller lines of credit.  There is some evidence 
that loan guarantees and collateral are substitutes.  Smaller firms and those with limited 
liability legal forms are more likely to have loan guarantees applied to lines of credit.  
Firms with longer relationships with the lender and firms with a smaller number of 
banking relationships are less likely to have loan guarantees.  Other firm characteristics 
such as leverage, liquidity, and fixed asset intensity also explain the presence of loan 
guarantees.   
     With regard to the initial interest rate, this study finds that loan guarantees, larger 
firms, higher fees, shorter lender relationships, and fewer banking relationships are all 
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associated with lower initial interest rates.  The use of collateral and the presence of a 
compensating balance are not significant in setting the interest rate.  Fixed rate loans have 
a higher interest rate than variables rate loans, consistent with the higher risk to the lender 
in the event prevailing rates increase during the term of the loan agreement.   
     Based on earlier research, it would also be expected that larger loans would be 
explained by the presence of a loan guarantee.  However, in this study the presence of a 
loan guarantee is associated with smaller lines of credit.  The presence of collateral and 
compensating balances do not significantly explain the size of the line of credit.  Loan 
size is also explained by the size of the firm, with larger firms obtaining smaller loans 
(relative to the asset base of the firm), which perhaps is simply a size effect, that is larger 
firms require proportionately smaller lines of credit.  The length of the banking 
relationship is associated with smaller lines of credit.   
     Collateral is more likely on large loans, and is less likely in the presence of a loan 
guarantee or on higher interest rate loans.  Firms with more fixed assets are less likely to 
have a requirement for collateral.  Consistent with Chakraborty and Hu (2006), who find 
that longer relationships allow banks to reduce collateral requirements for lines of credit, 
firms with longer lender relationships are less likely to have a collateral requirement.  
This is inconsistent with the findings of Brick and Palia (2007) who find no significance 
to the length of the relationship. However, all of the significant relationship effects, 
whether on collateral, loan guarantees, interest rate, or loan size are all economically 
small. 
     Two additional variables are included in this study, which that have not been used in 
the prior, cited research.  The strength of the banking relationship is often measured by 
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the length of the relationship.  This study uses that measure also and adds the number of 
bank relationships that each firm has with.  Firms with more banking relationships may 
have weaker relationships, but may be able to negotiate better lending terms.  Firms with 
more banking relationships are more likely to have loan guarantees and pay higher 
interest rates, but findings consistent with the notion that weaker banking relationships 
may lead to the more frequent use of loan guarantees and higher interest rates.   
     Because of the expected interplay among loan guarantees, collateral, interest rate, and 
loan size during loan negotiations, a variable added is the ratio of the dollar value of 
credit granted scaled by the requested amount.  Higher values of this ratio are associated 
with a higher likelihood of a loan guarantee but a lower likelihood of a collateral 
requirement.  The ratio does not explain the interest rate or the relative size of the loan. 
     The findings described above are based on empirical analysis using the 2003 Survey 
of Small Business Finances using a set of simultaneous equations, similar to the method 
used by Brick and Palia (2007). 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
     Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) discuss the conditions under which credit rationing may 
occur in markets under equilibrium conditions.  The authors suggest that interest rates 
alone may not be sufficient to screen applicants and distinguish good and bad borrowers.  
They postulate that expected bank returns may reach a maximum at some interest rate 
and decline at higher rates because of expected higher rates of default.  A similar 
argument is made for collateral requirements.  They conclude that credit rationing may be 
expected for banks, especially under conditions of imperfect and limited information, a 
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typical aspect of lending to small businesses.  Using interest rates alone to screen 
applicants also may introduce an adverse selection problem in that only the riskiest 
borrowers may agree to such high interest rates.    
     Because of the recognized importance of small businesses to overall national 
economic development and recognizing the possible credit rationing behavior, many 
nations have introduced loan guarantee programs for small business to counter the 
expected credit rationing behavior of banks. 
     A number of authors examine the effects of loan guarantee programs.  Camino and 
Cardone (1999) suggest that policy-makers view loan guarantees as substitutes for 
collateral.  The guarantees are then made to induce lenders to lend, absent normal levels 
of collateral.  Their study summarizes a number of European loan guarantee programs 
and provides a framework for further study, but does not reach specific conclusions about 
the costs or effectiveness of such loan guarantee programs. 
     Riding and Haines (2001) survey previous attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of 
loan guarantee programs and note widely differing rates of default among national 
programs.  They go on to examine the Canadian experience with its loan guarantee 
program and find it to be quite cost effective.  They find higher default rates among 
newer firms and varying rates of default by industry.  They also find that lenders are quite 
sensitive to the size, or percentage, of the loan that is guaranteed, so small changes in the 
level of the guarantee would be expected to alter default rates.  
     Cowling and Mitchell (2003) study the loan guarantee program in the UK.  They find 
that default rates are positively related to interest rates, consistent with the Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) expectation.  However, the default rates do not vary with the government 
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premium.  They also find that default rates are affected by other variables, including the 
size of the loan, its purpose, the legal form of the borrower, the age of the firm, the term 
of the loan, and the location of the business. 
     Glennon and Nigro examine SBA 7(a) loan guarantees in the US.  They first compare 
the default rate of small business loans to other traded debt securities and conclude that 
the default rate falls between Ba/BB and B rated corporate bonds, as rated by Moody’s 
and S&P.  These are below investment grade, but are of similar default risk as a large 
number of corporate loans held by banks.  They find that newer firms have a higher rate 
of default than older firms and larger firms have a higher default rate than smaller firms.  
Higher guarantee percentages were associated with higher default rates.  They also found 
that lenders did not price loans based on risk during the sample period (1983 – 1998). 
     Doh and Ryu (2004) study loan guarantees among Korean chaebol.  Within the 
chaebol, there is better information and between the borrower and lender (asymmetric 
information) and they suggest that the issuance of a loan guarantee by one member on 
behalf of another is a positive signal regarding the borrower to an outside lender.  They 
further summarize research by Lee and Lee (1998) which indicates that corporate loan 
guarantees lead to higher debt to equity ratios and suggest firms within chaebols over-
borrow because of the availability of these affiliate guarantees.  In addition, they suggest 
that guarantors extract a fee for providing the guarantee, which can be viewed as a form 
of transfer pricing.  They further note that this practice provides perverse incentives to the 
participants. 
     Chakraborty and Hu (2006) study collateral for lines of credit and non-lines of credit.  
They find that the length of the banking relationship is negatively related to the amount 
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of collateral required and suggest this result stems from the special knowledge lender 
have of informationally opaque small firms, an understanding developed ruing a long 
banking relationship.   
     The above reviews a number of studies that examine default rates and the 
governmental cost and effectiveness of loan guarantee programs.  The focus of this study 
is on the interest rate and loan size decisions in the presence of a loan guarantee. 
     Brick and Palia (2007) examine the interdependence of interest rates, collateral, and 
fees using the 1993 Survey of Small Business Finances for small business lending in the 
US.  They found evidence that these variables are jointly determined (endogenous) and, 
therefore, use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure to analyze the data.  They 
found a positive correlation among all three.  Further, the duration of the banking 
relationship was not found to be significant, as would be expected for relationship-based 
lending for small, informationally opaque borrowers.  A major contribution of this work 
is the finding that there does appear to be jointness in the way these loan parameters are 
set, so single equation, rather than simultaneous, studies may produce inaccurate or 
misleading results.  A factor not considered in the Brick and Palia (2007) study nor the 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006) study was the effect of a loan guarantee, which is the focus 
of this study. 
 
2.3. Methodology 
     There are three endogenous hypothesis variables in this study, representing the 
presence of a loan guarantee, initial interest rate, and the size of the line of credit.  
Control variables are included to capture effects that have been previously observed in 
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other research.  The include such effects as relation length, firm characteristics including 
leverage, cash, and the proportion of fixed assets, the legal form of the firm, the number 
of exiting lines of credit, the number of lenders dealt with, whether the owner is an active 
manager, and the industry affiliation based on two-digit SIC codes.  
     Four basic equations will be used to explore this topic.  Their general form is shown 
below. 
 
(1) LOCG = α11 + β11RATE + β12LSIZEP + β13COLLAT +  β1nCV + ε1 
 
(2) RATE = α21 + β21LOCG + β22LSIZEP + β23COLLAT +  β2nCV + ε2 
 
(3)  LSIZEP = α31 + β31RATE + β32LOCG + β33COLLAT + β3nCV + ε3 
 
(4) COLLAT = α31 + β31RATE + β32LOCG + β33LSIZEP + β3nCV + ε3 
Where: 
LOCG is binary and indicates the presence of a loan guarantee 
RATE is the initial line of credit interest rate 
LSIZEP is the size of the line of credit as a proportion of firm assets 
COLLAT is binary and indicates the presence of a collateral requirement 
CV is the vector of control variables (see Table 1-I for descriptions) 
      
     The three equations will first be applied to the 2003 survey.  Note that the LOCG 
variable is dichotomous, so that equation (1) is estimated using a logistic procedure.  
Ordinary least squares will be used for the other two equations.  Different authors have 
treated one of more of these same data sets differently.  Chakraborty and Hu (2006) 
assume the variable are exogenous and use typical estimation procedures.  Brick and 
Palia (2007) argue that the terms of credit lines are set jointly, and therefore, the 
estimation technique must assume a system of simultaneous equations.  In this study, the 
existence of simultaneity will be tested before proceeding with a similar, 2SLS approach 
as was performed by Brick and Palia (2007). 
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     Because of the use of the logistic regression for equation (1), the existence of 
simultaneity will be tested using a Hausman test in which RATE and LSIZEP 
individually on all exogenous variables.  The residuals from these two equations are then 
included, one at a time, as dependent variables in regressions where the dependent 
variables are each of the other two hypothesis variables.  If the coefficient of the residual 
is significant at the 5% level, then the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous is 
rejected and a simultaneous method of estimation will be used for further analysis.  A 
two-stage procedure will be used for analyzing equations with simultaneity. 
     For the simultaneous equation method, each of the three hypothesis variables will be 
regressed on all exogenous variables, including all control variables.  Then, the predicted 
values from these first stage regressions will be used as independent variables, replacing 
the respective original variable in the right hand side of equations 1–3.  Variables not 
found to be consistently significant in the initial regressions are omitted from the second 
stage analysis.  SAS SYSLIN procedure will be used where the two continuous variables 
are the dependent variable.  An instrumental variable for the binary LOCG will be 
developed using a Logit procedure and will be added to the model for the other two. 
     When the binary LOCG variable is the dependent variable, the predicted values for 
RATE and LSIZEP will be taken from reduced form equations and added to the right 
hand side of the second stage logistic procedure. 
     Loan guarantees can be viewed as reducing the loss given default for the lender, so to 
the extent that the interest rate reflects anticipated losses, then loans with credit 
guarantees should have lower interest rates.  Since some authors suggest collateral 
provides a similar function, then collateral also should reduce the interest rate.  It can be 
35 
 
argued that loan guarantees from other corporate entities or government agencies may 
add administrative costs and possibly raise the interest rate.  However, the premise here is 
that loan guarantees will reduce the interest rate on lines of credit, all other factors being 
equal.  Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
     H1:  The interest rate charged on lines of credit will be lower in the presence of a     
     loan guarantee.  Similarly, the presence of collateral will also lower the interest    
     rate. 
      
     Secondly, it is expected that the presence of a loan guarantee offers the possibility of a 
larger line of credit, for similar reasons.  The bank could be expected to recover in the 
event of default.  One factor not included in this data set is whether loan guarantees cover 
100% or some smaller amount of the total line of credit.  However, on the basis that the 
presence of a loan guarantee protects the lender in the event of default and consistent 
with the over-borrowing behavior within Korean chaebols when loan guarantees are 
readily available, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
     H2:  The size of a line of credit is larger in the presence of a loan guarantee.       
     Likewise, collateral is expected to have the same effect. 
 
2.4. Data 
     The data source is the 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBF), available 
from the US Federal Reserve Board.  A total of 4,240 firms and 1972 variables are 
included in the 2003 survey.  There is a wide range of data available, ranging from 
dichotomous variables to numeric values.  For this study, a subset of the data was used 
which includes only firms that whose most recent loan was a line of credit.  Mach and 
Wolken (2006) report that 34.3% of firms in the 2003 survey have lines of credit.  This is 
the highest proportion, by loan type, of any financial service included in the surveys, 
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which is the reason for this selection. 
     A listing of the definitions of variables used in this study is provided in Table 2-I. 
Variables with unreasonable or impossible values (e.g. a negative cash balance) were 
treated as missing and not used for analysis.  In addition, there are also a number of 
missing observations for some of the variables.  Missing variables were not estimated, 
and those observations were eliminated from the analysis. 
     Table 2-II provides descriptive statistics for the variables used.  There are 
approximately 1460 observations available for most of the variables in this subset 
containing all recent lines of credit.  Approximately 63.7% of all lines of credit have loan 
guarantees.  The average initial interest rate is 5.548%.  The mean term is just under 31 
months.  The average size of the line of credit scaled by total assets is 66.1%.  The firms 
average over 17 years of age.  They deal with 3.87 lenders each.  Almost 80% of the 
firms have a limited liability legal form (subchapter S, C, or are LLC’s).  Collateral was 
required in 51% of the loans, while compensating balances were required on less than 9% 
of the lines of credit.  Eighty-three percent of the firms have the owner as manager.  
Binary variables were used to capture the industry sector based on 2-digit SIC codes.  Of 
the industries represented, 1% were in the mining industry, 8.2% in construction, 15.8% 
in manufacturing, 4.1% in transportation, 8.6% in wholesale, 16.4% in retail, 42.5% in 
insurance, and 3.4% in services, which was used as the base (no binary variable for 
services to avoid perfect multi-colinearity).  None of the firms had previously filed for 
bankruptcy and none had been delinquent on loans.  The preponderance of the lines of 
credit established was initiated in 2003, with a few exceptions. 
     Small businesses are defined by the US government as those having fewer than 500 
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employees.  In this study, the average business has approximately 52 employees, has    
assets of approximately $6.2 million. of cases.   
     A correlation matrix for the variables is provided in Table 2-III.  The majority of the 
correlation coefficients are below 20%.  The presence of loan guarantees (LOCG) is 
positively correlated with the binary LIMLIAB.  FEES and RATE are positively 
correlated at 28%.  Firm age (FAGE) and firm size are positively correlated at 33%.  The 
number of financial institutions dealt with is positively correlated with firm size (34%).  
Firms tend to develop longer relationships (RELATE) as the firm itself is older (FAGE).  
These two variables are positively correlated (30%).  The number of employees 
(EMPLOY) is positively correlated with firm size (FSIZE) with a correlation coefficient 
of 59%.  The presence of an owner/manager is negatively correlated with firm size  
(-31%).    
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
     There are three exogenous, dependent variables of interest in this study, the presence 
of a loan guarantee (LOCG), the size of the loan as a proportion of total assets (LSIZEP), 
and the initial interest rate (RATE).  Results for each stage of the regressions are reported 
for each stage in the analysis. 
     Table 2-IV provides the results of a logistic regression with LOCG as the dependent 
variable.  All variables are included here, including RATE and LSIZEP.  In addition to 
the primary control variables identified in Table 2-I, a number of additional exogenous 
variables are included in this regression and are used as instrumental variables in the first 
stage, reduced form equations.  This is done in an attempt to improve the quality of the 
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instruments.  RATE is negative and significant, suggesting loan guarantees are priced 
with lower interest rates.  Larger loans are associated with loan guarantees.  Collateral, as 
with interest rates has a negative coefficient but is only significant at the 7% level.  Firms 
dealing with more institutions are more likely to have loan guarantees.  Firms with a 
limited liability legal form are more likely to have a loan guarantee.   Firms with a higher 
ratio of liabilities scaled by assets are more likely to have a loan guarantee.  Firms with 
more fixed assets (PPE) are less likely to have a loan guarantee.   
     The first stage of the RATE equation is provided in Table 2-V.  Because this is a 
reduced form equation, LOCG and LSIZEP are not included.  FSIZE is negative and 
significant, indicating larger firms are associated with lower interest rates.  Leverage is 
negative and significant, but LIABOVERASSETS is positive and significant.  COLLAT 
is negative and significant.  RELATE is positive and significant, suggesting lenders may 
exploit the lending relationship and charge higher interest rates.  Another measure of the 
relationship is NINST, the number of institutions dealt with.  Here also, firms with more 
banking relationships have higher line of credit interest rates as this variable is positive 
and significant at the 1% level.  COMPBAL is not significant, suggesting compensating 
balances are not used to adjust interest rates.   
     Table 2-VI provides the results of the reduced form equation for LSIZEP.  FSIZE is 
negative and significant.  Fees are positive and significant.  FAGE is negative and 
significant, suggesting older firms have relatively smaller lines of credit.  RELATE is 
negative and significant, suggesting that longer relationships are associated with smaller 
lines of credit.  NINST is also negative and significant.  OWNMGR is positive and 
significant, suggesting larger lines of credit where an owner/manager is present. 
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COLLAT is positive and significant, suggesting the presence of collateral is associated 
with relatively larger lines of credit. 
     Table 2-VII provides the results of the second stage logistic regression where LOCG 
is the dependent variables.  The instruments for RATE and LSIZEP are designated by the 
suffix “_i”.  Both of the two instruments are not significant.  This suggests that loan 
guarantees for lines of credit are not priced, nor do they affect the size of the line of 
credit.  COLLAT is also not significant.  FSIZE is negative and significant, indicating 
larger firms are less likely to have loan guarantees.  LEVERAGE is positive and 
significant, indicating firms with higher leverage are more likely to have loan guarantees.  
CASH is also negative and significant, indicating firms with more cash are less likely to 
have loan guarantees.  FAGE and NINST are both positive and significant indicating that 
older firms and those with more institutional relationships are more likely to have loan 
guarantees.  Speculatively, this could be an indicating of a weaker relationship (because 
there are more institutional relationships) are an indication that older firms are more 
willing to offer a loan guarantee.  RELATE is negative and significant, suggesting that a 
longer banking relationship may be rewarded by a lower likelihood of a loan guarantees.  
This is consistent with the Boot and Thakor (1994) expectation that experience with a 
lender benefits the borrower and can influence the terms of a second or later loan.  
LIMLIAB is positive and significant.  This result may be an indication that lenders are 
not always satisfied with the security for lines of credit and seek personal loan guarantees 
from the owner(s).  Without a guarantee, the lender would be limited to the security 
pledged or at most the assets of the borrower.  FIXED is negative and significant, 
indicating fixed rate loans are less likely to have loan guarantees.  As in Table 2-IV, firms 
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with higher relative fixed assets (PPE) are less likely to have loan guarantees.  As with all 
second stage results, the seven binary industry sector variables are included in the 
estimation but not reported. 
     Table 2-VII also reports adjusted p values.  The adjustment is made because the error 
term in the second stage is actually the sum of the reduced form equation error and that 
from the second stage.  The adjustment is a function of the ratio of the square root of the 
sum of the squared errors.  In this case, the adjustment is approximately 5% and does not 
materially change the significance of any of the variables discussed.  For further 
discussion, see Maddala (1977).  
     Table 2-VIII provides the results of the second stage analysis where RATE is the 
dependent variable.  The instrument LOCG_I is developed from a reduced form 
estimation equivalent to that presented in Table 2-IV with the exception that RATE and 
LSIZEP are excluded.  LOCG_I is negative and significant, indicating lower interest rates 
are established when guarantees are applied.  FSIZE is negative and significant, 
indicating larger firms obtain lower rates.  LEVERAGE is not significant.  FEES are 
positive and significant, indicating a complementary role for fees and interest rates.  
TERM, as expected, is negative and significant.  RELATE is positive and significant.  
NINST is also positive and significant.  This result is consistent with the reduced form 
equation results of Table 2-V, but present somewhat of a puzzle.  Longer relationships 
are associated with higher interest rates, contrary to the expected benefits of a longer 
relationship, but yet having more relationships also leads to higher interest rates.  
LIMLIAB is not significant, perhaps a consequence of the correlation between LOCG 
and LIMLIAB.  As expected, FIXED is positive and significant.  OWNMGR is positive 
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and significant. 
     Table 2-IX presented the results of the second stage estimation where LSIZEP is the 
dependent variable.  LOCG_I is negative and significant, indicating loan guarantees are 
associated with relatively smaller lines of credit.  Perhaps this is an indication that 
without the guarantee, the loan would not have been made so the compromise is a smaller 
line of credit.  RATE is negative and significant, indicating higher rate loans are smaller.  
FSIZE is negative and significant, indicating larger firms have smaller lines of credit.  
LEVERAGE is positive and significant, so more leveraged firms borrow for longer 
periods of time.  FEES is positive and significant, indicating larger loans fees for longer 
loans.  RELATE is negative and significant.  NINST is positive, but only significant at 
the 10% level.  This suggest that longer banking relationships are associated with smaller 
lines of credit, but possibly more lender relationships can enable larger lines of credit.  
LIMLIAB is positive and significant, indicating limited liability legal forms have larger 
lines of credit.     
     The results provided in Tables 2-III through 2-VI are based on the assumption that all 
variables are exogenous.  Other authors using another of the surveys (1993) differ on the 
validity of this assumption.  Brick & Palia (2007) explore these relationships using a two 
stage procedure because of a concern for simultaneity in the data, whereas Chakraborty 
and Hu (2006) do not.  Table 2-X presents the results of an assessment of the presence of 
simultaneity among the potential endogenous hypothesis variables in this study.  Using 
the concept of the Hausman test, the residuals from two OLS regression of loan size and 
loan rate are included as independent variables when a potential endogenous variable is 
regressed on all other variables.  The null hypothesis is that the variables are exogenous, 
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and is tested by the significance of the coefficient of the error term.  In this case because 
of the present of the binary variable representing a loan guarantee a logistic regression is 
used to test the hypothesis.  In any case, if the parameter estimate on the residual is 
significant, then the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous is rejected and an 
econometric approach recognizing this should be employed.  The results in Table 2-X are 
mixed.  While these results indicate that RATE and LSIZEP are not simultaneously 
determined, but there is evidence of simultaneity with LOCG.  On that basis, the second 
stage results in Tables 2-VII through 2-IX are estimated.  This is conservative in that 
without simultaneity, the results of a two-stage process should not change the outcome. 
     Tables 2-XI through 2-XIV add two additional variables, one estimated as endogenous 
(COLLAT) and one estimated as exogenous (GRANTPCT).  It is COLLAT.  In Table  
2-XI, the dependent variable is LOCG.  Dependent variables include three instruments 
for collateral, rate, and size.  These results are very similar to those in Table 2-VII, except 
with the addition of COLLAT_I.  The significance of the variables does not change.  
COLLAT_I is positive, but not significant, suggesting the requirement for collateral does 
not significantly change the probability for a loan guarantee.  COLLAT was not 
significant in Table 2-VII either.  GRANTPCT is positive and significant.  A possible 
explanation for this is during loan negotiations, lenders are willing to increase the size of 
the loan, relative to the amount request, if a borrower will provide a guarantee. 
     In Table 2-XII, COLLAT is regressed on three instruments and the other independent 
variables.  Here, the presence of a loan guarantees lowers the probability of collateral 
being required as LOCG_I is negative and significant.  RATE_I is positive and 
significant, suggesting collateral is priced and offering security may lower the interest 
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rate.  LSIZEP_I is positive and significant, suggesting collateral is more likely with larger 
loans.  FAGE is positive and significant, but only at the 6% level. RELATE is negative 
and significant, suggesting the longer the relationship, the less likely collateral will be 
required.  NINST is not significant at conventional levels so it does not appear that the 
number of institutions affects the likelihood of a collateral requirement.  PPE is negative 
and significant, indicating that firms with more fixed assets are less likely to have a 
collateral requirement.  GRANTPCT is negative and significant.  This suggests that as 
the amount granted is increased relative to the amount requested, the likelihood of 
collateral being required is reduced.  This finding seems contrary to expectations, but it is 
consistent with the correlation (-13%) between GRANTPCT and COLLAT, which is 
significant at the 1% level.  Since LOCG_I and COLLAT are negatively related, 
collateral and loan guarantees are being exchanged to increase the size of the line of 
credit.   
     In Table 2-XIII, RATE is regressed on three instruments and the other variables.  As 
in Table 2-VIII, LOCG_I is negative and significant.  Neither COLLAT_I nor LSIZEP is 
significant.  The level of significance of the other variables does not change.  
GRANTPCT is not significant, so the amount of the line of credit granted relative to that 
requested does not play a role in setting the interest rate.  
     In Table 2-XIV, LSIZEP is regressed on three instruments and the other variables.  
COLLAT_I is not significant, which differs from Table 2-IX where COLLAT was 
positive and significant.  The general level of significance of the other variables does not 
change.  GRANTPCT is not significant, as was the case where RATE is the dependent 
variable. 
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     Hypothesis H1 indicates that loan guarantees lower the interest rate charged.  The 
results in Table 2-VIII (RATE as dependent variable) indicate that the presence of a loan 
guarantee is associated with a lower rate of interest, so this hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
However, when LOCG is the dependent variable, RATE is not significant. The follow-on 
statement in H1 states that collateral lowers the interest rate is supported somewhat.  The 
presence of collateral does not significantly affect the interest rate where RATE is the 
dependent variable (Table 2-XIII).  However, higher interest rates are associated with the 
use of collateral when collateral is the dependent variable (Table 2-XII).   
     Hypothesis H2, which states that lines of credit will be larger in the presence of a loan 
guarantee, can be rejected.  LOCG_I is negative and significant where LSIZEP is the 
dependent variable (Table 2-XIV).  In this case, loan guarantees appear to be associated 
with smaller loans, contrary to the hypothesis.  Perhaps the explanation is that if the 
lender requires a loan guarantee, it is an indication of lower credit quality and in those 
cases, a lender may only be willing to offer a smaller line of credit.  Loan guarantees are 
associated with higher leverage (see Table 2-VII, where LEVERAGE is positive and 
significant), consistent with this explanation. Additional support is provided in Table  
2-IV, where the coefficient is negative and significant on AO_DB_CREDRK, which is a 
1 to 6 point D&B credit score where a higher rating is less risky.   A further argument in 
favor of this is the fact that GRANTPCT is positive and significant where LOCG is the 
dependent variable.  Loan guarantees then appear to be implanted as a means to raise the 
amount of credit granted relative to the request.  This is also consistent with the use of 
loan guarantees by the US SBA.  Borrowers are only eligible for SBA loan guarantees if 
a lender will not grant the loan.  In such cases, the loan guarantee is the final factor that 
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permits the lender to make the loan.  This result may be an indication of a similar, routine 
practice. 
     Hypothesis H2 also states that lines of credit will be larger when collateral is required.  
The presence of collateral does not explain the size of the loan when LSIZEP is the 
dependent variable (Table 2-XIV).  However, larger loans increase the probability that 
collateral will be required when COLLAT is the dependent variable (Table 2-XII). 
     Consistent with Chakraborty and Hu (2006), the length of the banking relationship is 
significant is all the second stage results.  A longer relationship is associated with a lower 
probability of a loan guarantee, a lower probability of a collateral requirement, but is 
associated with higher interest rates and smaller lines of credit.  However, all the 
estimates suggest the practical effect is small as the coefficients are all small.  The 
finding here that the length of the relationship is significant is inconsistent with Brick and 
Palia (2007) who find no significance to the relationship length. 
     Based on the results provided, loan guarantees appear to be used more frequently for 
limited liability firms perhaps as a way to obtain greater assurance of repayment from the 
personal wealth of the owner.  This speculation cannot be confirmed because the nature 
of the guarantee is not known.  Loan guarantees are also used more frequently with more 
leveraged firms and those with lower credit ratings, consistent with the notion that 
guarantees are a means to assure repayment.  Longer banking relationships are associated 
with less frequent use of guarantees.  The interest rate and size of the line of credit offer 
no significant explanation for the presence of a loan guarantee.  The use of collateral also 
does not explain the use of loan guarantees. 
     The interest rate charged is lower in the presence of a loan guarantee, but not 
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significantly affected by the use of collateral or compensating balances.  
     Loan guarantees are associated with smaller loans, possibly an indication of poor 
credit quality.  It appears that lower credit quality is addressed though the use of loan 
guarantees and limited the size of lines of credit granted.  In this case, loan size and 
guarantees appear to be complementary. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
     In this research, loan guarantees are found to have a negative effect on the size of  
loans and also a negative effect on the interest rate of the loans.  There is some evidence 
that loan guarantees and collateral are substitutes as the presence of a loan guarantee 
lowers the likelihood of a collateral requirement.  Measures of liquidity and leverage 
affect the use of loan guarantees, while they do not significantly affect the use of 
collateral.  The presence of more fixed assets lowers the likelihood of both loan 
guarantees and collateral.   Both loan guarantees and collateral are explained, in part, by 
the ratio of the amount of credit granted to that applied for.  However, the signs are 
different, so loan guarantees are more probable as the loan amount increases but 
collateral is less likely.  This, perhaps, is a reflection that the two are substitutes.  The 
variable GRANTPCT may be suggesting that there is more bargaining with collateral 
requirements and loan guarantees than interest rates or the final size of the line of credit.  
This explanation is suggested and not conclusive.  A more detail explanation for this 
behavior is beyond the scope of this research and will be left for the future.   
     As with Brick and Palia (2007), there is some evidence of simultaneity among the 
terms of lines of credits which, absent the use of an appropriate econometric procedure, 
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may provide inconsistent results.  Both the Brick and Palia (2007) and Chakraborty and 
Hu (2006) research used only the 1993 Survey of Small Business Finances.  This study, 
instead, uses the 2003 survey.  Examining the differences among the surveys would be a 
worthwhile endeavor for future research. 
     Brick and Palia (2007) and much other prior research examines the effects of lending 
relationships on the terms of lending.  Different authors have found no effect or some 
significance to the relationship.  In this research, the length of the relationship is used as a 
measure of its effect, similar to that used by Brick and Palia (2007).  This research goes 
further and adds a variable which is the number of lending relationships a firm has.  The 
presence of more banking relationships seems to suggest a weaker relationship.   If both 
measure an aspect of the effect of the lending relationship, their signs should be opposite.  
A longer relationship is presumed to be a stronger relationship, but more lending 
relationships suggest a weaker relationship.  For loan guarantees a stronger relationship is 
associated with a lower probability of a loan guarantee, and both variables are significant.  
For collateral, only the length of the relationship is significant, but it indicates that a 
longer relationship is associated with a lower probability of collateral.  In the case of the 
interest rate, the two variables have the same sign, so their effects are in opposition.  For 
the size of the loan, a stronger relationship is associated with smaller loans, contrary to 
what might be expected.  As with the prior research, relationship effects are complex, but 
this study does add to the understanding. 
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TABLE 2-I. – Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
 
LOCG   binary variable indicating a guarantee (1 = present) 
RATE   nominal initial interest rate charged for line of credit 
LSIZEP  dollar value of the line of credit divided by total assets  
COLLAT  binary variable indicating collateral (1 = required) 
 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
LOCG_I  Instrument for LOCG 
RATE_I  Instrument for RATE 
LSIZEP_I  Instrument for LSIZEP 
COLLAT_I  Instrument for COLLAT 
 
Control Variables 
 
RATEOVRINDEX initial interest rate premium over index used 
FEES   Fees imposed as % of loan  
 FSIZE   natural log of firm’s assets 
 EMPLOY  number of full-time employees in survey year 
 LEVERAGE  ratio of debt to total assets 
 CASH   ratio of cash to total assets 
 PPE   ratio of net depreciable assets divided by total assets 
 INC   net income divided by sales 
 OPINC  operating profit divided by sales 
NUMLOC  number of lines of credit for the firm 
 TERM   term of the line of credit in months 
 FAGE   age of the firm in years 
 FIXED  binary variable indicating fixed interest rate (1 = fixed) 
 DISTANCE  distance in miles between firm and lender 
 RELATE  length of the firm’s relationship with lender in years 
 LIMLIAB  binary variable indicating limited liability legal form    
 OWNMGR  binary variable indicating presence of owner/manager   
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 NINST  number of financial institutions used by the firm 
 GRANTPCT  ratio of amount granted divided by amount requested  
 Industry  7 dummy variables for two digit SIC code groups (8 total) 
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TABLE 2-II. – Summary Statistics for the 2003 Survey 
Variable N Mean
Standard
Deviation Sum Minimum Maximum
LOCG 1460 0.637 0.481 930.000 0.000 1.000
RATE 1460 5.548 2.405 8100.000 0.000 20.900
LSIZEP 1450 0.661 1.404 958.946 0.001 12.265
FSIZE 1450 13.445 2.205 19495.000 7.601 19.066
COLLAT 1460 0.507 0.500 740.000 0.000 1.000
LEVERAGE 1450 0.685 1.236 992.800 0.000 14.608
FEES 1460 0.007 0.019 10.927 0.000 0.200
CASH 1405 0.139 0.211 195.579 0.000 1.000
INC 1450 0.038 1.731 55.177 -28.978 1.673
TERM 1262 30.989 46.083 39108.000 0.000 432.000
FAGE 1460 17.171 13.168 25069.000 1.000 99.000
NINST 1460 3.873 2.023 5655.000 1.000 13.000
GRANTPCT 1460 1.125 1.016 1642.000 0.075 12.500
RELATE 1460 76.346 98.031 111465.000 0.000 600.000
LIMLIAB 1460 0.798 0.402 1165.000 0.000 1.000
FIXED 1460 0.273 0.445 398.000 0.000 1.000
DISTANCE 1460 14.064 76.486 20533.000 0.000 1110.000
COMPBAL 1460 0.089 0.285 130.000 0.000 1.000
EMPLOY 1460 51.772 77.664 75587.000 1.000 486.000
RATEOVRINDEX 1459 1.203 1.622 1754.000 -1.500 12.000
PPE 1450 0.324 0.288 469.766 0.000 1.000
OWNMGR 1415 0.830 0.375 1175.000 0.000 1.000
NUMLOC 1460 0.182 0.843 265.000 0.000 7.000
MINE 1460 0.010 0.101 15.000 0.000 1.000
CONST 1460 0.082 0.275 120.000 0.000 1.000
MANUF 1460 0.158 0.364 230.000 0.000 1.000
TRANS 1460 0.041 0.199 60.000 0.000 1.000
WHOLE 1460 0.086 0.280 125.000 0.000 1.000
RETAIL 1460 0.164 0.371 240.000 0.000 1.000
INSURE 1460 0.425 0.494 620.000 0.000 1.000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-III. – Correlation Matrix 
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TABLE 2-IV. – Logistic Regression  
 
Dependent variable is LOCG (present = 1), N=999 
Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared) = 319.599 (p <.0001) 
Standard Wald
Parameter DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept 1 556 266.2 4.3612 0.0368
RATE 1 -0.1251 0.0528 5.6086 0.0179
LSIZEP 1 0.4579 0.142 10.3991 0.0013
FSIZE 1 0.2461 0.0956 6.6257 0.0101
COLLAT 1 -0.3494 0.1904 3.3684 0.0665
FEES 1 6.1701 7.365 0.7018 0.4022
CASH 1 -0.8657 0.6619 1.7107 0.1909
INC 1 1.0961 0.4386 6.2448 0.0125
TERM 1 0.0028 0.00253 1.2289 0.2676
FAGE 1 0.0351 0.00959 13.4213 0.0002
NINST 1 0.2198 0.0504 18.9993 <.0001
RELATE 1 -0.00232 0.00105 4.8736 0.0273
LIMLIAB 1 1.1072 0.2714 16.6493 <.0001
FIXED 1 -0.6158 0.2838 4.7082 0.03
DISTANCE 1 0.0147 0.00481 9.3303 0.0023
COMPBAL 1 0.888 0.416 4.5573 0.0328
RATEOVRINDEX 1 0.0229 0.0758 0.0912 0.7626
PPE 1 -1.1214 0.444 6.3781 0.0116
OWNMGR 1 -0.1876 0.25 0.5629 0.4531
NUMLOC 1 -0.174 0.118 2.1761 0.1402
MINE 1 -0.6846 0.8501 0.6486 0.4206
CONST 1 0.6858 0.5782 1.4071 0.2355
MANUF 1 -0.3361 0.5552 0.3664 0.545
TRANS 1 0.0158 0.7061 0.0005 0.9821
WHOLE 1 -1.2726 0.5629 5.1118 0.0238
RETAIL 1 0.7197 0.5741 1.5715 0.21
INSURE 1 0.2457 0.5476 0.2013 0.6537
Assets 1 -4.74E-08 1.20E-08 15.7006 <.0001
EMPLOY 1 -0.00729 0.00151 23.3104 <.0001
trading 1 -0.2889 0.5459 0.28 0.5967
liaboverassets 1 1.8347 0.4352 17.772 <.0001
LEVERAGE 1 -1.112 0.4619 5.7971 0.0161
roa 1 -0.1576 0.0722 4.7642 0.0291
Quick 1 0.00672 0.00965 0.4853 0.486
C_AGE_1 1 -0.0256 0.0105 5.9296 0.0149
C_SHARE_1 1 0.00152 0.00383 0.1584 0.6907
ownerjudge 1 1.1217 0.5393 4.3271 0.0375
delinq 1 -0.7552 0.3626 4.3379 0.0373
U8 1 -2.62E-08 1.81E-08 2.1002 0.1473
A0_DB_CREDRK 1 -0.1991 0.0718 7.6785 0.0056
ownbankrupt 1 15.4319 516.5 0.0009 0.9762
firmjudge 1 -1.9075 0.506 14.2091 0.0002
A0_HHI0 1 0.0666 0.1543 0.1862 0.6661
A10_1 1 0.1402 0.0466 9.0582 0.0026
AUDITED 1 -0.8222 0.3021 7.4089 0.0065
year 1 -0.2787 0.1328 4.4001 0.0359
Concordant (%) 82.5 Somer's D 0.651
Discordant (%) 17.4 Gamma 0.652
Ties (%) 0.1 Tau - a 0.296
Pairs 226850 c 0.825  
TABLE 2-V. – OLS Regression 
Dependent variable is RATE (Stage 1) 
57 
 
N=999  Adjusted R-squared=.4376 
 
 Standard
Variable    t Value  
 1 1409.08629 9.15 <.0001
FSIZE  -0.16007  -3.04 0.0024
COLLAT  -0.27455 0.11476 -2.39 0.0169
 1 -0.32806 0.13583 -2.42 0.0159
FEES 1 21.09981 3.8952  <.0001
CASH 1 0.43275 0.39145 1.11  
INC 1 -0.46028 0.2496 0.0655
TERM  -0.00495 0.00145 -3.41 0.0007
FAGE  -0.00125 0.00515 -0.24 0.8088
RELATE 1 0.00221 0.00061244 3.61 0.0003
LIMLIAB 1 -0.57056  -3.29 0.0011
FIXED 1 2.01952 0.15803 12.78 <.0001
 1 -0.00244  -1.9  
COMPBAL  0.23815 0.2309  0.3026
EMPLOY 1 -0.00071482 0.00085025 -0.84 0.4007
RATEOVRINDEX 1 0.37397 0.04426 8.45 <.0001
 1 0.35285 0.24918 1.42 0.1571
OWNMGR 1 0.26591 0.15583   
 1 -0.0611 0.08037 -0.76 0.4473
MINE 1 1.03387 0.6168 1.68  
CONST 1 -0.13577 0.36784 -0.37  
 1 1.04843 0.35206 2.98 0.003
TRANS 1 1.05417 0.42026 2.51 0.0123
WHOLE 1 0.70948 0.3645 1.95 0.0519
RETAIL 1 -0.12194 0.35877 -0.34 0.734
INSURE 1 0.84036 0.35368 2.38 0.0177
Assets 1 -1.21E-08 3.61E-09 -3.36 0.0008
trading 1 1.01982 0.35929 2.84 0.0046
liaboverassets  0.29745 0.13373 2.22 0.0264
roa  -0.00427 0.01862  
 1 0.0003875 0.00029792  0.1937
C_AGE_1 1  0.00643 -2.38 0.0174
 1  0.00238 1.71 0.0884
ownerjudge 1 -1.53404 0.31356 -4.89 <.0001
delinq 1 0.70689  3.19  
U8 1 6.34E-09 7.90E-09 0.8 0.4225
A0_DB_CREDRK 1 0.15583 0.04281 3.64 0.0003
  -0.2062 0.46997 -0.44 0.6609
firmjudge 1 0.79185 0.3124 2.53 0.0114
 1 -0.38172 0.09431 -4.05 <.0001
NINST 1 0.07444 0.02948 2.52 0.0117
A10_1 1 0.0631 0.02496 2.53 0.0116
AUDITED 1 -0.45096 0.17782 -2.54 0.0114
year 1 -0.70005 0.07686 -9.11 <.0001
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TABLE 2-VI. – OLS Regression 
 
Dependent variable is LSIZEP (stage 1) 
N = 999  Adjusted R-squared = .7114 
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 -252.48034 59.50642 -4.24 <.0001
FSIZE 1 -0.08553 0.02034 -4.2 <.0001
COLLAT 1 0.32738 0.04434 7.38 <.0001
LEVERAGE 1 0.00624 0.05248 0.12 0.9054
FEES 1 3.37984 1.505 2.25 0.0249
CASH 1 0.54338 0.15124 3.59 0.0003
INC 1 -0.78276 0.09644 -8.12 <.0001
TERM 1 -0.00039662 0.00056106 -0.71 0.4798
FAGE 1 -0.00543 0.00199 -2.73 0.0064
RELATE 1 -0.00098276 0.00023663 -4.15 <.0001
LIMLIAB 1 0.07471 0.06709 1.11 0.2657
FIXED 1 -0.05499 0.06106 -0.9 0.368
DISTANCE 1 0.00030635 0.00049573 0.62 0.5367
COMPBAL 1 0.15574 0.08921 1.75 0.0812
EMPLOY 1 0.0003946 0.00032851 1.2 0.23
RATEOVRINDEX 1 -0.02215 0.0171 -1.3 0.1955
PPE 1 0.01953 0.09628 0.2 0.8393
OWNMGR 1 0.16455 0.06021 2.73 0.0064
NUMLOC 1 0.01642 0.03105 0.53 0.5971
MINE 1 0.30472 0.23831 1.28 0.2013
CONST 1 -0.30424 0.14212 -2.14 0.0326
MANUF 1 -0.4217 0.13603 -3.1 0.002
TRANS 1 -0.28305 0.16238 -1.74 0.0816
WHOLE 1 -0.2571 0.14083 -1.83 0.0682
RETAIL 1 -0.49565 0.13862 -3.58 0.0004
INSURE 1 -0.21053 0.13665 -1.54 0.1237
Assets 1 1.43E-09 1.40E-09 1.03 0.3055
trading 1 -0.22341 0.13882 -1.61 0.1079
liaboverassets 1 0.07595 0.05167 1.47 0.1419
roa 1 0.20394 0.0072 28.34 <.0001
Quick 1 -0.00019616 0.00011511 -1.7 0.0887
C_AGE_1 1 0.01192 0.00248 4.8 <.0001
C_SHARE_1 1 0.00028565 0.00091779 0.31 0.7557
ownerjudge 1 0.50629 0.12115 4.18 <.0001
delinq 1 -0.64274 0.08568 -7.5 <.0001
U8 1 3.41E-09 3.05E-09 1.12 0.2642
A0_DB_CREDRK 1 0.04059 0.01654 2.45 0.0143
ownbankrupt 1 0.74516 0.18158 4.1 <.0001
firmjudge 1 0.96451 0.1207 7.99 <.0001
A0_HHI0 1 0.03614 0.03644 0.99 0.3215
NINST 1 -0.05133 0.01139 -4.51 <.0001
A10_1 1 0.02324 0.00964 2.41 0.0162
AUDITED 1 0.05363 0.06871 0.78 0.4352
year 1 0.12643 0.0297 4.26 <.0001   
 
TABLE 2-VII. – Logistic Regression (Stage 2) 
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Dependent variable is LOCG (present = 1) 
N = 999 
Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared) = 193.4505 (p <.0001) 
                                                                      
Standard Wald
Parameter DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Adjusted p
Intercept 1 1.7856 1.3478 1.7551 0.1852 0.162
RATE_i 1 0.0175 0.121 0.0208 0.8852 0.879
LSIZE_i 1 -0.1573 0.1177 1.7859 0.1814 0.159
FSIZE 1 -0.1914 0.0683 7.8567 0.0051 0.003
COLLAT 1 -0.1086 0.1692 0.4119 0.521 0.498
LEVERAGE 1 0.4885 0.1597 9.3556 0.0022 0.001
FEES 1 4.3147 6.3613 0.4601 0.4976 0.474
CASH 1 -1.2443 0.5655 4.8414 0.0278 0.020
INC 1 0.5191 0.3401 2.3302 0.1269 0.107
TERM 1 0.00282 0.00208 1.839 0.1751 0.153
FAGE 1 0.0224 0.00666 11.3272 0.0008 0.000
NINST 1 0.2029 0.046 19.4565 <.0001 0.000
RELATE 1 -0.00278 0.000867 10.2486 0.0014 0.001
LIMLIAB 1 1.3251 0.2513 27.8043 <.0001 0.000
FIXED 1 -1.1516 0.2874 16.0567 <.0001 0.000
DISTANCE 1 0.0123 0.00447 7.5795 0.0059 0.004
COMPBAL 1 0.5979 0.3482 2.949 0.0859 0.070
EMPLOY 1 -0.00447 0.00122 13.3865 0.0003 0.000
RATEOVRINDEX 1 -0.0665 0.0742 0.8044 0.3698 0.344
PPE 1 -1.1923 0.3628 10.8022 0.001 0.001
OWNMGR 1 -0.0769 0.2039 0.1421 0.7062 0.691
NUMLOC 1 -0.1428 0.1025 1.9414 0.1635 0.142
Concordant (%) 76.1 Somer's D 0.523
Discordant (%) 23.7 Gamma 0.524
Ties (%) 0.2 Tau - a 0.238
Pairs 226850 c 0.762  
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TABLE 2-VIII. – OLS Regression (Stage 2) 
 
Dependent variable is RATE 
N=999 
Adjusted R-squared = .3989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1365.855 154.466 8.84 <.0001
LOCG_I 1 -0.94375 0.352867 -2.67 0.0076
LSIZEP_I 1 -0.10158 0.075725 -1.34 0.1801
FSIZE 1 -0.2489 0.047177 -5.28 <.0001
COLLAT 1 -0.1976 0.117378 -1.68 0.0926
LEVERAGE 1 -0.00462 0.056189 -0.08 0.9345
FEES 1 26.65432 3.618188 7.37 <.0001
CASH 1 -0.2058 0.394521 -0.52 0.602 
INC 1 -0.38543 0.233926 -1.65 0.0997
TERM 1 -0.0037 0.001477 -2.51 0.0123
FAGE 1 -0.00479 0.004391 -1.09 0.2756
RELATE 1 0.001566 0.000641 2.44 0.0148
LIMLIAB 1 -0.23338 0.202021 -1.16 0.2483
FIXED 1 1.446405 0.167861 8.62 <.0001
DISTANCE 1 -0.00155 0.00134 -1.16 0.246 
COMPBAL 1 0.324661 0.232871 1.39 0.1636
EMPLOY 1 -0.00212 0.000869 -2.44 0.0148
RATEOVRINDEX 1 0.314604 0.044411 7.08 <.0001
PPE 1 0.181853 0.247838 0.73 0.4633
OWNMGR 1 0.275939 0.14445 1.91 0.0564
NUMLOC 1 -0.04566 0.074136 -0.62 0.5381
NINST 1 0.141287 0.032131 4.4 <.0001
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TABLE 2-IX. – OLS Regression (Stage 2) 
 
Dependent variable is LSIZEP 
N = 999 
Adjusted R-squared = .3243  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2-X. – Hausman Test for Exogenous Variables 
Parameter Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 4.962929 0.542892 9.14 <.0001 
LOCG_I 1 -0.84096 0.205911 -4.08 <.0001 
RATE_I 1 -0.19599 0.047259 -4.15 <.0001 
FSIZE 1 -0.28519 0.026576 -10.73 <.0001 
COLLAT 1 0.173804 0.07 2.48 0.0132 
LEVERAGE 1 0.291817 0.030777 9.48 <.0001 
FEES 1 11.41985 2.549563 4.48 <.0001 
CASH 1 -0.18441 0.233831 -0.79 0.4305 
INC 1 0.26572 0.140366 1.89 0.0586 
TERM 1 -0.00143 0.00089 -1.61 0.1081 
FAGE 1 0.001412 0.002634 0.54 0.5919 
RELATE 1 -0.00084 0.000381 -2.2 0.0281 
LIMLIAB 1 0.556778 0.120009 4.64 <.0001 
FIXED 1 -0.15582 0.124577 -1.25 0.2113 
DISTANCE 1 0.000943 0.000797 1.18 0.237 
COMPBAL 1 0.013996 0.13933 0.1 0.92 
EMPLOY 1 0.001204 0.00052 2.31 0.0209 
RATEOVRINDEX 1 -0.03368 0.030305 -1.11 0.2667 
PPE 1 0.157069 0.148414 1.06 0.2902 
OWNMGR 1 -0.02648 0.085728 -0.31 0.7575 
NUMLOC 1 0.014198 0.043846 0.32 0.7462 
NINST 1 0.038768 0.019131 2.03 0.043 
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Dependent 
Variable
Residuals from OLS 
Rate regression
p value
Residuals from OLS 
Loan Size regression
p value
RATE -                         0.2533                        
LSIZEP 0.2521                       -                          
LOCG 0.0784                       * 0.0067                        ***
significance denoted by  ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
HAUSMAN TEST FOR EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
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TABLE 2-XI. – Logistic Regression (Stage 2) 
 
Dependent variable is LOCG (present = 1) 
N = 999 
Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared) = 199.0581 (p <.0001) 
 
 
Expected Standard Wald Adjusted
Parameter Sign Estimate ErrorChi-Square Pr > ChiSq p
Intercept 1.6359 1.37 1.4259 0.2324 0.212
COLLAT_I - 0.4571 0.6199 0.5437 0.4609 0.441
RATE_I - 0.055 0.1198 0.2105 0.6464 0.631
LSIZEP_I + -0.1234 0.1214 1.0329 0.3095 0.288
FSIZE -0.2225 0.0711 9.8006 0.0017 0.001 ***
LEVERAGE 0.4797 0.1603 8.9604 0.0028 0.002 ***
FEES 4.9409 6.3538 0.6047 0.4368 0.416
CASH -1.2096 0.5701 4.5023 0.0338 0.026 **
INC 0.219 0.4015 0.2976 0.5854 0.568
TERM 0.00284 0.00225 1.5923 0.207 0.187
FAGE 0.02 0.00681 8.6389 0.0033 0.002 ***
NINST 0.1867 0.046 16.4583 <.0001 0.000 ***
GRANTPCT 0.2242 0.0938 5.715 0.0168 0.012 **
RELATE -0.00249 0.000956 6.7683 0.0093 0.006 ***
LIMLIAB 1.3934 0.2531 30.3097 <.0001 0.000 ***
FIXED -1.2332 0.2882 18.3157 <.0001 0.000 ***
DISTANCE 0.0108 0.00466 5.4297 0.0198 0.015 **
COMPBAL + 0.5721 0.357 2.5684 0.109 0.094 *
EMPLOY -0.00435 0.00122 12.6546 0.0004 0.000 ***
RATEOVRINDEX -0.0614 0.0786 0.6107 0.4345 0.414
PPE -1.1364 0.4057 7.8464 0.0051 0.003 ***
OWNMGR -0.0503 0.2083 0.0583 0.8092 0.801
NUMLOC -0.1079 0.1059 1.0377 0.3084 0.287
Concordant (%) 76.5 Somer's D 0.532 
Discordant (%) 23.3 Gamma 0.533 
Ties (%) 0.2 Tau - a 0.242 
Pairs 226850 c 0.766 
significance denoted by  ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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TABLE 2-XII. – Logistic Regression (Stage 2) 
 
Dependent variable is COLLAT (present = 1) 
N = 999 
Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared) = 286.869 (p <.0001) 
 
 
 
 
Expected Standard Wald Adjusted
Parameter Sign Estimate ErrorChi-Square Pr > ChiSq p
Intercept -0.00351 1.4226 0 0.998 0.998
LOCG_I - -0.9495 0.5219 3.31 0.0689 0.071 *
RATE_I - -0.4833 0.1157 17.4471 <.0001 0.000 ***
LSIZEP_I + 0.4053 0.1255 10.4369 0.0012 0.001 ***
FSIZE 0.1949 0.0759 6.5982 0.0102 0.011 **
LEVERAGE 0.0214 0.0854 0.0627 0.8023 0.804
FEES 7.5784 6.309 1.4429 0.2297 0.234
CASH -0.4446 0.544 0.668 0.4138 0.418
INC 1.2889 0.3766 11.7138 0.0006 0.001 ***
TERM 0.00701 0.00244 8.2351 0.0041 0.004 ***
FAGE 0.0132 0.0068 3.7865 0.0517 0.054 *
NINST 0.0634 0.0461 1.8858 0.1697 0.173
GRANTPCT -0.352 0.1206 8.5135 0.0035 0.004 ***
RELATE -0.0029 0.000926 9.7953 0.0017 0.002 ***
LIMLIAB -0.1686 0.2937 0.3296 0.5659 0.569
FIXED 0.3721 0.2963 1.5766 0.2093 0.213
DISTANCE 0.025 0.00644 15.0206 0.0001 0.000 ***
COMPBAL + 1.1205 0.3645 9.4479 0.0021 0.002 ***
EMPLOY -0.00334 0.00148 5.0944 0.024 0.025 **
RATEOVRINDEX -0.0308 0.0733 0.1767 0.6742 0.677
PPE -1.332 0.377 12.4829 0.0004 0.000 ***
OWNMGR -0.224 0.2145 1.0899 0.2965 0.301
NUMLOC -0.1978 0.1091 3.2834 0.07 0.072 *
Concordant (%) 79.5 Somer's D 0.591 
Discordant (%) 20.4 Gamma 0.591 
Ties (%) 0.1 Tau - a 0.292 
Pairs 246078 c 0.795 
significance denoted by  ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
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TABLE 2-XIII. – OLS Regression (Stage 2) 
 
Dependent variable is RATE 
N=999 
Adjusted R-squared = .3965 
 
 
 
 
Expected Parameter Standard
Variable Sign Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1410.404 159.9105 8.82 <.0001 *** 
COLLAT_I - 0.337321 0.419803 0.8 0.4219 
LOCG_I - -0.87179 0.354412 -2.46 0.0141 **
LSIZEP_I ? -0.06317 0.077256 -0.82 0.4138 
FSIZE -0.26347 0.051399 -5.13 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE -0.03115 0.057438 -0.54 0.5877 
FEES 27.14055 3.673374 7.39 <.0001 *** 
CASH -0.14923 0.395215 -0.38 0.7058 
INC -0.57723 0.269188 -2.14 0.0323 **
TERM -0.00439 0.00156 -2.81 0.005 *** 
FAGE -0.00629 0.004431 -1.42 0.1558 
RELATE 0.002012 0.000695 2.89 0.0039 *** 
LIMLIAB -0.2556 0.205702 -1.24 0.2143 
FIXED 1.501037 0.172206 8.72 <.0001 *** 
DISTANCE -0.00219 0.001406 -1.56 0.1196 
COMPBAL ? 0.261787 0.237327 1.1 0.2703 
EMPLOY -0.00222 0.00088 -2.52 0.0119 **
RATEOVRINDEX 0.340663 0.048513 7.02 <.0001 *** 
PPE 0.321277 0.268936 1.19 0.2325 
OWNMGR 0.318567 0.148363 2.15 0.032 **
NUMLOC -0.01677 0.076618 -0.22 0.8268 
NINST 0.138426 0.032074 4.32 <.0001 *** 
GRANTPCT 0.051839 0.064012 0.81 0.4182 
significance denoted by  ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
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TABLE 2-XIV. – OLS Regression (Stage 2) 
 
Dependent variable is LSIZEP 
N=999 
Adjusted R-squared = .3201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected Parameter Standard Variable 
Variable Sign Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 4.9651 0.54324 9.14 <.0001 *** 
COLLAT_I + -0.34085 0.23872 -1.43 0.1537 
LOCG_I + -0.81473 0.205854 -3.96 <.0001 *** 
RATE_I ? -0.1815 0.047225 -3.84 0.0001 *** 
FSIZE -0.27026 0.02916 -9.27 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.304582 0.030877 9.86 <.0001 *** 
FEES 10.54297 2.570075 4.1 <.0001 *** 
CASH -0.23177 0.233219 -0.99 0.3206 
INC 0.384306 0.157705 2.44 0.015 ** 
TERM -0.00054 0.000928 -0.58 0.5631 
FAGE 0.002097 0.00264 0.79 0.4272 
RELATE -0.00118 0.000401 -2.94 0.0033 *** 
LIMLIAB 0.575649 0.122094 4.71 <.0001 *** 
FIXED -0.22951 0.126073 -1.82 0.069 * 
DISTANCE 0.001586 0.000823 1.93 0.0542 
COMPBAL ? 0.083414 0.140926 0.59 0.5541 
EMPLOY 0.001391 0.00052 2.67 0.0077 *** 
RATEOVRINDEX -0.06369 0.031666 -2.01 0.0446 ** 
PPE -0.02375 0.161072 -0.15 0.8828 
OWNMGR -0.07046 0.08679 -0.81 0.4171 
NUMLOC -0.00905 0.045275 -0.2 0.8416 
NINST 0.033616 0.018933 1.78 0.0761 * 
GRANTPCT 0.035809 0.037653 0.95 0.3418 
significance denoted by  ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
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CHAPTER III 
ESSAY 2: NON-PRICE TERMS OF LENDING FOR SMALL BUSINESS AND FARM 
LOANS 
 
3.1. Introduction and Prior Research  
     Banks set lending terms in a negotiation with borrowers in an effort to earn a target 
rate of return and manage the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD).  
Varying interest rates and non-price terms, such as collateral, can reduce the LGD.  
However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that raising interest rates and increasing 
collateral requirements above a maximum amount can actually reduce the expected return 
to the bank.  This occurs because of adverse selection, in which case only the riskiest 
borrowers will accept the higher interest rates.  Because of this behavior, lenders would 
have more risk than the higher interest rates compensate for, explaining the lower returns 
to the lender as interest rates increase.  Given this situation, it is rational for banks to 
ration credit (refuse to lend to certain borrowers), rather than attempt to price it with 
higher interest rates.  This explains why total lending volume may decline in response to 
tightened lending standards. 
     Many other authors have examined the use of collateral as a non-price means to 
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resolve the asymmetric information between borrower and lender.  The borrower knows 
better than the lender the true risk of the business, and in the case of small businesses, 
information asymmetry is higher because of the absence of public disclosure of financial 
data, as is the case with publicly traded companies.   Boot and Thakor (1994) examine the 
use of collateral and conclude that collateral is more likely to be used on a first loan 
related to a short or non-existent prior banking relationship. The need for collateral can 
then be reduced or eliminated on subsequent loans to the same borrower following a 
successful initial loan contract  
     Small borrowers tend to be more informationally opaque than large, publicly traded 
firms.  There is a large body of research that examines bank relationship lending by 
banks.   In this case, the banks place some reliance upon the prior relationship with a 
borrower and the knowledge gained from that relationship, such as cash flows observed 
in checking accounts.  There are a group of studies that focus on the effects of the lender-
borrower relationship on interest rates and the use of collateral.  Machauer and Weber 
(1998) find that German borrowers offer more collateral to their “housebank”, the bank 
with whom they have a primary banking relationship.  In this case, it appears the banks 
may exploit the relationship or are using their private knowledge of the small firm to set 
the terms of lending.  This seems to suggest that a closer banking relationships lead to 
greater use of collateral, perhaps because the inside knowledge of the lender enable them 
to identify collateral which might be available to pledge.  Contrary to this finding, Elsas 
and Krahnen (1999) find an inverse relationship between the use of collateral and the 
strength of the banking relationship. Brick and Palia (2007) examine the use of collateral, 
loan interest rates, and the length of lending relationships.  Here, the length of the 
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banking relationship is used as a measure of the strength of the relationship.  They review 
prior research noting mixed findings on the inter-relationships among interest rate, 
collateral, and the length of the banking relationship.  Berger and Udell (1990) find a 
positive relationship between the use of collateral and interest rates, whereas in a later 
study, Berger and Udell (1990) find a no relationship.    
     Chakraborty and Hu (2006) examine the use of collateral in small business loans.  
They examine multiple types of loans, including lines of credit and others types, such as 
fixed term loans.  They find a negative relationship between the length of the bank-
borrower relationship and the use of collateral for lines of credit.  The relationship length 
is not significant for other types of loans. One key difference between the research of 
Brick and Palia (2007) versus Chakraborty and Hu (2006) is whether the terms of lending 
are endogenous or exogenous.  Brick and Palia (2007) argue that they are endogenous 
and use a two-stage procedure in their econometric analysis.  This same method is 
employed in Essay 1 for the same reason.  Both Essay 1 and Brick and Palia (2007) find 
evidence that key loan terms are in fact determined jointly, or simultaneously, and 
therefore those variables are not predetermined but rather are endogenous. The following 
table summarizes the research discussed above. Overall, there is mixed evidence with 
regard to the relationship between length of the bank lending relationship and the use of 
collateral.  There is also mixed empirical evidence regarding the interplay between the 
use of collateral and other lending terms. 
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Authors Year
Dependent 
Variable
Independent
variable Findings
Boot & Thakor 1994 Theoretical model collateral and interest rate affected by 
relationship; interest rate drops and so does the 
need for collateral following a successful loan
Berger & Udell 1995 Rate Premium Collateral (ns) collateral not significant
Relationship (-) lower rate with longer banking relationship
Collateral (logit) Relationship (-) collateral less likely with longer banking 
relationship
Total Asssets (+) collateral more likely with larger firm total assets 
Machauer & Weber 1998 Rate Premium Noncollateral (-) uncollateralized percentage of credit line 
negatively related to rate premium (i.e. amount of 
collateral increases with rate premium)
Chakraborty & Hu 2006 Collateral (logit) Relationship (-) collateral less likely with longer banking 
relationship
lines of credit only
Total Assets (+) collateral more likely with larger firm total assets
Brick & Palia 2007 Rate Premium Collateral (+) significant if collateral is personal (e.g. co-signed)
tested only lines of credit [endogenous]
Summary of Prior Literature on Use of Collateral
 
     Farm Lending - Both loans to the small non-farm (commercial) business sector and 
loans to the small farm sector represent different forms of small business lending.  Given 
the substantial differences in the risk these firms face and the types of assets such firms 
possess, it is possible that lenders to these two sectors may view collateral in significantly 
different ways.  This may especially be true since farm businesses are characterized by 
large fixed assets in the form of land and equipment and are subject to a high degree of 
output price volatility. 
     Another important difference in loans to small businesses and loan to farms is that 
according to Walraven and Barry (2004), over 60% of farm loans are made by small 
commercial banks.  In contrast, approximately 43% of small non-farm commercial loans 
(<$100,000) are made by small commercial banks based on the November, 2008 Federal 
Reserve’s Terms of Business Lending survey.  Thus, not only are the two borrowing 
sectors, farm and non-farm, unique their primary lenders are quite different as well. 
     Walraven and Barry (2004), using data from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to 
Farmers and from call reports, examine the relationship between the effective interest rate 
charged and various price and non-price terms of lending.  They find that secured loans 
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(using collateral) have a higher effective interest rate as do loans secured by farm real 
estate.  In this case, collateral appears to be a complement to interest rates, rather than 
being a substitute. 
     Lown and Morgan (2006) examine the effects of changes in loans standards on the 
quantity of loans made.  They argue that the loan standards variable (taken from the Loan 
Officer Opinion Survey) is an approximate index for a vector of non-price lending terms.  
They show, using a VAR model, that the volume of C&I loans (commercial and 
industrial) is negatively affected by an increase in lending standards. 
3.2. Research Hypotheses  
 
     As discussed above, collateral is a common feature of bank loans that can reduce both 
the probability-of-default (PD) and the loss- given-default (LGD) to the lender and 
attempt to control asymmetric information between lender and borrower.  The empirical 
evidence regarding the role of collateral is mixed.  Given the previous mixed empirical 
findings, the following questions will be addressed in this study: 
1. What are the differences in the terms of lending between small business   
commercial loans and similar (non-real estate) loans to farmers, and how do these 
differences vary over time? 
2. In particular, how are loan risk, collateral, and interest rates related for these two 
different types of farm and non-farm borrower?  
3. How are these lending term relationships affected by the size of the lender? 
Testable Hypotheses 
     Farms typically are fixed-asset intensive because both land and equipment is required.  
As a result, it is anticipated that lenders will seek to use the more readily available and 
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easy to identify collateral for non-real estate loans to farmers. There is evidence from 
Chakraborty and Hu (2006) that more collateral is required as the size of the borrower 
(total assets) increases.  Furthermore, small banks typically lend to local and regional 
small borrowers, which may be concentrated by industry type.  This would tend to 
concentrate credit risk in smaller banks where it is more difficult to diversify their loan 
portfolio.  For example, smaller rural banks located in agricultural areas are like to have a 
loan portfolio heavily concentrated in farm loans to local borrowers. Therefore, the 
following three hypotheses are tested: 
     H1:  Collateral will be more prevalent in farm lending than in small non-farm     
     commercial loans 
 
     H2:  Small banks require more collateral than larger lenders due to their more    
     concentrated higher risk loan portfolios.  
 
H3: The importance of collateral will change over time as lenders modify their 
underwriting (credit) standards to reflect changes in external economic 
conditions and their internal risk management strategies.    
 
 
3.3. Data 
     The Federal Reserve Board conducts two quarterly surveys of the terms of lending, 
one for business (C&I) lending, and one for lending to farmers.  More formally, the 
business lending survey is named E.2 Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL), and 
the other is named E.15 Agricultural Finance Databook (AFD).  Both surveys are 
quarterly and since 1999Q4 have provided the same information with regard to summary 
loan data.  The AFD has more variables and more detailed information than is provided 
in the STBL, and in some cases has more years of data.  It is subdivided into three 
sections; A)  Amount and Characteristics of Farm Loans Made by Commercial Banks; B)  
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Selected Statistics from the Quarterly Reports of Condition of Commercial Banks; and C)  
Reserve Bank Surveys of Farm Credit Conditions and Farm Land Values.   
     For this study, six variables common to both surveys will be used.  These are 
collateral (percentage of loans secured by collateral), interest rate (effective interest rate 
charged), risk (1 to 5 loan categories where 5 is the most risky), volume (dollar volume of 
loans made), maturity (average maturity weighted by loan amount), and commitment 
(percentage made under commitment).  Both farm and non-farm surveys are subdivided 
into small and large bank (lenders) categories, so comparisons of the effects of bank size 
can be made by comparing the results of the same model for the two different size 
categories.  Likewise, comparisons between farm lending and C&I lending can be made 
using identical models with the different data sets.  Loans up to $99,000 are included in 
this study.  One additional variable from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey is used.  
It is the net percentage of domestic bank respondents that are tightening standards. (That 
is, the percent of banks that have tightening their credit standards less the percentage of 
banks that have loosened their lending standards).    
     There are two standards time series, one for small borrowers and one for large.  While 
the size of the typical borrower is not known, since this study examines loans smaller 
than $100K, it is presumed that the standards series for small borrowers would be most 
appropriate.  Regardless, as shown by Morgan and Lown (2006) the two series are highly 
correlated.  For these time series, the two series have a Pearson correlation coefficient of 
.968, which is significant at the 1% level.  For this study, the small borrower lending 
standards series will be used. 
     Although the time series is relatively short (38 quarters), this data does offer the 
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opportunity for examining effects of changes of lending terms on subsequent borrower 
behavior. All of the time series were tested for the presence of unit roots using the 
augmented Dickey Fuller procedure.  For the variables where the null hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected (5% level of significance), they are included in the model in first 
difference form.  When this is the case, either the first or second letter of the variable 
name is a “D”, indicating it is a differenced variable. Furthermore, if the first letter in a 
variable name is “F”, this indicates that the variable applies to a farm lender. If the last 
letter is an “L”, the variable applies to a large lender. 
     In Table 3-III, descriptive statistics of the AFD and STBL for the entire time series are 
provided for the common variables.  The data is provided for large farm banks, small 
farm banks, and for small and large banks.  The variables are defined as follows:   
     1) FOTCOLLAT – Non-real estate collateral as a percent of total loans.   
 
     2) DSTANDARDS – percentage of lenders increasing lending standards on a net    
      
     basis. 
 
     3) FDEXRATE – The weighted average effective interest rate of loans in excess of      
     comparable maturity treasury rate.  
     4) FRISK – weighted average loan risk rating on a scale from 1 to5, with 5 being the    
     highest risk. The risk ratings are assigned by the lender.                                                      
     5) FDVOLUME – The volume or size of the lenders total loan portfolio in billions of                 
     dollars. 
     6) FMATURE – The weighted average maturity of the loan portfolio in months 
     7) FCOMMIT – The percentage of loans made under a prior loan commitment 
     arrangement. 
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     The correlation matrices are provided in Table 3-IV.  Many of the correlations are not 
significant.  All of the correlation matrices contain two lags of the variable 
DSTANDARDS.  This is done since lags of this variable are significant in some cases in 
the panel regressions.  Further, Granger causality associated with this variable is also 
shown to be present, the results of which are presented later.  
     Even though many of the correlation coefficients are not significant, some general 
observations can be made.  For farm lenders, the use of non-real estate collateral is 
negatively correlated with maturity.  This suggests that has farm loan maturities increase, 
the use of real estate collateral increases since the use of real estate collateral and non-
real estate collateral are negatively correlated.  Also for farm lenders, the use of non-real 
estate collateral is negatively correlated with two lags of the lending standards variable, 
so as lending standards tighten, collateral is used less.   
     Risk is negatively correlated with lending standards, and lags thereof, for large banks.  
Risk is weakly and negatively correlated with standards tightening for small banks mildly 
(11% level of significant).  Furthermore, risk is not significantly correlated with changes 
in lending standards at farm lenders. 
     To begin to assess the differences between types of loans and the effects of lender size 
and type, t-tests of the differences in means were performed.  The results are provided in 
Table 3-V.  Panel A compares small and large farm lenders.  If the t-statistic has a 
positive sign, then the mean value of the variable for the small lenders is greater than that 
for the large lender.  Panel A indicates that farm lenders use non-real estate collateral in a 
similar manner.  Small farm lenders charge higher nominal rates (79.3 bps higher), make 
lower risk loans for longer periods of time,  and report lower total loan volume.  Small 
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farm lenders issue a lower proportion of loans under commitment (35% lower). 
     Panel B compares small and large non-farm commercial lenders. All six variables are 
significantly different for large and small banks (5% level).  Small commercial banks 
require more collateral, charge higher interest rates, issue lower risk loans, lend less total 
volume of loans, offer longer maturity, and issue a smaller proportion of loans under 
commitment. 
     Panel C and D analyze how lending terms differ between large commercial banks and 
large farm lenders (Panel C) and between small commercial banks and small farm lenders 
(Panel D). As indicated in Panel C, both types of lenders require similar levels of non-
real estate collateral and charge similar nominal interest rates. Commercial banks accept 
more risk on lower loan volume with higher maturities and a higher proportion of loans 
made under commitment. As reported in Panel D, small farm lenders and small non-farm 
banks charge roughly similar nominal interest rates, with small farm lenders charging 
somewhat higher rates (55.4 bps), which is significant at the 10% level. On the other 
hand, small commercial banks require more collateral, accept more risk, lend a lower 
volume, accept longer maturities, and issue a larger proportion of loans under 
commitment. 
     In summary, bank size effects are as follows: small banks charge higher nominal 
interest rates, make less risky loans, lend less total volume, lend with longer maturities, 
and conduct less lending under commitment.  These findings apply regardless of whether 
the lender is a farm lender or a bank. The effects of lender type (banks versus farm 
lenders) are summarized as follows, regardless of size:  Commercial banks accept higher 
risk, lend less total volume, offer longer maturities, and lend proportionately more under 
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commitment. 
     A. Role of Collateral - One difference between the variables in the two surveys is the 
presence of two collateral variables in the AFD data.  The value of the non-real estate 
collateral (“other” collateral) variable (OTCOLLAT) is the percentage of loans that have  
non-real estate collateral.  Even though the loans examined in this study are non-real 
estate loans, a portion of the collateral actually used to support non-real estate lending is 
based on real estate.  Given the nature of farms, it is not surprising that collateral of this 
type may be used for non-real estate loans.  A preliminary evaluation of these two forms 
of collateral reveals that they are negatively correlated.  This suggests subsequent 
analysis must use a single collateral variable due to a high degree of multi-colinearity   It 
also suggests that total collateral variable which is the sum of  real estate collateral 
(RECOLLAT) and non-real estate collateral (OTCOLLAT) may mask differing 
relationships. The correlation between the two variables is -0.87.   
     Machauer and Weber (1998) discuss the presence of “money illusion,” which is the 
tendency for interest rate risk premiums, measured over some risk free rate, to be lower 
when nominal interest rates are high and higher when nominal rates are low. To 
borrowers this procedure appears to stabilize their borrowing rates over the interest rate 
cycle. There is evidence of this rate smoothing phenomenon over the sample period as 
the correlation between the fed funds rate and the borrowers risk premium (EXRATE) is 
-0.74. 
 
3.4. Alternative Models 
     A. OLS Model  - The first model to be estimated will be of the following 
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contemporaneous form as follows: 
     COLLATERALt = α + β1STANDARDSt + β2EXRATEt +   β3MATURE +  β4RISKt +   
     β5VOLUMEt + β6COMMIT + εt                                                                                                                           (1)  
This equation will be estimated for four categories of lenders: large and small 
commercial banks and large and small farm lenders.  The presence of possible non-
stationarity in the data will be examined and corrected as necessary. Furthermore, 
Newey-West robust coefficients will be used to address the presence of autocorrelation or 
heteroskedasticity. Depending upon empirical findings, it may be appropriate to include a 
lag of the STANDARDS variable rather than its contemporaneous value. 
     B. Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) - In order to capture dynamic time-varying inter-
relationships effects among the variables a vector auto-regressive (VAR) model will be 
estimated similar to the model used by Lown and Morgan (2004). As discussed 
previously, certain prior studies consider terms of lending to be exogenous, whereas other 
research considers the terms of lending to be endogenous or jointly determined (See 
Essay 1 in this dissertation). The VAR procedure is quite flexible since it assumes that all 
the variables in the model are potentially interrelated or endogenous. 
     The VAR model will include the same variables as shown in equation (1) except that 
the right hand side will include lags of both the dependent variable and selected 
independent variables.  Thus, the VAR model is a series of equations, all of the form 
specified in equation (2), where the number of equations is equal to the number of 
variables. To illustrate, the general form of the VAR model will be as follows: 
     COLLATERALt = β0 + Σβ1iSTANDARDSt-i + Σβ2iEXRATEt-i + Σβ3iMATUREt-i +    
     Σβ4iRISKt-i + Σβ5iVOLUMEt-i + Σβ6iCOMMITt-i + Σβ7iCOLLATERALt-i + εt                (2)  
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     where Σ indicates the inclusion of lags of the variables from time t-1 to time n.   
     The number of lags (n) to be used is an empirical matter and will be based on the 
lowest values for the AIC and SIC summary statistics. The number of lags of the 
variables will be limited because of the relatively short length of the time series.  Given 
the limited number of degrees of freedom, the VAR model will be estimated using only 
those independent variables found to be statistically significant in equation (1).   
     The credit standards variable may or may not be exogeneous.  Loan and Morgan 
(2006) suggest that it represents a proxy for all non-price terms of lending. In their 
research, they find a negative relationship between credit standards and aggregate loan 
volume and assume credit standards to be exogenous. However, it may be that lenders, in 
order to properly manage their loan portfolio, may adjust underwriting standards for 
internal purposes, and not simply in response to external economic factors or monetary 
policy changes.                                                                                                                            
     C. Granger Causality - Given the expectation that tightening of lending standards will 
influence both priced and non-price terms of lending, Granger causality tests will be 
conducted to determine which variable(s) appear to precede or “cause” the other variables 
to change.  While the appropriate number of lags is an empirical matter, prior research 
suggests that no more than 4 lags should be necessary. 
 
3.5. Results 
 
     A. OLS Results - Equation (1) was first estimated using OLS for the four categories of 
lenders.  These results are provided in Table 3-VI, Panels A-D.  Six variables are used in 
each model. The credit standards variable used in each model is specified in first 
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difference form (DSTANDARDS), hence a positive value for the variable would indicate 
that credit standards are being tightened at an increasing rate. Several other independent 
variables, loan commitment (COMMMITL), interest rate risk premium (DEXRATEL), 
and loan volume (VOLUME) are also specified in first difference form as needed to 
correct for non-stationarity.     
     The dependent variable in this section is specified in levels, not in first difference 
form.  The model for Large Farm Lenders (Panel A) showed strong first-order  auto-
correlation, while the Durbin-Watson statistic for the other models was marginal at the 
5% level.  Thus, all four models include a first-order autoregressive term, AR(1), which 
proved to be highly significant in all models. In addition, all models were tested for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, using both the White and Bruesch-Pagan-Godfrey tests.  
The results, reported in the Appendix, indicate that heteroskedasticity is not present in 
any of the models.                                                                                                                                          
…..*In Panel A, the results for Large Farm Lenders are provided.   FMATURITY is                                  
significant at the 10% level and carries a negative sign.  This result is consistent with the 
previously mentioned correlation where maturity is negatively correlated with use of non-
real estate collateral.  FCOMMITL is positive and significant at the 5% level.  The credit 
standards variable is not significant.   
     The equation estimated in Panel B for small farm loans is significant at the 1% level, 
but once again the standards variable is not significant.  As with large lenders, loan 
maturity (FMATURE) is negative and statistically significant.  Risk is not significant.  
Maturity is negative and significant, as is the case for large farm lenders.  Loan volume is 
positive and significant, while the coefficient on loan commitment (FCOMMIT) is 
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negative and significant at the 5% level.  The interest rate variables, FRISK and 
FEXRATE, are not statistically significant.   
     The OLS results for large commercial banks are provided Panel C.  The overall 
regression is significant at the 1% level and loan risk (RISKL) is the only significant 
variable in the model and carries a negative coefficient.  This sign may appear 
inconsistent with expectations as it would be expected that banks would require collateral 
on riskier loans to mitigate the risk.  However, as support for this sign, the correlation 
matrix (Table 3-IV, Panel C) indicates the sign is negative and significant at the 1% level.  
An alternate explanation for the negative sign is that the loan portfolio is riskier because 
fewer loans require collateral.  This could occur when the competitive environment 
forces banks to reduce their collateral demands in order to secure the loan.  
     In Panel D, the results for small commercial banks are provided.  Loan volume is 
significant and negatively related to collateral usage. This negative relationship between 
loan volume contrasts to the positive but small coefficient reported in Panel B. This may 
be due to abundant levels of both real estate and non-real estate collateral available from 
farms borrowers. Loan commitment (DCOMMIT) is also significant at the 10% and 
negatively related to collateral usage. 
     Table 3-I provides a summary of the OLS results.  In the regression for large farm 
lenders, maturity and commitment are significant at conventional levels.  Maturity is also 
negative and significant for small farm lenders.  Commitment is significant, but 
negatively related to collateral, contrary to the findings for large farm lenders.  For small 
farm lenders, the first difference of volume is used in the analysis so the proportion of 
collateral used increases as volume increases.  Risk is the only significant variable for 
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large banks.  For small banks, higher volume is associated with a lower proportion of 
collateral in loans, suggesting looser terms of lending in periods of higher volume.  For 
both types of small lenders, the proportion of loans made under commitment is negatively 
associated with the proportion of collateral required, suggesting borrowers may benefit 
from the prior commitment regarding collateral requirements when compared to current 
lending standards.  For small farm lenders, loan maturity is negative and significant, 
consistent with the finding that non-real estate collateral is negatively related to loan 
term.  The most consistent finding is that commitment is significant in three of the four 
lender type estimations.  In general, each lender category appears to have unique, 
contemporaneous explanatory variables for the proportion of loans requiring collateral. 
 
 TABLE 3-I. – OLS Summary Results
Dependent Variable = COLLATERAL
sign (+/-) Variable Significance 
A. Large Farm Lenders:
- MATURE *
+ COMMIT **
B. Small Farm Lenders:
+ VOLUME *
- MATURE ***
- COMMIT **
C. Large Commercial Banks:
- RISK **
D. Small Commercial Banks:
- VOLUME **
- DCOMMIT *
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively
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     B. VAR Results - VAR models of the form described in equation (2) were estimated 
for each of the four lender categories and the results are provided in Table 3-II, Panels A-
D.  Because of the limited number of observations, all the VAR models include the 
collateral and standards variables, and at least two more variables having the lowest p 
value in their respective OLS regression. Furthermore, all variables with significance 
levels below 0.10 are included in the respective VAR model.   
     The VAR results for large farm lenders are provided in Panel A.  In equation (1) 
DSTANDARDS are explained by one lag of FDOTCOLLATL and one and two lags of 
FDRISKL.  Thus, as collateral is increased lending standards are subsequently loosened, 
and as loan risk increases credit standards are subsequently tightened.  In equation (2) 
none of lagged variables appear to impact FDOTCOLLATL in a significant way.  The 
strongest explanatory variable identified in equation (3) for FMATUREL is its own value 
lagged two quarters.  One lag of DSTANDARDS is also significant, suggesting that 
maturities increase in response to tightening standards.  In equation (4) the variable 
FMATUREL lagged one quarter has a positive impact on changes in loan risk 
(FDRISKL).  This suggests that as maturity increases, loan risk subsequently increases.   
     The results for small farm loans reported in Panel B in equation (1) for 
DSTANDARDS indicate that none of the explanatory variables are significant. In 
equation (2), FOTCOLLAT is explained by one lag of DSTANDARDS (negative sign) 
and two lags of FCOMMIT, which is positive and statistically significant.  In equation (3) 
FDVOLUME is explained by a one quarter lag in its own value which carries a negative 
coefficient. Thus, an increase in loan volume is followed by a subsequent decrease in 
volume.  In equation (4), FMATURE is explained by one lag of DSTANDARDS and one 
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lag of FOTCOLLAT, both with positive coefficients.  This suggests that as standards 
tighten and collateral is required more, loan maturities increase.  In equation (5), 
FCOMMIT is explained by both one and two lags of FDVOLUME, where the signs of 
both coefficients are both positive.  This indicates that as volume increases, the 
proportion of loans made under commitment increases in subsequent quarters.  
     The results for large commercial banks are provided in Panel C.  None of the lags of 
the variables are significant in explaining the DSTANDARDS in equation (1).  One lag 
of VOLUMEL is positive and significant in explaining OTCOLLAT in equation (2). As 
previously noted, VOLUMEL was not significant at conventional levels in the 
contemporaneously OLS model (Table 3-VI, Panel C.), but one lag is significant here, 
suggesting that loan volume increases lead to increased use of collateral in the following 
quarter. In equation (3), loan RISK is positively related to its own value lagged one 
period and the same is true for loan volume in equation (4).     
     The VAR results for small commercial banks are provided in Panel D.  In equation (1) 
the value of the risk premium lagged two quarters is weakly related to changes in loan 
standards two quarters later. In equation (2) the one quarter lagged value of OTCOLLAT 
is positively related to OTCOLLAT.  In equation (3) one lag of OTCOLLAT is negative 
and significant in explaining VOLUME.  This result is similar to the findings for small 
farm lenders where one lag of FOTCOLLAT is positive and significant in the 
FDVOLUME equation.  None of the lagged variables are significant in explaining risk 
premiums (DEXRATE) as indicated in equation (4), indicating once again that 
contemporaneous relationships may be more important. However, one lag of 
DSTANDARDS is significant in the DCOMMIT model, equation (5), suggesting that as 
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lending standards tighten more loans are made under commitment.  Perhaps this occurs 
because borrowers take advantage of the pre-existing loan commitment to obtain new 
loans after standards are tightened. Finally, as seen in equation (5) the percent of loan 
commitments is negatively related to its lagged value.     
     The VAR results are summarized in Table 3-II.  The VAR results present a complex 
picture of the interaction of the variables over time.  In four equations, a lag of standards 
is significant in the model.  However, only once is STANDARDS explained by a lag of 
another variable.  This result could be interpreted as evidence that standards functions 
more as an exogenous shock as opposed to a internally determined lending policy.  This 
is consistent with the Lown and Morgan (2006) view that this variable is a composite of 
non-priced terms of lending.  As shown in Table 3-II, there is not a consistent pattern of 
lagged influences, either by lender size or type.  Each seems to have its own, unique 
lagged relationships.    
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     C. Granger Causality - Given the complex lag relationships between the variables as 
evidenced by the VAR analysis, Granger causality is explored.  Table 3-VIII - Panels A-
D provides the Granger results for each of the four loan samples. Lags of 5 or more 
quarters were not found to be significance.  In many cases, two lags were sufficient to 
demonstrate a relationship.  For all analyses in this section, 4 quarterly lags are used.  
 
TABLE 3-II. – VAR Results Summary
Lender 2 Lags 1 Lag No Lag
Dependent 
Variable 
A. Large Farm Lenders:
Maturity (-) Standards (+) Const (+) MATURE
Risk (+) Risk (+) STANDARDS 
Collat (-)
Maturity (+) Const (-) RISK
B. Small Farm Lenders: 
Commit(+) Standards(-) Const(+) OTCOLLAT 
Collat (+) MATURE
Standards(+)
C. Large Commercial Banks:
Volume (+) Const (+) OTCOLLAT 
D. Small Commercial Banks:
Standards(+) COMMIT
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While analyses were conducted among all pairs of variables in the model, only the results 
indicating Granger causality at the 10% level or better are reported in Table 3-VIII.   
     Panel A provides the results for large farm lenders.  A number of significant 
relationships are shown.  The use of collateral is Granger caused by maturity, loan 
commitments, and standards.  Loan maturity is Granger caused by both risk and volume.   
Loan risk is Granger caused by the interest rate risk premium.  Credit standards is 
Granger caused by loan commitments. 
     Panel B provides the results for small farm lenders.  The use of collateral is Granger 
caused by standards and loan commitments and is somewhat similar to the case for large 
farm lenders, except that maturity is not significant.  Maturity is Granger caused by the 
interest rate premium, loan commitments, and volume.  The interest rate premium is 
Granger caused by standards and loan commitments.  Risk and Volume are Granger 
caused by maturity.  Loan commitments are Granger caused by loan volume.   
     Granger causality appears to be weaker and less prevalent among commercial banks 
compared to farm lenders.  For example for large commercial banks (Panel C), there are a 
much smaller number of significant relationships.  Lending standards Granger causes 
maturity, while loan commitments Granger cause changes in the interest rate premium, 
and loan volume Granger causes changes in loan commitments. Finally, Panel D provides 
the results for small commercial banks.  Loan commitments are Granger caused by 
collateral and credit standards.  Collateral Granger causes interest rate premiums and risk 
Granger causes Standards.  For small commercial banks, most of the relationships found 
are only weakly significant at only the 10% level.   
     Figure 3-1 provides a summary of the Granger causality results.  Many more variables 
88 
 
are shown to Granger cause other terms of lending for both sizes of farm lenders.  
Collateral is Granger caused by standards and commitments for all farms lenders.  Loan 
maturity is Granger caused by loan volume.  Risk is Granger caused by maturity for both 
as well.  As shown in Table 3-V (differences in means), the means of all variables used 
differ as a function of size for farm lenders, except collateral, where the difference is not 
significant.  But, many aspects of Granger causality are similar among farm lenders.      
     Unlike farm lenders, the picture of Granger causality is quite different for banks.  For 
each pair of variables where Granger causality is significant, the pairs differ between 
large and small banks.  The only common causal factor is standards where for large banks 
it Granger causes maturity and for small banks it Granger causes commitment.  Each 
bank type appears to have its own unique relationship with regard to Granger causality. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
     This study examines the use of non-real estate collateral for small loans (<$100,000) 
 
Variable Granger Caused By
A. Large Farm Lenders: 
OTCOLLAT Standards
Maturity
Commitment
MATURE Risk
Volume
RATE Maturity
RISK Rate
B. Small Farm Lenders: 
OTCOLLAT Commitment
Standards
MATURE Commitment
Exrate
Volume
RISK Mature
COMMITMENT Volume
EXRATE Standards
Commitment
VOLUME Maturity
C. Large Commercial Banks: 
MATURE Standards
EXRATE Commitment
COMMITMENT Volume
D. Small Commercial Banks: 
COMMIT Collateral
Standards
RATE Collateral
STANDARDS Risk
FIGURE 3.1. –  Summary of Granger Causality Results 
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in four types of lenders: large and small farm lenders and large and small banks.  The 
purpose of the research is to determine how terms of lending differ as a function of lender 
type and lender size.  Four different types of analyses were performed: 1) T-tests for 
differences in mean values over the 38 quarters of data, 2) panel regressions using OLS, 
3) vector auto-regressions (VAR), and 4) Granger causality tests.  Hypothesis H1 
proposes that collateral is used more frequently among farm loans than commercial loans, 
and was developed primarily based on the view that collateral is typically more plentiful 
in farms than other small businesses.  Based on univariate t-tests, large farm lenders do 
use more collateral than large commercial banks, but small commercial banks use 
collateral more frequently than small farm lenders.  Hence, the relationship varies by type 
of lender. 
     Hypothesis H2 proposes that small commercial banks use collateral more frequently 
than large commercial banks.  This hypothesis was developed on the basis that small 
banks would be more risk averse than their larger counterparts and would more 
frequently impose collateral requirements to reduce their risk.  Bi-variate t-tests partially 
support this hypothesis.  All farm lenders appear to use similar levels of collateral, 
whereas small banks use more collateral more frequently than large banks.  Multivariate 
analyses show that the determinants of collateral differ based on lender characteristics.     
     For non-real estate loans, farm lenders can require either real estate or other assets 
(non-real estate) to be pledged as collateral.  For all sizes of farm lenders, loan maturity is 
negative and significant in explaining the use of non-real estate collateral. Thus, the 
shorter the term of the loan, the more likely the use of non-real estate collateral. Because 
of the negative correlation between non-real estate (“other”) collateral and real estate 
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collateral, it appears that as maturities lengthen real estate is more often used as 
collateral.  Given the indefinite life of real estate, this finding is suggests that farm 
lenders match the length of loans with the longevity of the assets used for collateral. 
     Loan commitment has a somewhat consistent effect on the use of collateral among 
farm lenders.  For small farm lenders, loan commitments explains the use of collateral in 
the OLS regression and in the VAR results, two lags of commitment are also significant 
in explaining collateral usage.  Commitment is shown to Granger cause the use of non-
real estate collateral for both large and small farm lenders. These findings support the 
view that changes in the proportion of loans made under commitments affects the use of 
collateral.  One possible explanation is that as standards tighten, borrowers may be more 
inclined to exercise a prior loan commitment rather than requesting a new loan with their 
current bank or seeking a loan with a new lender.  It may also be that under these 
circumstances, current collateral requirements have become tougher, so it is preferable to 
the borrower to exercise the prior commitment.  In the small farm lender OLS analysis, 
the coefficient for commitment is negative and significant, which is consistent with this 
explanation. 
     The use of non-real estate collateral in small lenders, regardless of type, is influenced 
by contemporaneous changes in lending volume and commitment.  The sign on 
commitment is always negative, indicating that as the proportion of loans made under 
commit increase, the proportion of loans requiring collateral decreases.  However, the 
sign on volume is positive for small farm lenders but negative for small commercial 
banks, indicating a lender type difference in behavior. 
     In terms of Hypothesis H3, changes in loan credit standards over time play a role in 
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many of the relationships observed.  On a contemporaneous basis, changes in credit 
standards were not found to be significant in any of the OLS panel regressions.  In the 
VAR analysis, one-quarter lags of credit standards is significant in explaining: 1) 
maturity in the case of large farm lenders, 2) collateral and maturity for small farm 
lenders, and 3) loans commitments in small commercial banks.  Furthermore, changes in 
lending standards Granger cause collateral in both size of farm lenders, but does not 
affect the use of collateral among commercial banks. Changes in lending standards 
Granger causes maturity in large banks and loan commitment in small banks.  In total, 
changes in lending standards Granger causes five terms of lending variables.  
     Prior research where the same standards variable is used suggests it is a composite of 
non-priced terms of lending and is related to economic or monetary policy factors.  As 
such, it is viewed as an exogenous shock.  The results in this research tend to support the 
concept of standards being exogenous, since it is a significant explanatory variable in 
four models, but is explained by other variable only in one.  The Granger causality results 
also show that in only one case is standards Granger caused by another variable.  
However, standards Granger causes five other variables and appears at least once in each 
lender category. 
     Despite the evidence that standards may be exogenous, the cases where other variables 
explain standards (contemporaneously or with a time lag) are also of interest.  Loan risk 
is negative and significant in explaining collateral for large banks, but is not significant in 
any other of the OLS equations.  One and two lags of loan risk are positive and 
significant in the credit standards VAR equation for large farm lenders (Table 3-VII, 
Panel A, equation (1)).  Risk also Granger causes changes in lending standards for small 
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commercial banks.  All of these results suggest that changes in lending standards are 
made in response to changes in the risk of the loan portfolio, as would be expected of 
lenders.  In these situations, credit standards appear to be endogenous.  The fact that 
credit standards is not significant in any of the OLS results, but is often significant in the 
VAR analysis and Granger causality tests, suggests that there are time lags in the lender’s 
response to changes in credit standards.  Outstanding loan commitments may also play an 
important role since the loan terms are negotiated before the loan is made.  One lag of 
credit standards is significant in the VAR model in the loan commitment equation for 
small commercial banks.  Maturity has contemporaneous explanatory power in the use of 
collateral in both sizes of farm lenders, and in either case, as maturity increases less non-
real estate collateral is used.  On the other hand, for small banks longer maturities are 
associated with the use of more collateral.   
     These results illustrate that the use of collateral as an important term of lending is 
quite complex and varies by the type and size of the lender. Prior research reveals 
inconsistent findings regarding the use of collateral.  This research sheds some light on 
these inconsistencies because the use of collateral varies by lender type and size.  As 
noted in the comparison of farm versus non-farm lending, different types of collateral 
appear to be used differently, with real estate collateral being more used more frequently 
as loan maturities lengthen.  In summary, while this research does not completely explain 
the use of collateral, is does support the notion that it is a complex relationship that varies 
with the type of lender and the size of the lender and strongly supports the endogenous 
modeling approach employed in Essay 1.   
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TABLE 3-III. –  Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A. Large Farm Lenders 
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FDOTCOLLATL DSTANDARDS FDEXRATEL FMATUREL FDRISKL FDVOLUMEL FCOMMITL
 Mean 0.172 1.819 0.014 12.415 -0.002 4299.351 84.843
 Median 0.244 1.900 0.051 11.767 -0.008 0.000 85.153
 Maximum 5.190 21.400 0.554 16.206 0.212 116191.000 92.957
 Minimum -5.341 -27.300 -0.841 9.141 -0.188 -105635.000 73.083
 Std. Dev. 2.415 10.569 0.326 1.935 0.091 55936.610 4.023
 Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37  
 
Panel B. Small Farm Lenders 
FOTCOLLAT DSTANDARDS FDEXRATE FMATURE FRISK FVOLUME FCOMMIT
 Mean 83.752 1.819 0.052 18.283 2.410 201647.200 49.734
 Median 84.229 1.900 0.058 18.039 2.410 193814.000 50.827
 Maximum 90.949 21.400 1.353 25.054 2.535 315965.000 56.678
 Minimum 72.414 -27.300 -1.138 11.572 2.234 117463.000 33.412
 Std. Dev. 3.706 10.569 0.515 3.020 0.076 48277.800 5.433
 Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37  
 
Panel C. Large Banks 
OTCOLLATL DSTANDARDS EXRATEL MATUREL RISKL VOLUMEL DCOMMITL
 Mean 83.803 1.819 3.281 47.270 3.489 1506.892 0.089
 Median 84.100 1.900 3.340 46.000 3.500 1486.000 0.000
 Maximum 87.900 21.400 4.480 95.000 3.700 1846.000 2.100
 Minimum 78.700 -27.300 2.340 34.000 3.200 1209.000 -3.100
 Std. Dev. 2.575 10.569 0.523 10.469 0.113 173.209 1.035
 Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37  
 
Panel D. Small Banks 
OTCOLLAT DSTANDARDS DEXRATE MATURE RISK VOLUME DCOMMIT
 Mean 86.254 1.819 0.022 294.541 3.138 1275.135 0.441
 Median 86.100 1.900 -0.020 293.000 3.100 1273.000 0.100
 Maximum 90.800 21.400 0.640 409.000 3.300 1682.000 6.400
 Minimum 81.100 -27.300 -0.760 203.000 3.000 915.000 -5.700
 Std. Dev. 2.909 10.569 0.330 47.004 0.072 141.155 3.381
 Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37  
 
FOTCOLLAT – Non-real estate collateral, % of loans.  The first letter “F” indicates a farm lender, for all variables 
DSTANDARDS – percentage of lenders increasing lending standards. The prefix “D” indicates the first difference of the 
series, used because the level data has a unit root 
FDEXRATE – Interest rate of loans in excess of an appropriate treasury rate.  The “D” second letter indicates the first 
difference of the series 
FRISK – The reported loan risk (1 to 5 scale with one being the lowest risk) 
FDVOLUME – The volume of loans, in millions of dollars 
FMATURE – The maturity of the loans, in months 
FCOMMIT – The percentage of loans made under a prior commitment 
GENERAL – The first letter “F” indicates a Farm lender.  If the last letter is an “L”, it is a large lender.  A “D” as either the 
first or second letter indicates the first difference of the series, which is being used because the level data has a unit root. 
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TABLE 3-IV. – Correlation Matrices 
 
Panel A. Large Farm Lenders 
 
FDOTCOLLATL DSTANDARDS FDEXRATEL FMATUREL FDRISKL FDVOLUMEL FCOMMITL 
FDOTCOLLATL 1.000
----- 
DSTANDARDS -0.037 1.000
0.832 ----- 
FDEXRATEL 0.000 -0.051 1.000
0.999 0.773 ----- 
FMATUREL -0.357 -0.157 -0.013 1.000
0.035 0.368 0.942 ----- 
FDRISKL 0.192 -0.288 -0.451 0.019 1.000
0.269 0.094 0.007 0.915 ----- 
FDVOLUMEL -0.004 -0.356 -0.098 0.376 0.178 1.000
0.981 0.036 0.575 0.026 0.307 ----- 
FCOMMITL 0.238 -0.208 -0.107 -0.459 0.157 -0.014 1.000
0.168 0.230 0.542 0.006 0.369 0.936 -----  
 
Panel B. Small Farm Lenders 
 
FOTCOLLAT DSTANDARDS FDEXRATE FRISK FDVOLUME FMATURE FCOMMIT 
FOTCOLLAT 1.000
----- 
DSTANDARDS 0.079 1.000
0.653 ----- 
FDEXRATE 0.193 0.156 1.000
0.268 0.372 ----- 
FRISK -0.001 -0.204 0.048 1.000
0.997 0.241 0.784 ----- 
FDVOLUME 0.175 0.103 -0.034 -0.109 1.000
0.315 0.554 0.848 0.534 ----- 
FMATURE -0.494 0.015 -0.043 -0.067 0.215 1.000
0.003 0.932 0.805 0.702 0.214 ----- 
FCOMMIT -0.273 -0.276 -0.168 -0.063 -0.314 -0.188 1.000
0.113 0.109 0.334 0.719 0.067 0.279 -----  
 
Legend:  Pearson Correlation coefficient / p value 
 
 
Panel C. Large Banks 
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OTCOLLATL DSTANDARDS EXRATEL MATUREL RISKL VOLUMEL DCOMMITL 
OTCOLLATL 1.000
----- 
DSTANDARDS 0.229 1.000
0.174 ----- 
EXRATEL 0.062 0.242 1.000
0.718 0.150 ----- 
MATUREL -0.029 0.070 0.118 1.000
0.865 0.679 0.488 ----- 
RISKL -0.539 -0.320 -0.414 -0.042 1.000
0.001 0.053 0.011 0.804 ----- 
VOLUMEL 0.331 0.063 -0.417 -0.042 -0.220 1.000
0.046 0.712 0.010 0.803 0.190 ----- 
DCOMMITL 0.040 -0.127 0.128 -0.097 -0.073 -0.146 1.000
0.815 0.454 0.451 0.567 0.669 0.389 -----  
 
Panel D. Small Banks 
 
OTCOLLAT DSTANDARDS DEXRATE MATURE RISK VOLUME DCOMMIT 
OTCOLLAT 1.000
----- 
DSTANDARDS 0.091 1.000
0.591 ----- 
DEXRATE -0.191 0.167 1.000
0.258 0.323 ----- 
MATURE 0.146 0.182 0.014 1.000
0.390 0.281 0.936 ----- 
RISK -0.186 -0.293 -0.178 -0.023 1.000
0.270 0.078 0.293 0.894 ----- 
VOLUME -0.474 -0.016 0.001 0.153 0.155 1.000
0.003 0.925 0.997 0.366 0.359 ----- 
DCOMMIT -0.233 -0.215 -0.124 -0.267 0.090 -0.016 1.000
0.165 0.202 0.464 0.110 0.595 0.923 -----  
 
Legend:  Pearson Correlation coefficient / p value 
 
TABLE 3-V. – Tests of Differences in Means 
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TABLE 3-VI (A). – OLS Results - Large Farm Lenders 
 
Panel A. Farm Lenders (small - large)
VARIABLE Difference in meanst statistic p value
FOTCOLLAT -1.095 -1.247 0.217 
RATE 0.793 2.270 0.026 *
RISK -0.749 -35.186 0.000 **
VOLUME -73,067 -6.475 0.000 **
MATURE 5.902 10.253 0.000 **
COMMIT -35.339 -31.917 0.000 **
Panel B. Banks (small - large)
VARIABLE Difference in meanst statistic p value
OTCOLLAT 2.447 3.866 0.000 **
RATE 1.014 2.493 0.015 *
RISK -0.358 -16.064 0.000 **
VOLUME -219.790 -5.973 0.000 **
MATURE 246.711 31.922 0.000 **
COMMIT -14.545 -18.161 0.000 **
Panel C. Large Lenders (bank - farm)
VARIABLE Difference in meanst statistic p value
OTCOLLAT -0.888 -1.154 0.252 
RATE -0.775 -1.805 0.075 * 
RISK 0.332 13.253 0.000 **
VOLUME -275,243 -34.528 0.000 **
MATURE 34.865 20.456 0.000 **
COMMIT 5.252 7.282 0.000 **
Panel D. Small Lenders (bank - farm)
VARIABLE Difference in meanst statistic p value
OTCOLLAT 2.654 3.485 0.001 **
RATE -0.554 -1.712 0.091 * 
RISK 0.723 40.307 0.000 **
VOLUME -202,396 -25.340 0.000 **
MATURE 275.674 36.464 0.000 **
COMMIT 26.047 22.442 0.000 **
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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Dependent Variable: FOTCOLLATL   
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 10/02/09   Time: 09:32 
Sample (adjusted): 2000Q2 2009Q1   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments   
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 68.51552 10.51249 6.517535 0.0000  
DSTANDARDS -0.014441 0.029902 -0.482947 0.6329  
FDEXRATEL 0.929741 0.968974 0.959511 0.3455
FMATUREL -0.279961 0.151666 -1.845907 0.0755  
FDRISKL -0.795862 3.384479 -0.235150 0.8158  
FDVOLUME 5.01E-06 4.59E-06 1.092687 0.2838  
FCOMMITL 0.269504 0.109156 2.468971 0.0199
AR(1) 0.898823 0.074738 12.02628 0.0000  
R-squared 0.786096     Mean dependent var 85.06165  
Adjusted R-squared 0.732620     S.D. dependent var 3.865390  
S.E. of regression 1.998748    Akaike info criterion 4.416049
Sum squared resid 111.8598     Schwarz criterion 4.767942  
Log likelihood -71.48888     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.538869  
F-statistic 14.69996     Durbin-Watson stat 1.827665  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Inverted AR Roots       .90 
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TABLE 3-VI (B). – OLS Results - Small Farm Lenders 
 
Dependent Variable: FOTCOLLAT 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/01/09   Time: 11:02 
Sample (adjusted): 2000Q2 2009Q1 
Included observations: 36 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 116.4900 18.32044 6.358475 0.0000
DSTANDARDS -0.000274 0.051344 -0.005336 0.9958
FDEXRATE 0.669704 0.918775 0.728910 0.4721
FRISK -2.088728 6.856947 -0.304615 0.7629
FDVOLUME 1.66E-05 8.52E-06 1.951693 0.0610
FMATURE -0.845834 0.172966 -4.890160 0.0000
FCOMMIT -0.247296 0.101240 -2.442678 0.0211
AR(1) 0.353307 0.187369 1.885625 0.0698
R-squared 0.499484     Mean dependent var 83.70063
Adjusted R-squared 0.374355     S.D. dependent var 3.745603
S.E. of regression 2.962686     Akaike info criterion 5.203200
Sum squared resid 245.7703     Schwarz criterion 5.555093
Log likelihood -85.65760     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.326020
F-statistic 3.991756     Durbin-Watson stat 1.984707
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003818    
Inverted AR Roots       .35 
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TABLE 3-VI (C). – OLS Results - Large Banks 
 
Dependent Variable: OTCOLLATL 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/01/09   Time: 11:04 
Sample (adjusted): 2000Q2 2009Q1 
Included observations: 36 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 15 iterations  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 117.6571 15.64218 7.521781 0.0000
STANDARDS -0.018602 0.023208 -0.801527 0.4296
DEXRATEL -0.006893 0.991094 -0.006955 0.9945
RISKL -10.31678 3.932943 -2.623171 0.0139
MATUREL 0.022736 0.031261 0.727286 0.4731
VOLUMEL 0.000729 0.002375 0.306899 0.7612
DCOMMITL 0.354029 0.278361 1.271832 0.2139
AR(1) 0.523187 0.154238 3.392075 0.0021
R-squared 0.553195     Mean dependent var 83.70278
Adjusted R-squared 0.441494     S.D. dependent var 2.537545
S.E. of regression 1.896390     Akaike info criterion 4.310911
Sum squared resid 100.6962     Schwarz criterion 4.662804
Log likelihood -69.59640     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.433731
F-statistic 4.952459     Durbin-Watson stat 1.934383
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000973    
Inverted AR Roots       .52 
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TABLE 3-VI (D). – OLS Results - Small Banks 
 
Dependent Variable: OTCOLLAT 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/01/09   Time: 11:08 
Sample (adjusted): 2000Q2 2009Q1 
Included observations: 36 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 87.94629 20.14291 4.366117 0.0002
DSTANDARDS 0.027235 0.035581 0.765443 0.4504
DEXRATE -0.451871 0.990259 -0.456316 0.6517
RISK 1.552733 6.431910 0.241411 0.8110
VOLUME -0.006334 0.002907 -2.178869 0.0379
MATURE 0.005240 0.008881 0.589993 0.5599
DCOMMIT -0.171814 0.091772 -1.872179 0.0717
AR(1) 0.616081 0.152213 4.047498 0.0004
R-squared 0.547080     Mean dependent var 86.30000
Adjusted R-squared 0.433850     S.D. dependent var 2.936373
S.E. of regression 2.209413     Akaike info criterion 4.616461
Sum squared resid 136.6821     Schwarz criterion 4.968354
Log likelihood -75.09629     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.739281
F-statistic 4.831586     Durbin-Watson stat 2.285127
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001149 
Inverted AR Roots       .62 
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 Sample (adjusted): 2000Q3 2009Q1
 Included observations: 35 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & ***,**,* indicating significance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DSTANDARDS FDOTCOLLATL FMATUREL FDRISKL
DSTANDARDS(-1) -0.004 -0.031 0.056 0.001
(0.19)                   (0.04)                   (0.03)                   (0.00)                   
*
DSTANDARDS(-2) 0.136 -0.031 0.012 -0.001
(0.17)                   (0.04)                   (0.03)                   (0.00)                   
FDOTCOLLATL(-1) -2.212 -0.101 0.208 0.006
(0.81)                   (0.19)                   (0.14)                   (0.01)                   
**
FDOTCOLLATL(-2) -1.007 -0.267 0.147 0.004
(0.83)                   (0.19)                   (0.15)                   (0.01)                   
FMATUREL(-1) -0.005 0.115 0.137 0.023
(1.02)                   (0.24)                   (0.18)                   (0.01)                   
**
FMATUREL(-2) 0.246 0.401 -0.384 0
(1.12)                   (0.26)                   (0.20)                   (0.01)                   
*
FDRISKL(-1) 45.962 0.072 -4.765 -0.37
(23.71)                 (5.51)                   (4.12)                   (0.21)                   
* *
FDRISKL(-2) 47.283 -1.999 -6.54 -0.194
(23.53)                 (5.47)                   (4.09)                   (0.21)                   
*
C -0.949 -5.953 15.259 -0.289
-16.422 -3.814 -2.853 -0.143
*** *
 R-squared 0.344 0.299 0.419 0.348
 Adj. R-squared 0.142 0.083 0.24 0.147
 Sum sq. resids 2543.374 137.183 76.785 0.192
 S.E. equation 9.891 2.297 1.719 0.086
 F-statistic 1.705 1.385 2.345 1.732
 Log likelihood -124.666 -73.567 -63.412 41.39
 Akaike AIC 7.638 4.718 4.138 -1.851
 Schwarz SC 8.038 5.118 4.538 -1.451
 Mean dependent 1.366 0.26 12.414 -0.002
 S.D. dependent 10.68 2.399 1.972 0.093
TABLE 3-VII (A). – VAR Results - Large Farm Lenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3-VII (B). – VAR Results - Small Farm Lenders 
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 Sample (adjusted): 2000Q3 2009Q1
 Included observations: 35 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & ***,**,* indicating significance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DSTANDARDS FOTCOLLAT FDVOLUME FMATURE FCOMMIT
DSTANDARDS(-1) 0.024 -0.12 750.638 0.104 0.081
(0.20)                 (0.06)                 (630.55)             (0.05)                 (0.08)                 
* **
DSTANDARDS(-2) 0.099 -0.056 388.348 0.064 -0.09
(0.20)                 (0.06)                 (652.69)             (0.05)                 (0.09)                 
FOTCOLLAT(-1) -0.8 -0.008 3157.739 0.423 0.132
(0.72)                 (0.22)                 (2,298.33)          (0.19)                 (0.30)                 
**
FOTCOLLAT(-2) 0.745 0.04 -260.501 -0.042 -0.037
(0.77)                 (0.24)                 (2,449.49)          (0.20)                 (0.32)                 
FDVOLUME(-1) 0 0 -0.468 0 0
-                    -                    (0.17)                 -                    -                    
** *
FDVOLUME(-2) 0 0 -0.048 0 0
-                    -                    (0.16)                 -                    -                    
***
FMATURE(-1) -0.436 0.006 -1657.534 0.17 0.362
(1.01)                 (0.31)                 (3,215.21)          (0.26)                 (0.42)                 
FMATURE(-2) 1.537 0.332 -5110.188 -0.161 -0.295
(0.95)                 (0.29)                 (3,030.55)          (0.24)                 (0.40)                 
FCOMMIT(-1) -0.314 -0.199 -1464.61 0.154 0.279
-0.448 -0.138 -1432.24 -0.115 -0.188
FCOMMIT(-2) 0.349 0.28 1732.255 -0.075 -0.05
(0.46)                 (0.14)                 (1,470.23)          (0.12)                 (0.19)                 
*
C -16.486 70.985 -137665.3 -17.888 29.547
(94.18)               (29.08)               (300,958.00)      (24.23)               (39.41)               
**
 R-squared 0.216 0.409 0.588 0.382 0.422
 Adj. R-squared -0.11 0.162 0.416 0.125 0.182
 Sum sq. resids 3039.737 289.74 3.10E+10 201.199 532.274
 S.E. equation 11.254 3.475 35964.58 2.895 4.709
 F-statistic 0.662 1.658 3.425 1.486 1.755
 Log likelihood -127.786 -86.651 -410.22 -80.269 -97.295
 Akaike AIC 7.931 5.58 24.07 5.215 6.188
 Schwarz SC 8.419 6.069 24.559 5.704 6.677
 Mean dependent 1.366 83.67 -1269.314 18.345 49.824
 S.D. dependent 10.68 3.796 47075.89 3.095 5.206  
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 Sample (adjusted): 2000Q3 2009Q1
 Included observations: 35 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & ***,**,* indicating significance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DSTANDARDS OTCOLLATL RISKL VOLUMEL
DSTANDARDS(-1) -0.067 0.041 -0.002 -0.165
(0.20)                 (0.04)                 (0.00)                 (2.83)                 
DSTANDARDS(-2) -0.088 -0.03 -0.002 -0.801
(0.20)                 (0.04)                 (0.00)                 (2.92)                 
OTCOLLATL(-1) -0.275 0.303 0.011 3.031
(1.19)                 (0.21)                 (0.01)                 (17.21)               
OTCOLLATL(-2) 0.925 0.003 -0.002 2.281
(1.09)                 (0.19)                 (0.01)                 (15.71)               
RISKL(-1) -26.144 -5.68 0.453 69.988
(25.79)               (4.59)                 (0.21)                 (373.29)             
**
RISKL(-2) -0.669 0.466 0.213 108.04
(26.17)               (4.66)                 (0.21)                 (378.72)             
VOLUMEL(-1) 0.008 0.004 0 0.405
(0.01)                 (0.00)                 -                    (0.20)                 
* **
VOLUMEL(-2) 0.002 0.001 0 0.213
(0.01)                 (0.00)                 -                    (0.19)                 
C 26.224 68.47 0.514 -492.049
(156.47)             (27.87)               (1.28)                 (2,264.52)          
**
 R-squared 0.155 0.524 0.52 0.312
 Adj. R-squared -0.105 0.377 0.372 0.1
 Sum sq. resids 3278.288 103.983 0.219 686681.4
 S.E. equation 11.229 2 0.092 162.514
 F-statistic 0.595 3.577 3.518 1.474
 Log likelihood -129.108 -68.718 39.158 -222.638
 Akaike AIC 7.892 4.441 -1.723 13.236
 Schwarz SC 8.292 4.841 -1.323 13.636
 Mean dependent 1.366 83.629 3.489 1510.429
 S.D. dependent 10.68 2.535 0.116 171.346
 Sample (adjusted): 2000Q3 2009Q1
 Included observations: 35 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & ***,**,* indicating significance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DSTANDARDS OTCOLLAT VOLUME DEXRATE DCOMMIT
DSTANDARDS(-1) 0.142 -0.008 0.635 -0.002 0.086
(0.20)                  (0.05)                  (2.09)                  (0.01)                  (0.05)                  
*
TABLE 3-VII (C). – VAR Results - Large Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3-VII (D). – VAR Results - Small Banks 
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TABLE 3-VIII. - Granger Causality Tests 
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Panel A. Large Farm Lenders
 Null Hypothesis: F-statisticProbability
 DSTANDARDS does not Granger Cause FDOTCOLLATL 33 2.212 0.098 *
 FMATUREL does not Granger Cause FDOTCOLLATL 33 4.016 0.012 **
 FCOMMITL does not Granger Cause FDOTCOLLATL 33 3.414 0.024 **
 FDRISKL does not Granger Cause FMATUREL 33 2.900 0.043 **
 FDVOLUMEL does not Granger Cause FMATUREL 33 2.472 0.072 *
 FCOMMITL does not Granger Cause DSTANDARDS 33 2.975 0.040 **
 FMATUREL does not Granger Cause FDEXRATEL 33 2.833 0.047 **
 FDEXRATEL does not Granger Cause FDRISKL 33 3.571 0.020 **
Panel B. Small Farm Lenders
 Null Hypothesis: F-statisticProbability
 FDEXRATE does not Granger Cause FMATURE 33 3.1480 0.0325 **
 FDVOLUME does not Granger Cause FMATURE 33 2.2428 0.0944 *
 FCOMMIT does not Granger Cause FMATURE 34 2.9013 0.0422 **
 DSTANDARDS does not Granger Cause FOTCOLLAT 33 4.0612 0.0118 **
 FCOMMIT does not Granger Cause FOTCOLLAT 34 3.2831 0.0271 **
 DSTANDARDS does not Granger Cause FDEXRATE 33 2.6632 0.0571 *
 FCOMMIT does not Granger Cause FDEXRATE 33 2.7288 0.0529 *
 FMATURE does not Granger Cause FRISK 34 2.3214 0.0846 *
 FMATURE does not Granger Cause FDVOLUME 33 2.8407 0.0464 **
 FDVOLUME does not Granger Cause FCOMMIT 33 3.0765 0.0353 **
Panel C.  Large Banks
 Null Hypothesis: F-statisticProbability
 DSTANDARDS does not Granger Cause MATUREL 33 2.941 0.041 **
 DCOMMITL does not Granger Cause DEXRATEL 33 2.784 0.050 **
 VOLUMEL does not Granger Cause DCOMMITL 33 2.865 0.045 **
Panel D. Small Banks
 Null Hypothesis: F-statisticProbability
 OTCOLLAT does not Granger Cause DCOMMIT 33 2.360 0.082 *
 DSTANDARDS does not Granger Cause DCOMMIT 33 2.419 0.076 *
 OTCOLLAT does not Granger Cause DEXRATE 33 2.403 0.078 *
 RISK does not Granger Cause DSTANDARDS 33 3.069 0.036 **  
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3.8. Appendix 
 
Tests for Heteroskedasticity in OLS estimations (Table 3-IV) 
 
Panel A 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
F-statistic 2.104209     Prob. F(27,8) 0.1372 
Obs*R-squared 31.55649     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.2489 
Scaled explained SS 7.377179     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.9999 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 0.425088     Prob. F(6,29) 0.8562 
Obs*R-squared 2.910224     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.8200 
Scaled explained SS 0.680343     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.9949 
 
 
Panel B  
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 1.785376     Prob. F(6,29) 0.1372 
Obs*R-squared 9.710887     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.1374 
Scaled explained SS 10.79912     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0948 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
F-statistic 0.690679     Prob. F(27,8) 0.7775 
Obs*R-squared 25.19256     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.5637 
Scaled explained SS 28.01573     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.4102 
 
Panel C  
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 0.569453     Prob. F(6,29) 0.7512 
Obs*R-squared 3.794393     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.7045 
Scaled explained SS 2.217427     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.8987 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
F-statistic 0.505426     Prob. F(27,8) 0.9115 
Obs*R-squared 22.69531     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.7013 
Scaled explained SS 13.26304     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.9875 
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Panel D 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 0.825779     Prob. F(6,29) 0.5595 
Obs*R-squared 5.253130     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.5118 
Scaled explained SS 3.464257     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.7487 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
F-statistic 0.927748     Prob. F(27,8) 0.5927 
Obs*R-squared 27.28572     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.4485 
Scaled explained SS 17.99399     Prob. Chi-Square(27) 0.9037 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ESSAY 3:  CREDIT SCORING MODELS AS PREDICTORS OF FARM LOAN 
 
DELINQUENCY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction and Literature Review 
     Numerous authors have examined credit scoring models for bank lending to 
agricultural firms.  Zech and Pederson (2003) have found that debt-to-asset ratio is a 
strong predictor of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.  They further found that asset 
turnover and family living expenses are good predictors of farm performance.  Durguner 
and Katchova (2007) find that prior year working capital to gross farm return, debt-to-
asset ratio, and return on farm assets are the most pertinent factors explaining 
creditworthiness.  In earlier work, Splett, Barry, Dixon, and Ellinger (1994) use a 5 factor 
credit scoring model.  The five factors are Liquidity (current ratio) Solvency (Equity-
Asset ratio), Profitability (farm ROE), Repayment Capacity (capital debt-repayment 
margin), and Financial Efficiency (Net income from operations ratio).  A weight is 
applied to each factor to arrive at an overall credit score. 
     Many authors also comment about the need for credit scoring models specific to the 
type of farm and possibly even for a particular region.  However, Escalante, Barry, Park 
and Demir note that credit risk migration behavior is more influenced by macroeconomic 
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factors and that farm-level factors, including various financial ratios. 
     The Farm Financial Standards Council (FFSC), a cooperative of agricultural 
producers, lenders, and other interested parties has developed a standardized set of 16 
financial ratios for use in reporting and analysis of farms.  They are grouped in five 
categories of Liquidity, Solvency, Profitability, Repayment Capacity, and Efficiency.  
These groups are consistent with those described in Splett, et al. (1994).  
     Moody’s Investor Services, provides credit rating for both firms and the individual 
securities they issues.  In addition to their public firm credit ratings, Moody’s has 
developed a credit scoring model for private companies.  Most farms are small, privately 
owned businesses and would fall under the general category of business for whom 
Moody’s private sector credit model would apply.  A detailed description of the model is 
provided by Falkenstein (2000), although pertinent details of the specific variable 
transformations employed are not discussed.  Ten financial ratios are selected based on 
their univariate relationship between the likelihood of default and each of the nine 
predictor variables.  Moody further transforms each variable to achieve better explanatory 
power in the model.  The ten financial ratios used in their model are well defined and in 
many ways consistent with those in the FFSC group. The ratios included in their model 
are similar, but not identical to those recommended by the FFSC.  A comparison of the 
ratios used by the two organizations is provided in the table below.  As noted, both have 
measures of liquidity, solvency/capital structure, profitability, and repayment capacity.  
Moody’s model includes two other categories of trading accounts and growth, but does 
not include distinct efficiency measures. 
     Much of the prior research is conducted with farm level data but very often with data 
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from a single geographic region.  An exception to this is provided by Walraven & Barry 
(2004) who use loan level data from the national Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to 
Farms conducted by the Federal Reserve Board.  This detailed data is typically not 
publicly available; hence only aggregate information will be used in the current study.  
The focus of their research is to examine the factors which determine the interest rate 
applied to farms loans. In addition, to macro factor which impact all interest rates, several 
loan risk rating categories were included to identify whether farm loan rates are set on a 
risk-adjusted basis.  Included among the explanatory variables are five risk rating 
categories.  They show that the risk rating levels, along with other non-price loan 
characteristics, and certain bank characteristics affect interest rates.  They found loan 
delinquency rates for commercial banks during the 1997 to 2002 time period to be 5.7%, 
well above the typical delinquency rates for agricultural lenders.  In the same time period, 
non-real estate loans to agricultural firms had a combined delinquent and non-performing 
total of between 2% and 4%.  The rate for the past 5 years has been typically under 2%. 
     There is also a substantial body of research addressing transition rates from one risk 
class to another.  This line of research also uses credit rating categories to examine how 
the rating of a borrower or loan may change in risk over time.  A credit score is assigned 
based upon the data taken from the loan application. If the credit score is sufficiently 
large the loan is granted. Presumably loan risk will affect both the priced and non-price 
terms of the loans.  Lenders may then use a credit migration matrix to estimate capital 
requirements over time.  As reported in Walraven & Barry (2004), approximately 20% of 
lenders did not credit score their farm loans, while an additional 25% did not show any 
variation in their assigned risk categories.  The purpose of this research is to determine 
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which financial performance variables are associated with farms that become delinquent 
on their loans. A delinquent borrower is identified in the survey when the borrower self-
reports paying less than the amount required by their lender(s) during the year.  Credit 
scoring ratios from FFSC and Moody’s will be used in the analysis.   
     This is research unique in its examination of loan delinquency (rather than default) 
and in the use of a large, national survey of farm businesses as a data source.  Further, in 
addition to the use of financial ratios as explanatory variables, the primary hypothesis 
variables are those that capture the number of loans held by a farm and the number of 
different lenders granting those loans.  This research will also examine whether prior 
credit denial in the past 5 years explain current loan delinquency.   
     In this research, many of the financial ratios are significant in one or more estimations 
where a measure of farm delinquency is the dependent variable.  However, few are 
typically significant in any one regression model estimation.  The five categories of 
Liquidity, Solvency, Repayment Capacity, Efficiency, and Profitability seem appropriate 
for credit determination.  If a parsimonious model consisting of one measure from each 
of the five categories is used, most of the variables are typically significant.  No single 
ratio or financial measure is consistently significant.    
     The number of lenders used by a borrower, the number of loans obtained by 
borrowers, and the product of the two all appear to have explanatory power in explaining 
loan delinquency.  As the number of loans and the number of lenders increase, the 
likelihood of having a delinquent loan increases.  These factors seem to be at least as 
significant as the financial ratios in explaining loan delinquency. 
     Perhaps the most consistent finding regarding farm borrower default is that borrowers 
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who have been denied credit sometime in the past five years are more likely to have a 
delinquent loan.  In the 2007 survey, the primary data used for this analysis, no borrowers 
were denied credit in 2007, so the reported credit denials are from previous years.  The 
binary variable which captures whether a borrower has been denied credit in the past five 
years is consistently positive and significant, more so than any other independent variable 
estimated. 
     The role of multiple loans and lenders is different with regard to interest rates.  
Borrowers using more lenders have lower average interest rates.  Those with more loans 
pay higher rates.  Borrowers denied credit in the past also pay higher interest rates. 
     Using multiple lenders also appears to have an influence on the average term of loans, 
with those borrowers using more lenders having longer terms.  Average term also appears 
to be explained by the farm type, with livestock farms having longer terms.  The only 
equations estimated where prior credit denial is not a significant factor is where the loan 
term is the dependent variable.  Therefore, prior credit denial does not appear to influence 
the term of loans. 
     Performing similar analyses using the 2006 survey indicates that factors explaining 
default do change somewhat year to year.  While the same five major categories of 
financial ratios are still applicable, which ratios are significant varies somewhat year to 
year.  The same is true for the number of lenders and the number of loans.  Pooled 
regressions combining both 2006 and 2007 data is also performed.  Pooled results are 
consistent with the individual years and provide similar results.   
 
4.2. Research Questions 
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     The data, described in the next section, provides considerable detailed information 
about farms and their financial condition.  Included in the data are variables that indicate 
the amount of debt outstanding at year end, the number of loans outstanding, the number 
of lenders used for those loans, and whether any are delinquent.  There is also 
information about whether a borrower has been denied credit in the past five years, or 
whether a borrower has no new loans because credit is denied in the current year.  Based 
on this information, it is possible to segregate farms into two broad categories as 
mentioned below: 
     1. Current Borrowers: 
 a. Current on all loans  
 b. Delinquent on at least one loan  
 c. Have had trouble obtaining credit in the past  
      2. Non-Borrowers:  
 a. Don’t currently require credit; have sufficient funds 
 b. Currently unable to obtain credit  
 c. Current terms of credit are unacceptable due to high transactions cost and/or     
     collateral related risk. 
 d. Have had trouble obtaining credit in the past  
     Based on these categories of borrowers and non-borrowers, the followings research    
questions are addressed.  
     1. How are farm borrowers different than non-borrowers? That is, what operating      
characteristics determine when a farm requires external bank financing?    
     2. When a farm requires external funds, what factors determine the number of loans 
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outstanding and the number of unique banks a borrower uses to obtain credit. 
Furthermore, what influence does the number of lenders a borrower has have on the 
borrowing relationship? 
     3. How are delinquent borrowers different from non-delinquent borrowers?  In 
particular, is the number of loans outstanding from various lenders a significant factor in 
explaining the differences? 
 
Testable Hypotheses: 
     Weak liquidity, low profitability, and high leverage are likely indicators of financial 
distress for farms. Furthermore, it is possible that financial difficulties which contributed 
to the denial of credit in the past may be an indication of continued financial distress or 
financial mismanagement. However, it can also be argued that borrowers who have been 
denied credit have an incentive to reform their financial management practices to enable 
them to borrow in the future.  Furthermore, the existence of multiple outstanding loans is 
potentially another contributor toward default.  This is analogous to individual borrowers 
with numerous credit cards issued by multiple lenders who become overextended. On the 
other hand, farm borrowers using multiple lenders can possibly negotiate more favorable 
terms and can be more readily assured of obtaining credit during periods of banking 
distress. On the negative side it is also possible that using multiple lenders may diminish 
the value of the borrower’s primary banking relationship. These propositions will be 
tested as follows:  
     H1: The standard set of financial ratios proposed by both Moody’s and FFSC to       
     measure a borrower’s creditworthiness should be effective in predicting farm    
     loan delinquencies.  
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     H2: Borrowers who have had difficulty getting credit in the past are more likely     
     to be delinquent on their current loan(s).   
     
     H3: Delinquent borrowers are more likely to have a larger number of    
     outstanding loans and deal with a greater number of lenders than non-delinquent    
     borrowers.  
      
     H4: Borrowers using multiple lenders should be able to negotiate more favorable    
     lending terms such as lower effective interest rates, longer maturity loans, lower    
     collateral requirements, and have access to a larger and more stable flow of 
     credit.     
 
 
 
4.3. Data 
 
     The data used for this study is the ARMS (Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey) data, developed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
provided through the Economic Research Service (ERS).  This is a large annual survey of 
farms which includes data on farming practices as well as other operational and financial 
information.  The most recent surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008 include more 
information about farm debt and borrowing practices.  The 2005 survey contains similar 
information, but there are so few delinquent borrowers that model results from that year 
are not reported.  The information included in the survey changes over time, sometimes 
significantly.  For example, the identification of delinquent loans is not available before 
2005, so this limits the number of years available for the study of questions related to 
issues of borrower delinquency. 
     This study will primarily focus on the 2007 survey data since certain key information 
is only available in the 2007 survey.  At the same time, data from 2006 and a pooled 
model containing observations from both years will be used to demonstrate the 
robustness of the findings. The 2007 survey contains data on 18,709 farms, while 21,734 
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farms were surveyed in 2006. (The 2005 survey included 22,843 farms). The ARMS 
dataset contains the raw survey results and other variables derived from the raw data, 
such as total assets, total debt, etc.  For this analysis, the raw data and the summary 
variables were used to create variables for this analysis.  None of the raw variables were 
used directly in the regression analyses.  
     Several types of variables were developed for this analysis.  Various financial metrics 
suggested by Moody’s and FFSC to predict creditworthiness were computed.  Then, other 
variables were created to test specific research hypotheses.  Several control variables 
were also created which address such factors as farm type, legal form of the organization, 
age and education of the primary operator, and eight dummy variables representing the 
nine geographic survey regions.  A description of these variables is presented in Table  
4-I.  The ERS develops weights for the survey variables.  This is done based on the 
production value of the farms in an attempt to make the survey results as representative 
as possible.  For example, a much greater percentage of large farms are surveyed than for 
smaller farms, so the weights applied to small farms are generally larger than those for 
large farms. Table 4-II provides the un-weighted descriptive statistics for the variables 
used.  Table 4-III provides the weighted statistics of the same variables.  The effect of the 
survey weights is apparent when the total assets are examined.  Un-weighted, the mean of 
total assets are almost $2.6 million, whereas weighted, the mean is $0.845 million (note 
that the total asset value is divided by 1,000,000 for reporting convenience). Furthermore, 
the delinquent variable (DELINQYN) is an indicator variable and equals one if any loans 
outstanding at year end are delinquent.  There are 121 farms with delinquent loans in 
2007.  However, this variable using weights suggests there are 7,004 farms with 
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delinquent loans in the country.  More importantly, it is not clear that this variable will 
scale based on farm production value, as it is anticipated that farm specific factors 
unrelated to size will determine loan delinquency.  By dollar amount, there is over $71 
million (DELINQAMT) in delinquent loans.  These represented 0.5% of loans 
outstanding at year end, by dollar value. 
     For this study it is not clear that using weighed data is entirely appropriate but 
weighting procedures will be used in some of the analyses and reported in Appendix A. 
Most of the analyses will be conducted using un-weighted variables as the determinants 
of loan delinquency are expected to independent of aggregate farm sector output. At the 
same time, a size variable (total assets) will be used to control for farm size effects.  
     Examining other un-weighted variables in Table 4-II, there are a total of 7,708 loans 
made to farms (LOANSTOT#) and there are a total of 4,580 lenders identified in the 
survey (LEANDERNO).  However, these are not strictly additive, as the number of 
unique lenders involved is unknown.  The explanation for this is that this variable counts 
the number of different lenders per farm, but the variable is not formulated in a manner to 
count different lenders making loans to all farms in the survey.  By definition, the number 
of loans cannot be smaller than the number of lenders. 
     The weighted average interest rate is 6.699% (RATEWTAVG, weighted by dollar 
value).  The weighted average term of the loans is 127.4 months (TERMWTAVG). 
Most of the farms are not limited liability organizations but are typically partnerships or 
sole proprietorships.  A total of 2,704 farms are limited liability corporations (C or S 
corporations).  This represents 12.9% of the farms surveyed.  The majority of the farms 
are categorized as crop farms since 41.6% of the farms are livestock farms (FTYPE; 
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1=livestock). 
     The farms are relatively liquid with current ratios averaging almost 60, and quick 
ratios of over 34.  However, it does not appear that the current assets include large cash 
reserves as cash/assets has a mean value of 3%.  Using the weighted data, current and 
quick ratios are even higher, suggesting small farms are relatively more liquid.  Cash 
divided by assets is 1.3% using weighted data, so the smaller farms have relatively less 
cash. 
     The debt to asset ratio in the un-weighted summary is 20.2%, whereas for the 
weighted survey, it is 7.6%, suggesting small farms have relatively less debt.  Debt 
divided by equity is 14.6% un-weighted and 12.7% weighted, again supporting the view 
that smaller farms have relatively less debt.  The variable denied5yr is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if a farm has been denied credit during the past 5 years.  The total number of 
farms surveyed that had been denied credit is 183, larger than the number of currently 
delinquent borrowers.  Using survey weights, the mean of this variable is 0.6%, 
indicating that credit denial is more common in larger farms. 
     To gain further understanding of borrower and non-borrower characteristics, Table 
4-IV is provided.  Mean values for the variables are provided for borrowers and non-
borrowers.  The number of non-borrowers greatly exceeds the number of borrowers as 
there are approximately 4 non-borrowers for every borrower.  Table 4-IV also provides t-
tests of the differences between the variables for borrowers and non-borrowers.  
Borrowers are larger in total assets, have more cash (scaled by assets), turn their 
inventories more slowly, grow net income more rapidly, have higher levels of working 
capital (also a size effect), have lower operating margins but higher net income, have 
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higher capital replacement margins (also affected by size), have higher levels of interest 
expense and lower levels of net farm income.  Note that whether a farm is a borrower or 
not is based on whether debt was used to fund operations in the survey year.  Among 
control variables capturing personal characteristics, borrowers are younger and have a 
higher proportion of college education.  Livestock farms and farms organized as limited 
liability organizations have a higher proportion of borrowers versus non-borrowers.  
     Table 4-V provides correlation matrices for the variables.  Panel A contains Moody’s 
ratios and the hypothesis and control variables.  Panel B contains only the FFSC ratios.  
Many of the Moody’s ratios have low correlation coefficients with one another and they 
tend to be below 5%, with two exceptions.  ROA is correlated with liabilities over assets 
(65.6%) and net income over assets (97%).  The binary variable DELINQYN is not 
highly correlated with any of the ratio variables, and none of the correlations are 
significant.  However, the signs of the correlations coefficient are generally as expected:   
liabilities over assets is positive, and all others are negative.  The correlation between 
DELINQYN and LENDERNO is 17% and significant, and is 9.5% and significant with 
the number of loans (LOANSTOT#).  The correlation with farms reporting a prior credit 
denial (DENIED5YR) is 12% and significant. 
     There are three hypothesis variables that capture loan/lender characteristics.  They are 
the number of different lenders per farm (LENDERNO), the total number of loans per 
farm (LOANSTOT#), and LOANS*LENDERS which is the product of the previous two 
variables.  LENDERNO and LOANSTOT# are significantly correlated with a coefficient 
of 67%.  Because they are correlated to this degree, estimations will be performed with 
these two variables, individually.  The variable LOANS*LENDERS was to eliminating 
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the need to include two correlated hypothesis variables in a single estimation.    
     The weighted average interest rate (RATEWTAVG) has a negative and significant 
correlation with the number of lenders, but the correlation with the number of loans 
(LOANSTOT#) is positive, but not significant. 
     Correlations among the FFSC ratios are provided in panel B of Table 4-IV.  Many of 
the correlations among the ratios are low or not significant, with some exceptions.  Some 
of the significant correlations are size related.  For example, working capital, net income, 
and the capital replacement margin are not ratios and are therefore affected by the size of 
the farm.  The correlations among these three are all significant.  Other correlations are 
significant, such as those among operating margin, operating expense, and depreciation 
expense.  Some correlation is expected between these ratios as they are inter-related by 
definition.  The issue of multi-colinearity will be examined in more detail in the results 
section.  The FFSC ratios in most cases have multiple ratios in each general category (e.g. 
liquidity, solvency).  Therefore, many of the FFSC variables are expected to be, and are, 
correlated. 
 
4.4. Model 
     The purpose this study is to determine the factors that are associated with borrower 
delinquency, including which financial variables best explain this.  The variables to be 
used are those suggested for use by FFSC and those in the Moody’s credit scoring model 
for private firms.  The ARMS database includes a variable for each loan indicating 
whether the borrower paid the amount due, paid more than the amount due, or paid less 
than the amount due during the year.  This variable can either become a binary variable 
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DELINQYN (1=delinquent, 0 = current) or be created as a continuous variable such as 
the percent of the total dollar amount of loans outstanding which are delinquent per 
borrower (i.e., $ of loans delinquent/ $ total loans).  The two forms of the delinquency 
variable will then be used as the dependent variable in either a logistic or multiple 
regression model, where the appropriate hypothesis and control variables are included as 
explanatory variables. 
     There are a total of 121 farms with delinquent loans in the 2007 survey.  This 
represents 0.65% of the total farms in the survey and 1.83% of the loans outstanding.  
The rate of delinquency is consistent with that reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Agricultural Finance Databook.  Additional summary statistics from the 2007 ARMS 
survey regarding the sample of delinquent and non-delinquent borrowers is provided in 
the table below. All the reported ratios are lower for the delinquent farms, consistent with 
hypothesis H1.  The only unexpected result is that delinquent borrowers have a lower 
expense ratio. 
     The farms that have debt and are current on their loans represent 21.6% of all farms in 
the survey.  Approximately 78% of all farms in the survey had no debt at the end of the 
year.  Those farms are not included in the table below. 
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2007 ARMS Survey
Ratio Debt Current Delinquent Difference
Current 2.3 1.53 0.77         
Debt/Asset 17.73% 15.83% 1.90         
ROA 2.64% 1.87% 0.77         
ROE 1.61% 0.84% 0.77         
Operating Profit (ROS) 12.19% 11.03% 1.16         
Debt Coverage 2.66 2.55 0.11         
Asset Turnover 0.22 0.17 0.05         
Operating Expense 82.78% 77.84% 4.94         
Number of Obs. 2,603             103            
% of Farms 39.4% 1.56%  
 
     The following model (equation 1) will be estimated using a binary variable 
(DELINQYN) as the dependent variable.  In this case, a logistics procedure will be used.  
In addition, a continuous, but censored variable (DELINQPCT) will used as a dependent  
 
variable in a model of the same general form.  In this case, a Tobit procedure will be 
used.  The variable is censored because a large portion of the observations have a value 
of zero. 
     DELINQ = α + βnRATIOn + γmHYPOTHESISm + δpCONTROLp + ε                       (1)                         
     Where, RATIO is a vector of ‘n’ financial ratios, HYPOTHESIS is a vector of ‘m’     
     hypothesis variables and CONTROL is a vector of ‘p’ control variables for farm type,     
     location, and farmer characteristics such as age and experience.   
Individual cross sectional regressions are conducted for each of the two survey years 
used, and will also be estimated using a pooled data set.  Given the multiple borrower 
categories discussed above, it potentially is possible to perform this analysis with a 
multinomial logistic procedure.  In this case, the dependent variable would have three 
categories: good borrowers, delinquent borrowers, and denied borrowers.  However, in 
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the 2007 survey, no borrowers reported being unable to borrow when desired, so the 
multinomial logistic procedure is not feasible. 
     For each dependent variable, two regression models will be required for each year:  
one using the FFSC recommended ratios and the other using Moody’s. A comparison of 
the two models results will serve as a robustness check on the development of credit 
scoring model for farms.  Because there are multiple loan/lender variables that are 
correlated, several versions of each equation will be estimated to reduce the effects of 
multi-colinearity. 
     To test hypothesis H3, two additional models will be analyzed.  These are as follows: 
     RATEWTAVG = α + βnRATIOn + γmHYPOTHESISm + δpCONTROLp + ε             (2)      
     Where RATEWTAVG is the weighted average of the interest rate on the loans;     
     RATIO is a vector of financial ratios and metrics; HYPOTHESIS is a vector of      
     hypothesis variables, which are primarily the number of lenders and the number of    
     loans; and CONTROL is a vector of control variables. 
      
     TERMWTAVG = α + βnRATIOn + γmHYPOTHESISm + δpCONTROLp + ε            (3)   
      
     where TERMWTAVG is the weighted average of the interest rate on the loans;    
     RATIO is a vector of financial ratios and metrics; HYPOTHESIS is a vector of  
     hypothesis variables, which are primarily the number of lenders and the number of  
     loans; and CONTROL is a vector of control variables. 
      
     For the estimation of both equations (2) and (3), only borrowers (as opposed to non-
borrowers) will be included in the observations used.  Only the 2007 has the loan terms 
data sufficient to compute TERMWTAVG.  Therefore, estimations using the 2006 data 
and pooled regressions will not include equation (3). 
 
4.5. Empirical Results 
     A. Logistic Regression with DELINQYN as the Dependent Variable - Equation (1) is 
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first estimated as a logistic regression.  In Table 4-VI (A), the Moody’s ratios along with 
other control and hypothesis variables are included.  Table 4-VI (B) provides the results 
of the same model, but using the FFSC ratios.  Both use the variables in the un-weighted 
form.  In Table 4-VI (A), using the Moody’s ratios, two measures of liquidity (quick ratio 
and cash/assets) are negative and significant at the 5% level.  No other Moody’s variables 
are significant at this level.  The number of lenders is positive and significant, suggesting 
that more lenders are associated with loan delinquency, while the number of loans is not 
significant.  The interaction of loans and lenders is positive and significant at the 10% 
level.  Borrowers who were denied credit during the past 5 years are more likely to have 
delinquent loans because the binary variable DENIED5YR (credit denied in the past 5 
years) is positive and significant at the 1% level.  The variable FTYPE (farm type) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that livestock operations are less 
likely to be delinquent on loans.  The weighted average of the term of debt 
(TERMWTAVG) is negative and significant at the 10% level.   
     In Table 4-VI (B), equation (1) is estimated using the FFSC variables.  The number of 
lenders (LENDERNO) is positive and significant, while the number of loans 
(LOANSTOT# ) is not significant.  The interaction of the two (LOANS*LENDERS) is 
positive and significant at the 10% level.  One measure of solvency, the debt to asset 
ratio, (DEBTASSET) is positive and significant at the 1% level.  A measure of 
profitability, ROE is positive and significant at the 10% level. The measure of repayment 
capacity or the term debt coverage ratio, (TERMDEBTCOV) is also positive and 
significant.  Three measures of operating efficiency, asset turnover 
(ASSETTURNOVER), operating expense ratio (OPEXPRATIO), and the interest 
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expense ratio (INTEXPRATIO) are also significant.  The regression coefficient on 
ASSETTURNOVER is positive and significant, while the operating expense ratio 
(OPEXPRATIO) is negative and significant.  The coefficient on the interest expense ratio 
(INTEXPRATIO) is also negative and significant at the 10% level.  In addition, 
borrowers who have been denied credit in the past 5 years (DENIED5YR) are more 
likely to have a delinquent loan. 
     B. Parsimonious Models - Because some of the ratio variables are correlated 
(especially among the FFSC ratios) a parsimonious model with fewer independent 
variables is developed.  One variable from each of five broad financial performance 
categories (liquidity, solvency, repayment capacity, efficiency, and profitability) is 
selected. The selection is based upon which variable has the highest level of statistical 
significance from either of the two equations reported in Tables 4-VI (A) and 4-VI (B).  
The results of this parsimonious model are provided in Table 4-VII (A).  Three of the 
ratios are significant at the 1% level while (ROE) is significant at the 5% level.  The 
liquidity measure (QUICKRATIO) is not significant, nor is the inventory turns 
(INVTURNS) variable.  The solvency ratio, debt to assets (DEBTASSET) is positive and 
significant.  Surprisingly, the profitability measure, ROE is positive and significant. 
However, the mean of this ratio among borrowers is negative but positive for non-
borrowers, which may be the explanation for the sign.  The measure of repayment 
capacity (term debt coverage ratio, TERMDEBTCOV) is positive and significant.  The 
efficiency measure, asset turnover ratio, (ASSETTURNOVER) is negative and 
significant.  As in Tables 4-VI (A) and 4-VI (B), the loan term (TERMWTAVG) is 
negative and significant and the firm type (FTYPE) is negative and significant.  The 
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number of lenders (LENDERNO) is positive and significant, while the number of loans 
(LOANSTOT#) is not.  The number of lenders (LENDERNO) is positive and significant 
at the 1% level even when all three loan/lender variables are included in the same model 
(Model 4). 
     In Table 4-VII (B) the results of a Tobit regression are provided using the same 
variables of the parsimonious model estimated in Table 4-VII (A).  The dependent 
variable is DELINQPCT, the proportion of loans (by dollar amount) that are delinquent.  
As such, it might be expected that somewhat different results are obtained as compared to 
the logistic regressions.  This dependent variable is censored as it has the value of zero in 
most cases, hence the use of the Tobit procedure.  Here, the number of loans and the 
loan/lender interaction are both negative and significant at the 10% level.  This sign is 
different than in the previous logistic models and perhaps is merely an effect of the 
amount of debt and the influence on the value of the dependent variable.  A borrower 
with a small number of loans could only deal with a small number of lenders and the 
relative proportion of each loan of the total debt would be larger.  The negative sign can 
perhaps be explained when borrowers with a small number of loans also have a 
delinquent loan.  In this case, a smaller total number of loans would be associated with a 
higher percentage of delinquent loans.   
     As reported in Table 4-VII (A), borrowers who have been denied credit in the past 
(DENIED5YR) have a higher proportion of loan delinquencies.  A higher proportion of 
delinquencies is also associated with higher level of debt as the debt to asset ratio 
(DEBTASSET) is positive and significant, but at the 10% level.  ROE is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, as it is in the previous parsimonious model (Table 4-VII (A)).  
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The sign of loan term (TERMWTAVG) is actually negative, but when rounded to 3 
decimal points, the sign is lost in the rounding.  Farm type (FTYPE) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level.   All variables that are significant in the Tobit estimation 
(Table 4-VII (B)) have the same sign as those in the parsimonious logistic regress (Table 
4-VII (A)), with the exception of the loans/lender variables discussed above. 
     C. Impact of Multiple Loans on Interest Rates  -  To address hypothesis H3, which 
states that borrowers with multiple lenders will obtain lower interest rates and longer loan 
terms, two different regression models are used.  One uses RATEWTAVG (weighted 
average of the loan interest rate) as the dependent variable, and the other uses 
TERMWTAVG (weighted average of the term of the loan, in months) as the dependent 
variable.   
     Tables 4-VIII (A) and 4-VIII (B) report the results of two OLS analyses where 
RATEWTAVG (weighted average of interest rate) is the dependent variable.  Moody’s 
ratios are used in Table 4-VIII (A), and the FFSC ratios are used in Table 4-VIII (B).  In 
Table 4-VIII (A), (Moody’s ratios) the number of lenders is negative and significant at 
the 1% level, while the number of loans (LOANSTOT#) and the loan/lender 
(LOANS*LENDERS) interaction are not significant.  This is consistent with the ability 
of borrowers to use competitive forces to negotiate lower interest rates.  Borrowers that 
have been denied credit pay approximate 45 basis points higher interest rates.  Larger 
borrowers as measured by total assets pay lower interest rates.  Inventory turnover 
(INVTURNS) is positive and significant, indicating that borrowers which demonstrate 
greater efficiency in managing their inventory surprisingly pay higher interest rates.  
Perhaps this high turnover ratio is simply an indication of lower relative levels of 
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inventory which provide less security for loans.  Ceteris paribus, firms with higher 
inventory turnover will have lower levels of inventory.  Borrowers that are currently 
delinquent pay similar interest rates since DELINQYN (1 = delinquent) is not significant.  
FIXEDPCT (proportion of fixed rate debt) is negative and significant, suggesting that as 
the proportion of fixed rate debt increases, the interest rate is lower.  Since mortgage debt 
may likely be fixed rate, the ratio of fixed rate debt to total debt may increase as the ratio 
of mortgage debt to total debt increases.   
     Also reported in this table are variance inflation factors (VIF) for Model 4.  The 
Moody’s variables are not highly correlated so there is little variance inflation among 
those variables.  However, LENDERNO (number of lenders), LOANSTOT# (number of 
loans) and their interaction (LOANS*LENDERS) are highly correlated and when 
included together, show evidence of substantial variance inflation (VIF = 2.4 to 8.7).  
This suggests that it is most appropriate to use these variables individually in a regression 
model. 
     Table 4-VIII (B) provides the same model as in Table 4-VIII (A) using the FFSC 
variables.  The number of lenders (LENDERNO) is once again negative and statistically 
significant and DENIED5YR (credit denial in past 5 years) is positive and significant.  
The number of loans (LOANSTOT#) and the loan/lender interaction 
(LOANS*LENDERS) are both insignificant.  The interest expense ratio 
(INTEXPRATIO) is the only FFSC variable that is significant with a positive coefficient.  
The coefficient on FIXEDPCT is negative and significant.  The owner education variable, 
COLLEGE (1=attended college), is negative and significant at the 10% level.  The 
coefficient on total assets (TOTASSETS) is negative and significant.   
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     Once again VIF values are reported for Model 4.  Not only is there considerable 
variance inflation when all three loan/lender variables are included together, but, as 
discussed above, a number of the FFSC ratios when included together result in substantial 
multi-colinearity.  This is the reason for estimating the parsimonious models which 
includes only one variable to represent each performance category.  For these reasons no 
models with all three loan/lender variables included will be estimated. 
     D. Effect of Multiple Lenders on Interest Rates - In Tables 4-IX (A) and 4-IX (B), 
OLS regressions where TERMWTAVG (weighted average loan term) is regressed on 
hypothesis and control variables are reported.  Table 4-VIII (A) provides the results of an 
OLS estimate using the Moody’s ratios and other hypothesis and control variables.  
LENDERNO (number of lenders) is positive and significant, again suggesting that 
borrowers that use more lenders are able to get longer term loans and perhaps are using 
their bargaining power to do so.  The term of outstanding debt is not significantly 
influenced by prior delinquencies since DENIED5YR is not significant.  
LIABOVRASSETS (liabilities divided by assets) is positive and significant, suggesting 
that as total debt increases, its term increases.  CASHOVRASSETS (cash divided by 
assets) is negative and significant, suggesting that borrowers with more cash have shorter 
term debt.  DEBTSVCCOV (debt service coverage ratio) is negative and significant.  
Borrowers that are currently delinquent (DELINQYN,1 = delinquent) have shorter debt 
by approximately 21 months.  FIXEDPCT (proportion of debt that is fixed rate) is 
positive and significant, which perhaps shows the influence of mortgage debt, as 
discussed above.  LIMLIAB (limited liability legal form) is negative and significant 
indicating that this corporate form has shorter term debt.  FTYPE (farm type, 1 = 
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livestock) is positive and significant, indicating livestock farms have shorter term debt.          
     Table 4-IX (B) provides the results of the same model as Table 4-IX (A), except the 
FFSC variables replace the Moody’s variables.  All three loan/lender variables are 
positive and significant at the 5% level.  ROA (return on assets) and NETINC (pre-tax 
income) are negative and significant.  TERMDEBTCOV (term debt coverage ratio) is 
negative and significant.  Three measures of efficiency (ASSETTURNOVER [asset 
turnover], OPEXPRATIO [operating expense ratio], DEPREXPRATIO [depreciation 
expense ratio]) are all negative and significant.  INTEXPRATIO (interest expense ratio) 
is positive and significant.  As in Table 4-IX (A), FIXEDPCT (proportion of fixed rate 
debt) and FTYPE (farm type) are positive and significant and LIMLIAB (limited liability 
corporate form) is negative and significant. 
     E. 2006 Survey Results - To this point, all reported results are based on the 2007 
survey.  In 2007, there were 121 farm entities that had delinquent loans.  In the 2006 
survey, there are 179 delinquent borrowers.  Earlier surveys do not contain all the same 
information regarding loan delinquencies so the same analyses reported above cannot be 
estimated using data from the earlier years.  However, the content of the 2006 survey is 
similar to that of the 2007 survey, so similar models can be estimated using the 2006 
survey.  Most of the same models that were estimated using the 2007 survey were 
repeated using the 2006 survey data.  Rather than report all of the models analyzed, just 
the parsimonious models using the 2006 survey are provided.  The loan term data in the 
2006 survey is not available, so the TERMWTAVG (weighted average of debt term) 
variable is not present in the 2006 and in any pooled estimations.  TERMWTAVG also 
cannot be used as a dependent variable.  
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     Table 4-X (A) provides the results of a logistic regression (dependent variable is 
DELINQYN, 1 = delinquent) using the 2006 survey.  It is a parsimonious model selected 
in the same manner as the 2007 survey (one variable from each of five categories of 
financial ratios), so the included variables are similar, but not identical, to those used in 
the 2007 parsimonious model.  As in 2007, one variable from each major category is 
used.  In Table 4-X (A), the number of lenders (LENDERNO) is not significant, but the 
number of loans (LOANSTOT#) and the loan/lender interaction term 
(LOANS*LENDERS) are both positive and significant at the 5% level.  Borrowers 
previously denied credit (DENIED5YR) are more likely to be delinquent.  Variables 
measuring liquidity, solvency, and profitability are significant and have the expected 
signs.  TERMDEBTCOV (term debt coverage ratio) is positive and significant at the 10% 
level.  No other financial ratios are significant.  LIMLIAB (limited liability legal form) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating limited liability organizations are more 
likely to be delinquent. 
     Table 4-X (B) provides a parsimonious, OLS model where RATEWTAVG (weighted 
average interest rate) is the dependent variable.  Here, as in the 2007 results, the number 
of lenders (LENDERNO) is negative and significant at the 5% level.  Borrowers previous 
denied credit (DENIED5YR) pay higher interest rates.  The measure of liquidity 
(CURRENT [current ratio]) is negative and significant at the 10% level.  
LIABOVRASSETS (liabilities divided by assets) and ROA (return on assets) are both 
significant at the 1% level.  FIXEDPCT (proportion of fixed rate debt) is negative, as 
observed using 2007 data, and significant at the 1% level.  LIMLIAB (limited liability 
legal form) is negative and significant at the 10% level.   
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     F. 2006/2007 Pooled Survey Results - In order to use a larger data set, estimations 
using pooled data from 2006 and 2007 are performed.  As in the 2006 analyses, only the 
parsimonious models are reported.  Table 4-XI (A) provides the results of a logistic, 
parsimonious model where DELINQYN (1= delinquent) is the dependent variable.  The 
parsimonious model is developed in the same manner as those in 2006 and 2007.  A 
binary variable (YEAR07) which equals one if the year is 2007 is included to capture the 
effects of different years.  An interaction term (eitherYEAR07 x LENDERNO, 
LOANSTOT#, or LOANS*LENDERS) is also included.  The interaction term in any 
model is the one that uses the corresponding loan/lender term used in the model.  The 
number of loans (LOANSTOT#) and the loan/lender interaction variable 
(LOANS*LENDERS) are both significant at the 5% level.  The results from the two 
survey years differ here (LENDERNO (number of lenders is significant in the 2007 
survey and LOANSTOT# [number of loans] is significant in the 2006 survey).  Based on 
these results, borrowers that use more lenders and/or have more loans are more likely to 
be delinquent, even while controlling for the level of debt (solvency).  Borrowers denied 
credit (DENIED5YR) are more likely to be delinquent, and this variable is positive and 
significant at the 1% level.  Measures of liquidity (QUICKRATIO), solvency 
(DEBTASSET), profitability (ROA) and repayment capacity (TERMDEBTCOV) are all 
significant at the 5% level.  Farms with a limited liability legal form (LIMLIAB) are also 
more likely to be delinquent.  Livestock farms (FTYPE = 1) are less likely to be 
delinquent.   Neither the binary year variable (YEAR07) nor its interaction with the 
loan/lender variable is significant. 
     Table 4-XI (B) provides the results of an OLS estimation (dependent variable = 
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RATEWTAVG [weighted average interest rate]) and the same parsimonious model.  
Here, as in the 2006 and 2007 surveys, LENDERNO (number of lenders) is negative and 
significant, but only at the 10% level.  Borrowers previously denied credit 
(DENIED5YR) pay higher average interest rates, and this variable is significant at the 1% 
level.  Measures of liquidity (QUICKRATIO), solvency (DEBTASSET), and profitability 
(ROA) are all significant at the 1% level.  As in the individual year estimations, 
FIXEDPCT (proportion of fixed rate debt) is negative and significant.  The year binary 
variable (YEAR07) is negative and significant in Models 2 and 3, indicating lower 
average interest rates in 2007 versus 2006.  The expected sign of this variable is negative.  
Interest rates in 2006 and 2007 were quite similar.  Using weekly data for 10 year 
treasury bills, the rates in 2007 on average were higher than those in 2006.  However, 
when interest rates during the first two to three months of the two years are compared, the 
interest rates in 2007 are lower by 10 to 26 basis points.  As production loans to farms 
may often be made early in a calendar year, a negative sign for YEAR07 is not 
unexpected. 
     G. Summary of Regression Results - A summary of all regression results where the 
dependent variable is DELINQYN (delinquent = 1) is provided in Table 4-XII (A).  
Measures of solvency, repayment capacity, and profitability are consistently significant.  
Other categories of financial variables are less consistently significant.  Every group of 
models has at least one version of the loan/lender variable (LENDERNO, LOANSTOT#, 
LOANS*LENDERS) that is significant.  One of these variables is always significant. 
     Table 4-XII (B) provides a summary of the OLS regressions where RATEWTAVG 
(weighted average interest rate) is regressed on the hypothesis, ratio, and control 
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variables.  In these regressions, at least one of the financial ratio categories is significant, 
and the signs are consistent across models.  LENDERNO (number of lenders) is 
consistently negative and significant.  The number of loans (LOANSTOT#) is never 
significant, nor is the loan/lender (LOANS*LENDERS) interaction variable.  These 
results provide support for the hypothesis that borrows who use multiple lenders obtain 
lower interest rates, perhaps using the competition among lenders to obtain more 
favorable interest rates.   
     H. Analysis Using Survey Weights  - As noted earlier, survey weights are available in 
the data set.  The results provided to this point do not use the survey weights because they 
are established based on production value and there is no evidence that this factor has 
explanatory power.  However, three, parsimonious regressions using survey weights, are 
provided in Appendix A.  As in the un-weighted regressions, the number of lenders and 
number of loan variables are positive and significant in explaining loan delinquency.  A 
prior denial of credit is also positive and significant.  The financial ratios are generally 
not significant. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
     The focus of this research is on the factors associated with farm loan delinquency, the 
use of two sets of financial ratios as determinants of those delinquencies, the effect of 
multiple lenders and multiple loans on delinquencies and other terms of lending. 
     Splett, Barry, Dixon, and Ellinger (1994) find that a simple, five-ratio model is 
adequate for credit scoring of farm borrowers.  Their model includes one measure each of 
liquidity, solvency, repayment capacity, efficiency, and profitability.  The results of this 
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study find that one or more measures in each of their five categories is associated with 
loan delinquencies.  Measures of liquidity, solvency, repayment capacity, and 
profitability are typically significant.  Measures of efficiency are generally not 
significant.  The number of inventory turns is never significant.  In general, it appears that 
a select set of FFSC ratios are more suited for farms than the Moody’s ratios for small 
business, at least for explaining loan delinquency. 
     The number of loans and lenders does have explanatory power for loan delinquencies 
and loan interest rates.  In 2007, as the number of lenders increases, the likelihood of 
delinquency increases.  The number of loans is not significant.  The interaction variable 
(LOANS*LENDERS) is positive and significant at the 10% level.  However, using the 
2006 data, the number of loans and the interaction variable are both significant at the 5% 
level, while the number of lenders is not.  Pooled results using 2006 and 2007 data match 
the 2006 results.  Clearly, as the number of loans and lenders increases, the likelihood of 
delinquency increases, irrespective of the level of debt.  However, it is not entirely clear 
whether the number of loans or lenders is most influential.  The product of the two is 
significant, at least at the 10% level.   Because of the correlation between these variables, 
regressions models that include more than one of the variables are not useful. 
     Credit denial in the past five years is the most consistent explanation of current loan 
delinquencies.  A priori, it was not clear whether this variable would have a positive or 
negative sign.  One explanation is that borrowers that have had difficulty getting credit in 
the past are more likely to continue to struggle financially, so the sign should be positive.  
However, it is also possible that borrowers that have had prior credit difficulties may 
reform their behavior in order to get credit in the future.  Based on this study, prior credit 
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denial explains loan delinquencies and strongly suggests that prior credit denial is an 
important determinant of loan delinquency.  In this case, the analyses indicate that credit 
difficulties are persistent. 
     The number of lenders plays a role in the interest rate.  Farms using more lenders have 
a significantly lower average interest rate.  This is true in the 2006, 2007, and pooled 
analyses.  This finding supports the idea that borrowers are able to use competition 
among lenders to negotiate lower interest rates.  The number of loans and the loan/lender 
interaction variable are never significant when the weighted average interest rate is the 
dependent variable. 
     Using the 2007 survey data, both the number of lenders and the number of loans are 
positively associated with the average term of the debt.  All three variables are significant 
at the 5%, but only the number of lenders is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Prior credit denial is not a factor in the weighted average term of the loan.  The size of the 
farm (in total assets) is also not significant.  Measures of efficiency affect the term of the 
loan and higher levels of efficiency are associated with shorter term debt.  Limited 
liability organizations have shorter term debt.  Farms with higher liabilities, relative to 
assets, have longer term debt, perhaps because of higher level of liabilities.  The liquidity 
position of the farm does not explain the term of its debt.   
     Overall, either set of financial ratios is helpful in explaining farm borrower 
delinquencies, but many of the factors are not always significant.  When multiple 
measures in each category are used, multi-colinearity can confound the results, so simple 
models are most effective.  The five categories of liquidity, solvency, repayment 
capacity, efficiency, and profitability seem appropriate.  There are 11 financial measures 
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that are significant at least once.  At least one measure in each of the five major 
categories is significant at least once.  Difficulty with getting credit seems to be persistent 
as the most consistent explanation for loan delinquency is prior credit denial.   
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TABLE 4-I. – Variable Definitions 
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Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum
totassets 1870 2.58 6.29 48389
quickratio 1857 34.183 764.041 634877
liabovrassets 1869 0.20 8.05 377
cashovrassets 1869 0.03 0.11 55
NIovrassets 1869 0.17 6.86 325
DebtSvcCov 1177 32.813 1,183.000 386237
Invturns 1870 0.62 7.84 11714
 
 
 
TABLE 4-II. – Descriptive Statistics (un-weighted) for 2007 
 
 
 
Moody's Ratios
TOTASSETS Total assets 
QUICKRATIO Quick ratio 
LIABOVRASSETS Liabilities divided by total assets
CASHOVRASSETS Cash divided by total assets
NIOVRASSETS Net Income divided by total assets
DEBTSVCCOV Debt Service coverage ratio
INVTURNS Inventory Turns
NIGROWTH Net Income growth (1 year)
ROA Net Income divided by total assets
FFSC Ratios
CURRENT Current assets divided by current liabilities
WORKCAP Current assets less current liabilities
DEBTASSET Total debt divided by total assets
EQUITYASSET Book equity divided by total assets
DEBTEQUITY Total debt divided by book equity
ROA Net Income divided by total assets
ROE Net Income divided by book equity
OPMARGIN Operating income divided by sales
NETINC Before tax income
TERMDEBTCOV Annual after-tax cash flow divided by annual debt and least payment obligations
CAPREPLACE Dollar amount, cash flow after all debt and least payments
ASSETTURNOVER Gross revenue divided by total assets
OPEXPRATIO Operating expenses less depreciation/amortization divided by revenue 
DEPREXPRATIO Depreciation/amortization divided by revenue
INTEXPRATIO Total interest expense divided by revenue
NETFARMINCRATIO Net farm income divided by revenue
Hypothesis Variables
DELINQYN Binary - 1 if any loan is delinquent, otherwise 0
DELTOT Total number of delinquent loans
DELINQAMT Dollar amount of delinquent loans
DELINQPCT Delinqamt divided by total debt
LENDERNO Number of different lenders used
LOANNBR Number of loans detailed (4 or 5 max, depending on survey year) 
LOANSTOT# Total number of loans
FIXEDPCT Weighted average (by dollar amount) of fixed rate loans
BORROWER10 Binary - 1 if farm has debt, 0 otherwise
BORROWER123 Discrete: 1 for good borrower; 2 for delinquent borrower; 3 if denied in year
NONBORROWER Binary - 1 if farm is a non-borrower, 0 otherwise
RATEWTAVG Weighted average (by dollar amount) of interest rate
TERMWTAVG Weighted average (by dollar amount) of term of debt (in months) 
DENIED5YR Binary - 1 if farm has been denied credit in past 5 years, otherwise 0 
Control Variables
AGE Age of principal in farm, in years
COLLEGE Binary - 1 if principal in farm has attended college
LIMLIAB Binary - 1 if farm is a limited liability legal form (e.g. S or C corp.) 
FTYPE Binary - Farm type, 1=livestock, 0 = agricultural
REGIONx 8 binary variables for 9 regions
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Variable N Mean
 Std Error 
of Mean
totassets 18709 0.852 0.014
quickratio 18573 46.634 6.969
liabovrassets 18697 0.076 0.004
cashovrassets 18697 0.013 0.001
NIovrassets 18697 0.020 0.004
DebtSvcCov 11771 14.076 2.459
Invturns 18706 0.793 0.109
NIgrowth 5132 1.161 0.439
ROA 18697 -0.065 0.007
delinqyn 18709 0.003 0.001
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4-III. – Descriptive Statistics (weighted) for 2007 
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TABLE 4-IV. – Comparison of Borrowers and Non-borrowers 
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TABLE 4-V. – Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A. Moody’s Ratios 
Non-borrowerBorrower
Mean Mean difference t value p
totassets 2.245 3.776 -1.531 -11.94 0.0001 ***
quickratio 34.725 32.297 2.428 0.11 0.915 
liabovrassets 0.193 0.232 -0.039 -0.52 0.6020
cashovrassets 0.028 0.037 -0.009 -4.22 0.0001 ***
Niovrassets 0.188 0.125 0.063 0.94 0.3479
DebtSvcCov 38.844 20.991 17.853 1.06 0.2901
Invturns 0.666 0.487 0.180 2.40 0.0163 **
Nigrowth 2.471 8.074 -5.604 -3.17 0.0015 ***
Current 63.479 45.964 17.515 0.74 0.4568
workcap 0.195 0.415 -0.220 -7.42 0.0001 ***
debtasset 0.193 0.233 -0.040 -0.52 0.6020
equityasset 0.807 0.767 0.040 0.52 0.6020
debtequity 0.157 0.108 0.049 0.31 0.7567
ROA 0.104 0.091 0.013 0.21 0.8320
ROE 0.037 -1.977 2.013 1.04 0.2978
Opmargin -1.576 -0.165 -1.411 -3.22 0.0013 **
NetInc 0.132 0.280 -0.148 -6.85 0.0001 ***
Termdebtcov 20.008 19.613 0.395 0.70 0.4849
capreplace 0.164 0.265 -0.101 -4.46 0.0001 ***
Assetturnover 0.879 0.615 0.264 1.00 0.3191
Opexpratio 1.398 0.866 0.533 2.34 0.0192 **
Deprexpratio 0.089 0.114 -0.025 -1.47 0.1426
intexpratio 0.071 0.106 -0.035 -2.66 0.0079 ***
Netfarmincratio -1.647 -0.271 -1.376 -3.13 0.0017 ***
age 56.666 52.428 4.238 20.82 0.0001 ***
college 0.530 0.570 -0.040 -4.56 0.0001 ***
limliab 0.115 0.176 -0.061 -9.35 0.0001 ***
ftype 0.392 0.499 -0.107 -12.29 0.0001 ***
N (typical) 14,540 4,169
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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TABLE 4-V. – Correlation Matrix  
Panel B. FFSC Ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4-VI (A). – Logistic Regression (2007) 
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Dependent variable = delinqyn (1=delinquent) 
Moody’s Ratios, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept -3.015 -2.554 -2.567 -2.936 totassets - -0.035 -0.038 -0.041 -0.036
(0.921) (0.887) (0.886) (0.956) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
*** *** *** ***
lenderno + 0.372 0.313 ratewtavg + 0.024 0.014 0.015 0.023
(0.157) (0.225) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
**
loantot# + 0.046 0.027 termstavg ? -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.041) (0.127) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
*
loans*lenders + 0.025 0.017 fixedpct ? -0.339 -0.295 -0.298 -0.335
(0.014) (0.052) (0.269) (0.265) (0.266) (0.269)
*
quickratio - -0.112 -0.116 -0.115 -0.112 age - -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
** ** ** **
liabovrassets + -0.108 -0.129 -0.135 -0.110 limliab ? 0.291 0.279 0.292 0.295
(0.444) (0.445) (0.446) (0.449) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.304)
cashovrassets - -2.083 -2.124 -2.136 -2.091 college - -0.303 -0.280 -0.281 -0.304
(0.969) (0.952) (0.955) (0.969) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235)
** ** ** **
DebtSvcCov - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 ftype ? -0.562 -0.591 -0.581 -0.561
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.248) (0.247) (0.248) (0.249)
** ** ** **
Invturns - -0.081 -0.034 -0.038 -0.078
(0.254) (0.227) (0.231) (0.253) 8 region dummies included but not reported
Nigrowth - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 R square 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Re-scaled R squa 0.087 0.081 0.084 0.088
ROA - -0.092 -0.064 -0.065 -0.089 Likelihood Ratio 57.183 53.059 54.455 57.311
(0.293) (0.297) (0.297) (0.294) p 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
denied5yr + 1.189 1.124 1.234 1.193 Concordant 70.7 70.8 71 70.8
(0.337) (0.336) (0.335) (0.338) Discordant 26.9 26.8 26.6 26.9
*** *** *** ***  
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TABLE 4-VI (B). – Logistic Regression (2007) 
 
Dependent variable = delinqyn (1=delinquent) 
FFSC Ratios, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept -3.697 -3.339 -3.347 -3.685 ratewtavg ? 0.058 0.054 0.055 0.058
(0.829) (0.811) (0.811) (0.855) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
*** *** *** ***
Lenderno + 0.334 0.319 termwtavg ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.133) (0.199) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
*** * ** ** ** **
loantot# + 0.038 -0.002 fixedpct ? -0.313 -0.271 -0.276 -0.319
(0.037) (0.105) (0.225) (0.222) (0.222) (0.225)
loans*lenders + 0.022 0.003 age - -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.013) (0.046) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
*
denied5yr + 1.178 1.219 1.213 1.178 limliab ? 0.130 0.112 0.124 0.131
(0.28) (0.279) (0.279) (0.281) (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.265)
*** *** *** ***
Current - -0.024 -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 college - -0.373 -0.361 -0.361 -0.373
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199)
* * * *
Workcap - -0.144 -0.142 -0.148 -0.144 ftype ? -0.443 -0.480 -0.469 -0.443
(0.179) (0.176) (0.179) (0.179) (0.209) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209)
** ** ** **
debtasset + 0.955 0.953 0.955 0.954
(0.367) (0.365) (0.366) (0.369) 8 region dummies included but not reported
*** *** *** ***
debtequity + 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 R square 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) Re-scaled R square 0.109 0.104 0.106 0.109
ROA - -0.061 -0.026 -0.032 -0.062 Likelihood Ratio 98.475 93.490 94.918 98.487
(0.466) (0.47) (0.469) (0.468) p 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ROE - 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.044 Concordant 71.3 71.1 71.2 71.3
(0.026) (0.025) (0.258) (0.026) Discordant 26.8 26.9 26.7 26.7
* * * *
OpMargin + 0.542 0.554 0.549 0.541
(0.339) (0.334) (0.334) (0.339)
* *
NetInc + -0.199 -0.184 -0.194 -0.199
(0.303) (0.301) (0.309) (0.304)
TermDebtCov - 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
*** *** *** ***
Capreplace - 0.204 0.204 0.221 0.206
(0.269) (0.269) (0.274) (0.271)
Assetturnover - -0.963 -0.963 -0.965 -0.963
(0.316) (0.314) (0.315) (0.316)
*** *** *** ***
Opexpratio - 0.864 0.879 0.874 0.863
(0.407) (0.4) (0.401) (0.407)
** ** ** **
Deprexpratio - -0.594 -0.538 -0.556 -0.597
(0.911) (0.898) (0.901) (0.914)
Intexpratio - -1.095 -1.129 -1.123 -1.094
(0.619) (0.607) (0.608) (0.619)
* * * *  
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TABLE 4-VII (A). – Logistic Regression (2007) 
 
Dependent variable = delinqyn (1=delinquent) 
Parsimonious Model, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept -3.090 -2.729 -2.732 -3.106 ratewtavg - 0.042 0.037 0.038 0.042
(0.756) (0.74) (0.737) (0.785) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
*** *** *** ***
Lenderno + 0.365 0.359 termwtavg ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.132) (0.196) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
*** ** *** *** *** ***
loantot# + 0.045 0.013 fixedpct ? -0.363 -0.312 -0.316 -0.363
(0.035) (0.102) (0.224) (0.221) (0.221) (0.224)
loans*lenders + 0.023 -0.002 age - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.045) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
*
denied5yr + 1.142 1.180 1.177 1.140 limliab + 0.219 0.205 0.213 0.218
(0.277) (0.277) (0.277) (0.278) (0.256) (0.255) (0.256) (0.256)
*** *** *** ***
Quickratio - -0.044 -0.047 -0.046 -0.044 college - -0.352 -0.337 -0.337 -0.353
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.198) (0.197) (0.197) (0.198)
* * * *
debtasset + 0.861 0.849 0.848 0.854 ftype ? -0.525 -0.566 -0.554 -0.527
(0.329) (0.328) (0.328) (0.332) (0.208) (0.207) (0.208) (0.209)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
ROE - 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.039 totassets ? -0.040 -0.041 -0.043 -0.041
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0275)
** ** ** **
TermDebtCov - 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 8 region dummies included but not reported
*** *** *** ***
Assetturnover - -0.797 -0.771 -0.772 -0.796 R square 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.027
(0.274) (0.269) (0.27) (0.274) Re-scaled R square 0.099 0.093 0.095 0.099
*** *** *** ***
Invturns - -0.227 -0.179 -0.184 -0.225 Likelihood Ratio 89.039 83.339 84.844 89.084
(0.202) (0.195) (0.197) (0.202) p 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Concordant 69.7 69.6 69.9 69.9
Discordant 28.1 28.2 27.9 28.0  
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TABLE 4-VII (B). – Tobit Regression (2007) 
 
Dependent variable = delinqpct 
Parsimonious Model, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
Std Error
p value
Estimate
Std Error
p value
Estimate
Std Error
p value
Intercept 0.055 0.055 0.053 ratewtavg + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.025) (0.245) (0.024) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
** ** **
Lenderno + -0.005 termwtavg ? 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
** ** **
loantot# + -0.003 fixedpct ? -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
*
loans*lenders + -0.001 age - 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.00003)
*
denied5yr + 0.054 0.055 0.055 limliab ? -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
*** *** ***
Quickratio - 0.000 0.000 0.000 college - -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
debtasset + 0.025 0.027 0.026 ftype ? -0.021 -0.020 -0.021
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
* * * *** *** ***
ROE - 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 8 region dummies included but not reported
*** *** ***
TermDebtCov - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 AIC -1719.000 -1721.000 -1721.000
(0.000001) (0.00001) (0.000001)
Assetturnover - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Invturns - -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
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TABLE 4-VIII (A). – OLS Regression (2007) 
Dependent variable = ratewtavg 
Moody’s Ratios, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
Std Error
p value
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig. VIF
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 7.300 7.022 7.061 7.337 delinqyn + 0.1090 0.0720 0.0790 0.1050
(0.193) (0.187) (0.185) (0.203) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172)
*** *** *** ***
Lenderno - -0.198 -0.294 2.4 termwtavg + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.046) (0.069) (0.0003) (0.00003) (0.001) (0.0003)
*** *** **
loantot# - 0.009 0.013 6.0 fixedpct ? -0.259 -0.011 -0.276 -0.258
(0.014) (0.032) (0.071) (0.008) (0.071) (0.07)
*** *** ***
loans*lenders - -0.004 0.015 8.7 age - -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.016) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.003)
denied5yr + 0.476 0.439 0.450 0.466 1.0 limliab ? 0.022 0.008 0.034 0.025
(0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.083) (0.009) (0.083) (0.083)
*** *** *** ***
totassets - -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035 1.2 college - -0.070 -0.009 -0.079 -0.072
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.061) (0.007) (0.062) (0.061)
*** *** *** ***
quickratio - -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 1.1 ftype ? 0.074 -0.020 0.081 0.071
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.064) (0.007) (0.064) (0.064)
*** 0.242
liabovrassets + 0.211 0.169 0.192 0.172 1.2
(0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 8 region dummies included but not reported
*
cashovrassets - -0.179 -0.192 -0.188 -0.184 1.3 F statistic 5.050 4.310 4.310 4.970
(0.27) (0.271) (0.271) (0.269) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
DebtSvcCov + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.1 adjusted R-square 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.038
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Invturns + 0.105 0.096 0.097 0.107 1.3
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
** ** ** **
Nigrowth + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.0
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
*
ROA - 0.161 0.133 0.139 0.160 1.1
0.110 0.111 0.111 0.110  
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TABLE 4-VIII (B). – OLS Regression (2007) 
Dependent variable = ratewtavg 
FFSC Ratios, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig. VIF
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig. VIF
Intercept 7.225 7.032 7.068 7.225 termwtavg + 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 1.2
(0.183) (0.176) (0.175) (0.192) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
*** *** *** *** * *
Lenderno - -0.126 -0.189 2.5 fixedpct ? -0.283 -0.300 -0.296 -0.286 1.1
(0.044) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
loantot# - 0.019 0.033 6.3 age - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 1.1
(0.013) (0.031) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
loans*lenders - 0.001 0.004 9.1 limliab ? 0.019 0.026 0.025 0.017 1.1
(0.005) (0.016) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
denied5yr + 0.286 0.252 0.261 0.276 1.0 college - -0.108 -0.116 -0.114 -0.110 1.1
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
** ** ** ** * ** ** *
Current - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 1.1 ftype ? 0.092 0.099 0.100 0.087 1.2
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.059) (0.059) (0.0598) (0.059)
* * *
Workcap - 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.029 1.6 totassets - -0.022 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 1.6
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0056) (0.006)
*** *** *** ***
debtequity + 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.1
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 8 region dummies included but not reported
ROA - 0.143 0.102 0.117 0.122 1.4 F statistic 4.200 4.010 3.940 4.200
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROE - 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 1.1 Adj. R-squared 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.032
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
OpMargin - 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 9.8
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
NetInc - -0.060 -0.059 -0.062 -0.053 3.5
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
TermDebtCov - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Capreplace - -0.024 -0.018 -0.018 -0.024 3.1
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Assetturnover + 0.049 0.055 0.052 0.054 1.6
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Opexpratio + -0.085 -0.101 -0.095 -0.094 11.7
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
* * *
Deprexpratio - -0.048 -0.075 -0.067 -0.057 1.8
(0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125)
Intexpratio + 0.471 0.521 0.502 0.498 6.1
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
*** *** *** ***  
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TABLE 4-IX (A). – OLS Regression (2007) 
Dependent variable = termwtavg 
Moody’s Ratios, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 85.969 98.539 98.816 delinqyn ? -21.6260 -20.3440 -20.6060
(15.253) (14.667) (14.629) (11.06) (11.07) (11.074)
*** *** *** * * *
Lenderno + 9.720 ratewtavg + -1.506 -1.873 -1.821
(2.971) (1.243) (1.24) (1.24)
***
loantot# + 1.244 fixedpct ? 27.306 28.006 28.014
(0.873) (4.52) (4.519) (4.518)
*** *** ***
loans*lenders + 0.552 age ? 0.181 0.179 0.179
(0.361) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
denied5yr ? 6.790 7.868 7.769 limliab ? -18.682 -19.262 -19.138
(8.93) (8.941) (8.941) (5.309) (5.315) (5.317)
*** *** ***
totassets ? 0.328 0.289 0.309 college ? -1.194 -0.884 -0.909
(0.419) (0.424) (0.422) (3.938) (3.944) (3.944)
quickratio - -0.006 -0.024 -0.023 ftype ? 8.845 8.435 8.569
(0.2) (0.201) (0.201) (4.084) (4.089) (4.089)
** ** **
liabovrassets + 43.470 43.366 43.620
(7.73) (7.815) (7.781) 8 region dummies included but not reported
*** *** ***
cashovrassets - -51.784 -51.727 -51.777 F statistic 7.880 7.510 7.520
(17.289) (17.318) (17.317) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001
*** *** ***
DebtSvcCov - -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 Adj. R-squared 0.060 0.057 0.057
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
** ** **
Invturns ? 0.073 0.529 0.464
(2.808) (2.809) (2.809)
Nigrowth - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
ROA - -11.543 -10.647 -10.659
(7.07) (7.075) (7.074)  
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TABLE 4-IX (B). – OLS Regression (2007) 
Dependent variable  = termwtavg 
FFSC ratios, Un-weighted 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 112.430 123.784 124.427 ratewtavg + -1.524 -1.785 -1.733
(12.985) (12.544) (12.516) (1.034) (1.035) (1.034)
*** *** *** * *
Lenderno + 10.006 fixedpct ? 22.654 23.332 23.346
(2.602) (3.926) (3.928) (3.927)
*** *** *** ***
loantot# + 1.579 age ? -0.011 -0.007 -0.008
(0.764) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149)
**
loans*lenders + 0.647 limliab ? -9.222 -9.746 -9.631
(0.319) (4.574) (4.578) (4.579)
** ** ** **
denied5yr - -9.562 -8.471 -8.531 college ? -2.197 -1.943 -1.984
(7.668) (7.674) (7.676) (3.455) (3.459) (3.461)
Current - 0.131 0.125 0.123 ftype ? 7.391 6.715 6.922
(0.109) (0.11) (0.1099) (3.536) (3.539) (3.539)
** * **
Workcap - -1.238 -1.302 -1.287 totassets ? 0.249 0.220 0.243
(1.246) (1.247) (1.248) (0.332) (0.335) (0.334)
debtequity + 0.208 0.199 0.204
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 8 region dummies included but not reported
ROA - -16.943 -16.294 -16.066 F statistic 20.760 20.370 20.360
(6.964) (6.985) (6.977) p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
** ** **
ROE - -0.301 -0.310 -0.308 Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.158 0.158
(0.375) (0.375) (0.375)
OpMargin - 0.727 0.906 0.929
(0.234) (2.237) (2.236)
NetInc - -13.756 -13.362 -13.555
(2.593) (2.602) (2.598)
*** *** ***
TermDebtCov - -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
** ** **
Capreplace - 15.442 15.149 15.247
(2.366) (2.369) (2.37)
*** *** ***
Assetturnover - -31.009 -31.109 -31.139
(3.246) (3.253) (3.252)
*** *** ***
Opexpratio - -19.806 -19.656 -19.574
(3.18) (3.19) (3.188)
*** *** ***
Deprexpratio - -37.042 -36.431 -36.359
(7.392) (7.403) (7.402)
*** *** ***
Intexpratio + 116.998 116.785 116.519
(8.997) (9.031) (9.022)
*** *** ***  
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TABLE 4-X (A). – Logistic Regression (2006) 
Dependent variable = delinqyn (1=delinquent) 
Parsimonious, Un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept -12.069 -11.940 -11.924 ratewtavg + 0.078 0.078 0.079
(411) (414.6) (413.7) (0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0436)
* * *
Lenderno + 0.131 termwtavg ? -0.506 -0.511 -0.506
(0.1082) (0.1779) (0.1761) (0.1758)
*** *** ***
loantot# + 0.065 fixedpct ? -0.272 -0.290 -0.290
(0.0296) (0.1844) (0.185) (0.1852)
**
loans*lenders + 0.028 age - 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.0126) (0.007) (0.0071) (0.007)
**
denied5yr + 1.331 1.317 1.288 limliab ? 0.548 0.556 0.546
(0.215) (0.2138) (0.216) (0.192) (0.191) (0.1915)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Current - -0.053 -0.052 -0.052 college - 0.080 0.078 0.075
(0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.1711) (0.171) (0.1713)
*** *** ***
liabovrassets + 0.224 0.225 0.218 ftype ? -0.156 -0.157 -0.165
(0.1187) (0.1256) (0.1265) (0.1695) (0.1698) (0.1698)
* * *
ROA - -0.647 -0.667 -0.651 totasset ? 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.2913) (0.301) (0.301) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0088)
** ** **
TermDebtCov - 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022
(0.00124) (0.00123) (0.00124) 8 region dummies included but not reported
* * *
Deprexpratio - 0.004 0.003 0.003 R square 0.038 0.039 0.039
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0146) Re-scaled R square 0.117 0.119 0.119
Invturns - 0.1537 0.1545 0.1578 Likelihood Ratio 135.685 138.727 138.976
(0.1066) (0.1067) (0.1065) p 0.001 0.001 0.001
Concordant 72.9 72.7 72.8
Discordant 25.7 25.9 25.7  
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TABLE 4-X (B). – OLS Regression (2006) 
Dependent variable  = ratewtavg 
Parsimonious, un-weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 7.099 6.992 7.012 fixedpct ? -0.812 -0.817 -0.812
(0.2457) (0.241) (0.24) (0.0737) (0.073) (0.0737)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Lenderno - -0.097 age - -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.049) (0.00282) (0.0028) (0.00282)
**
loantot# - -0.001 limliab ? -0.144 -0.149 -0.145
(0.0166) (0.0847) (0.084) (0.0845)
* * *
loans*lenders - -0.009 college - 0.076 0.069 0.073
(0.0069) (0.0655) (0.065) (0.0655)
denied5yr + 0.620 0.581 0.609 ftype ? -0.034 -0.030 -0.031
(0.132) (0.131) (0.132) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
*** *** ***
Current - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.00194) (0.0019) (0.0019) 8 region dummies included but not reported
* * *
liabovrassets + -0.141 -0.142 -0.141 F statistic 10.640 10.460 10.540
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001
*** *** ***
ROA - 0.193 0.194 0.193 Adj. R-squared 0.059 0.059 0.059
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
*** *** ***
TermDebtCov - -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.00049) (0.00049) (0.00049)
Deprexpratio - -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.0043) (0.004) (0.004)
Invturns + -0.0624 -0.064 -0.0635
(0.0454) (0.045) (0.045)  
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TABLE 4-XI (A). – Logistic Regression (Pooled) 
Dependent variable = delinqyn (1=delinquent) 
Parsimonious, Un-weighted 
                                              
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept -12.592 -12.454 -12.452 ratewtavg + 0.064 0.062 0.063
(430) (434.8) (432.9) (0.0357) (0.0358) (0.0359)
* * *
Lenderno + 0.131 termwtavg - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.106) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009)
** * *
loantot# + 0.063 fixedpct ? -0.254 -0.246 -0.249
(0.0285) (0.14) (0.1397) (0.14)
** * * *
loans*lenders + 0.029 age - 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.0122) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
**
denied5yr + 1.311 1.317 1.294 limliab ? 0.334 0.332 0.328
(0.138) (0.1667) (0.168) (0.149) (0.149) (0.1495)
*** *** *** ** ** **
Quickratio - -0.064 -0.064 -0.063 college - -0.145 -0.142 -0.145
(0.022) (0.0223) (0.022) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
*** *** ***
debtasset + 0.156 0.152 0.150 ftype ? -0.309 -0.326 -0.326
(0.068) (0.0677) (0.0677) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
** ** ** ** *** ***
ROA - -0.394 -0.385 -0.381 Year07 - -0.301 0.023 0.004
(0.152) (0.1484) (0.147) (0.29) (0.194) (0.179)
*** *** ***
TermDebtCov - 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 lender/loans x year ? 0.208 -0.023 -0.007
(0.0001) (0.00014) (0.0001) (0.166) (0.0439) (0.017)
*** *** ***
Deprexpratio - 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0138) 8 region dummies included but not reported
Invturns - -0.0308 -0.0211 -0.02 R square 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.092) (0.089) (0.089) Re-scaled R square 0.089 0.089 0.090
totassets ? 0.002 0.001 0.001 Likelihood Ratio 184.727 182.332 184.497
(0.009) (0.0092) (0.0092) p 0.001 0.001 0.001
Concordant 69.7 69.4 69.6
Discordant 28.4 28.6 28.5  
 
 
159 
 
TABLE 4-XI (B). – OLS Regression (Pooled) 
Dependent variable  = ratewtavg 
Parsimonious, un-weighted 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 7.466 7.346 7.383 termwtavg + 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.141) (0.13) (0.128) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
*** *** ***
Lenderno - -0.076 fixedpct ? -0.542 -0.551 -0.547
(0.0453) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
* *** *** ***
loantot# - 0.002 age ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.015) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0049)
loans*lenders - -0.007 limliab ? -0.090 -0.093 -0.089
(0.006) (0.057) (0.057) (0.0569)
*
denied5yr + 0.495 0.464 0.482 college - -0.014 -0.022 -0.019
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
*** *** ***
Quickratio - -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 ftype ? 0.028 0.033 0.033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
*** *** ***
debtasset + -0.114 -0.114 -0.113 Year07 - -0.135 -0.233 -0.226
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.104) (0.072) (0.064)
*** *** *** *** ***
ROA - 0.142 0.141 0.140 lender/loans x year ? -0.054 0.014 0.007
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.065) (0.02) (0.009)
*** *** ***
TermDebtCov - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.00011) (0.0001) 8 region dummies included but not reported
Deprexpratio - -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 F statistic 12.080 11.710 11.710
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001
Invturns + -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 Adj. R-squared 0.039 0.038 0.038
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  
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TABLE 4-XII (A). – Summary of Findings: Logistic Regressions  
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TABLE 4-XII (B). – Summary of Findings: OLS Regressions 
Dependent variable = RATEWTAVG  
 
 
4.8. Appendices 
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Appendix A 
 
2007 Survey data results using survey weights 
     The majority of the analysis has been conducted using un-weighted survey data.  As 
noted, survey weights are included in the dataset in order to make better inferences for 
the country at large.  A much higher percentage of large farms are surveyed than small 
farms, so survey weights are important for this purpose.  However, for the study of loan 
delinquencies, the use of survey weights may not be appropriate.  However, in order to 
address this question, several estimations are provided in this appendix using the survey 
weights. 
     In Table 4-XIII (A), results of a parsimonious logistic regression model are provided.  
All three of the loan/lender variables are significant at the 10% level, and the number of 
loans (LOANSTOT#) and the loan/lender interaction term (LOANS*LENDERS) are 
both significant at the 1% level.  This result is generally consistent with the other findings 
that the number of lenders and number of loans have a positive and significant effect on 
the likelihood of loan delinquency.  As found previously, borrowers that had been denied 
credit during the past 5 years (DENIED5YR) are more likely to have delinquent loans.  
None of the financial ratios are significant.  Borrowers with longer maturity debt are less 
likely to have delinquent loans, a finding generally consistent with previous results.    
     In Table 4-XIII (B), the weighted average loan interest rate is regressed on a 
parsimonious group of ratios and other variables.  None of the loan/lender variables are 
significant.  Borrowers previously denied credit (DENIED5YR) pay higher interest rates, 
although this results is significant only at the 10% level.  ROE (return on equity) is 
negative and significant at the 10% level.  The only other significant variables are AGE, 
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which is positive and significant at the 10% level, and COLLEGE, which is negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  This result suggests that attending college is associated with 
average loan rates 45 basis points lower. 
     In Table 4-XIII (C), none of the loan/lender variables are significant, nor is 
DENIED5YR.  The debt-to-asset ratio (DEBTASSET) is positive and significant, 
indicating that as the total amount of debt increases, so does the term of the debt. Asset 
turnover (ASSETTURNOVER) is negative and significant.  Inventory turnover 
(INVTURNS) is also negative and significant.  As a higher proportion of loans is fixed 
rate, the average term of the debt increases.  This same result was found with un-
weighted data and is perhaps explained by borrowers for whom most of the debt is 
mortgage debt, which may especially be the case for smaller farms.  Limited liability 
organizations have shorter term debt.  This finding also is consistent with the un-
weighted analyses. 
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TABLE 4-XIII (A). – Weighted Regression Results - Weighted Logistic Regression  
(2007) 
 
Dependent variable  = delinqyn (1=delinquent) 
Parsimonious Model, weighted 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 140.808 144.271 142.213 ratewtavg + -1.482 -1.416 -1.447
(35.456) (34.977) (34.751) (2.588) (2.593) (2.592)
*** *** ***
Lenderno + 0.031 fixedpct ? 28.429 28.605 25.582
(5.938) (10.951) (10.915) (10.922)
Loantot# + -2.849 age ? -0.080 -0.075 -0.076
(2.304) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399)
Loans*lenders + -0.933 limliab ? -35.271 -34.726 -38.004
(0.815) (9.044) (9.134) (9.094)
*** *** ***
denied5yr - -10.416 -9.164 -9.717 college ? 8.627 8.708 8.667
(19.294) (19.205) (19.274) (9.629) (9.614) (9.62)
Quickratio - 0.761 0.741 0.745 ftype ? -12.537 -12.741 -12.762
(0.808) (0.807) (0.809) (10.488) (10.457) (10.468)
debtasset + 177.614 178.486 178.159
(21.569) (21.761) (21.69) 8 region dummies included but not reported
ROE - -0.870 -0.869 -0.860 F statistic 11.020 10.910 10.980
(0.94) (0.946) (0.939) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001
TermDebtCov - -0.0090 -0.0100 -0.0100 Adj. R-squared 0.239 0.240 0.239
(0.012) (0.012) (0.0122)
Assetturnover - -121.672 -120.518 -120.827
(12.093) (12.006) (12.037)
*** *** ***
Invturns - -11.804 -11.674 -11.662
(5.13) (5.033) (5.038)
** ** **  
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TABLE 4-XIII (B). – Weighted Regression Results - Weighted OLS Regression  
(2007) 
 
Dependent variable = Ratewtavg 
Parsimonious Model, weighted 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 5.964 5.917 5.965 termwtavg - 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.561) (0.533) (0.523) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
*** *** ***
Lenderno - 0.026 fixedpct ? -0.109 -0.112 -0.111
(0.118) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251)
Loantot# - 0.054 age - 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.039) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
* * *
Loans*lenders - 0.015 limliab ? 0.090 0.080 0.086
(0.0143) (0.1808) (0.178) (0.1793)
denied5yr + 0.624 0.603 0.616 college - -0.450 -0.451 -0.451
(0.334) (0.3338) (0.3336) (0.1607) (0.161) (0.161)
* * * *** *** ***
Quickratio - 0.000 0.000 0.000 ftype ? 0.127 0.130 0.129
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.167) (0.1675) (0.1675)
debtasset + 0.298 0.280 0.289
(0.436) (0.435) (0.436) 8 region dummies included but not reported
ROE - -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 F statistic 2.660 2.660 2.730
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001
* * *
TermDebtCov - -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 Adj. R-squared 0.052 0.052 0.051
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Assetturnover - 0.117 0.101 0.108
(0.2349) (0.236) (0.235)
Invturns - 0.0798 0.078 0.0787
(0.0555) (0.056) (0.0556)  
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TABLE 4-XIII (C). – Weighted Regression Results - Weighted OLS Regression  
(2007) 
 
Dependent variable = Termwtavg 
Parsimonious Model, Weighted 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Exp
sign
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Estimate
(Std Error)
sig.
Intercept 140.808 144.271 142.213 ratewtavg + -1.482 -1.416 -1.447
(35.456) (34.977) (34.751) (2.588) (2.593) (2.592)
*** *** ***
Lenderno + 0.031 fixedpct ? 28.429 28.605 25.582
(5.938) (10.951) (10.915) (10.922)
Loantot# + -2.849 age ? -0.080 -0.075 -0.076
(2.304) (0.399) (0.399) (0.399)
Loans*lenders + -0.933 limliab ? -35.271 -34.726 -38.004
(0.815) (9.044) (9.134) (9.094)
*** *** ***
denied5yr - -10.416 -9.164 -9.717 college ? 8.627 8.708 8.667
(19.294) (19.205) (19.274) (9.629) (9.614) (9.62)
Quickratio - 0.761 0.741 0.745 ftype ? -12.537 -12.741 -12.762
(0.808) (0.807) (0.809) (10.488) (10.457) (10.468)
debtasset + 177.614 178.486 178.159
(21.569) (21.761) (21.69) 8 region dummies included but not reported
ROE - -0.870 -0.869 -0.860 F statistic 11.020 10.910 10.980
(0.94) (0.946) (0.939) p value 0.001 0.001 0.001
TermDebtCov - -0.0090 -0.0100 -0.0100 Adj. R-squared 0.239 0.240 0.239
(0.012) (0.012) (0.0122)
Assetturnover - -121.672 -120.518 -120.827
(12.093) (12.006) (12.037)
*** *** ***
Invturns - -11.804 -11.674 -11.662
(5.13) (5.033) (5.038)
** ** **  
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Appendix B 
 
2007 ARMS Survey - Farm Debt Section 
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